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ABSTRACT 
 Based on fourteen months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Israel between 
2013 and 2016, this dissertation examines how clinicians and patients deal with the issues 
of cultural difference and diversity in Israel’s mental health care settings, which are 
increasingly called upon to practice “cultural competence.”  
In 2010s, the Israeli Ministry of Health started to design and execute policy 
measures intended to target inter-group health disparities and introduce cultural 
competence in health care institutions. Although modest in scope, these policies are also 
emblematic of the much larger tectonic shifts that have been reshaping Israeli society 
over the last three decades, including a neoliberal restructuring of Israeli economy and a 
decline of the secular Ashkenazi hegemony in political and cultural spheres. In this 
context, the Ministry of Health measures may be understood as a reaction of a particular 
segment of the Israeli political elite to the new realities and as an attempt to address 
mounting public anxieties, while also working within the existing neoliberal and largely 
non-pluralist political-economic framework.  
  viii 
The specific discourses of the cultural competence policies construe culture as a 
property of individual patients that individual clinicians and institutions should learn to 
accommodate, without attending to structural or political considerations. And yet, the 
actual implementation of the governmental agenda in the sphere of cultural competence 
training is almost never a mere passive reflection of the official discourses: While 
echoing some of the essentializing and implicitly hierarchical rhetoric of the official 
policies, the training also smuggles in quietly subversive approaches to cultural 
difference and recognition. The impact of this training on actual clinical practice is, 
unsurprisingly, very limited, and clinicians themselves rarely find the discourses of 
“cultural competence” resonant or relevant. At the same time, they are constantly 
engaged in complex moral reasoning and ethical decision-making over the nature and 
limits of empathy and recognition in the face of cultural alterity and political difference. 
This dissertation contributes to an interdisciplinary literature on the so-called “psy” or 
psychological disciplines (psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis etc.) by proposing an 
approach that is informed by the anthropology of ethics and morality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What is the relationship between mental health care institutions and discourses 
and the sociopolitical order? Social scientists and historians have provided wildly 
divergent opinions on the subject. Are psychiatric hospitals and clinics a microcosm of 
the larger society, where oppressive societal norms and power relations are reproduced, 
as Foucault (2006) or anti-psychiatry movement (Laing 1960; Szasz 1961) would have it? 
Or do these institutions have a dynamic of their own, wherein the rules of everyday life 
are upended and replaced with total, invasive control, as in Goffman’s (1961) haunting 
account of a mental hospital? Furthermore, are psychiatry and psychology tainted by their 
collusion with colonialist and racist regimes in Africa, Asia, the United States, and 
elsewhere (Ernst 1991; Keller 2007; Linstrum 2016; Mahone and Vaughan 2007; Metzl 
2009; Sadowsky 1999) or is the genealogy of “psy disciplines”1 more complex and 
intertwined with the rise of liberal democratic institutions and practices of subjectivation 
(Gordon 1986; Kirschner 1996; Rose 1996)? Indeed, what are we to make of the 
instances when psychiatric and psychoanalytic ideas were used to analyze and challenge 
oppressive social conditions such as colonialism (Fanon 1967; Heaton 2013)?  
A rich body of scholarship has been tracing and debating the historical 
genealogies of psy disciplines against the backdrop of the rise of democratic nation-
states, the spread of colonialism and post-colonial ruptures, and other momentous 
                                                      
1 This term, introduced by Nicholas Rose (1996) to encompass psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis, and 
psychotherapy (and I would add here, with some major qualifications, social work), is not only an apt 
shorthand, but it also encapsulates the formative role of these disciplines in the emergence of modern forms 
of subjectivity. 
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political transformations, such as the Cultural Revolution in China and its aftermath 
(DelVecchio-Good et al. 2008; Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Kleinman 1977; Kleinman 
1982a; Lee 1998). Another key question for the contemporary context is how psy 
disciplines and political processes articulate now that the discourse of “culture”, 
expressed in the idiom of “cultural competence,” is increasingly affecting health care and 
psy disciplines. In other words, what does it actually look like “on the ground” when the 
fields that were, at their core, built on the premise of universalism2 are encouraged to 
embrace and address cultural differences? In this dissertation, I flip this question around 
by inquiring, what can an analysis of institutions and actors in the mental health care field 
grappling with the problems of cultural diversity tell us about the challenges of living 
with difference? In the terms of the debate I introduced earlier, I am interested in 
exploring the relationship between the sociopolitical order and psy disciplines, 
discourses, and institutions in the contemporary moment, when the language of “culture” 
is becoming more ubiquitous and more contested.3  
I pursue this set of questions in a particular ethnographic context by analyzing 
how clinicians and patients in Israel deal with the issues of difference and diversity in 
                                                      
2 I do not mean to discount or diminish the significant differences between various schools of thought in 
psy disciplines. Indeed, just psychoanalysis alone is notorious for acrimonious debates between its 
practitioners. However, I would contend that, despite all these differences, psy practitioners generally 
assume that human subjectivity and developmental trajectory are directed by more or less universal 
principles. Most of the disagreements, then, focus on what those principles are, rather than take issue with 
the premise of universality itself. 
3 This is a particularly fascinating phenomenon for anthropologists to observe because of its sheer irony: 
While, as a discipline, anthropology has done so much to challenge the language of “race” and promote an 
appreciation of cultural diversity, in the last several decades anthropologists have been increasingly 
distancing themselves from the essentialist and reductionist models of culture (Grillo 2003; Gupta and 
Ferguson 1992; Kuper 2009), at the same time as “culturespeak” has being gaining enormous popularity in 
all spheres of public life, from business to international relations theory to nursing, and beyond 
(Breidenbach and Nyri 2011; Hannerz 1999; Wikan 1999). 
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mental health care settings that are increasingly called upon to practice “cultural 
competence.” I argue that “cultural competence” policy that was recently endorsed by the 
Israeli Ministry of Health, albeit modest in scope, is emblematic of a much larger tectonic 
shift that has been reshaping Israeli society over the last three decades. In the late 1970s, 
due to a range of factors that I will explore in the following section, cracks started 
appearing in the façade of the secular Ashkenazi hegemony that had largely defined the 
first decades of Israel’s existence. In the 1980s, this process intensified, as both the 
government’s assimilationist policies toward Jewish immigrants and exclusionary 
policies toward the Arab minority came to be increasingly contested (although not 
necessarily at the same time or by the same people). The assimilationism of the early 
decades was gradually toned down, and the rhetoric of Israel as a “mosaic” came to 
replace the pervasive “melting pot” imagery4. It is important to note that this adjusted 
approach was hardly multicultural in the ideological or normative sense, as it still 
assumed a hierarchical system wherein the dominant group provides partial recognition 
to the still subordinate minorities, although some of them are now permitted a greater 
degree of autonomy.  
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, amidst these changes, further compounded by 
the neoliberal restructuring of Israel’s economy, many Jewish Israelis started to feel that 
Israel had lost its foundational egalitarian vision and that socioeconomic and 
sociocultural cleavages were not only persisting, but growing (Shafferman 2012). It was 
                                                      
4 For just one example of the “mosaic” metaphor used in the official discourse, see the Israeli Ministry of 
Education booklet, “Israeli Mosaic: Aliyah Week in Kindergarten,” that proclaims, on its first page, that 
“the kindergarten is a reflection of Israeli society and is, as such, a rich and diverse social-cultural mosaic.” 
  
4 
during this time (mid-2000s) that Israeli Ministry of Health adopted a range of measures 
aiming to tackle health care disparities, one of which was the “cultural competence” 
policy that mandated all health care institutions to take steps toward greater cultural 
sensitivity. While some of the intentions behind this policy were, likely, benevolent, it is 
both limited in scope and – entirely unsurprisingly, given the state of affairs in 
contemporary Israel – engages in a discourse that depoliticizes the existing disparities and 
frames them as “cultural” issues rather than structural problems.  
However, the people who took charge of developing and carrying out cultural 
competence training for clinicians were hardly passive agents of the government. In fact, 
the discourses and practices of cultural competence workshops for clinicians often 
promote surprising, sophisticated, and even quietly subversive modalities of recognition. 
Even where they do echo the hierarchical assumptions and stereotypes circulating in the 
larger society, the training discourses paradoxically draw attention to the very fault lines 
that the cultural competence policy has glossed over, revealing the long-standing, salient 
rifts and power inequalities of Israeli society. 
To complicate the matters even further, the state of affairs in the clinic is different 
yet again. Few clinicians find the model of “cultural competence” very useful and they 
often have reservations about “culture-speak” in general, whether on political grounds or 
due to allegiance to a high-modernist sort of worldview, with its assumptions of linear 
progress. When “culture” is invoked, it serves as a “wild card” – a factor that accounts for 
the unaccountable. In actual clinical encounters with culturally different patients, there is 
indeed a certain elective affinity between the depoliticizing, implicitly hierarchical 
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underpinnings of culturespeak and psy discourses. At the same time, however, political 
issues are attended to and recognition does happen, but this works in non-linear and 
unexpected ways.  
My argument hinges on my engagement with several areas of literature, and I 
intend to make three theoretical interventions with my dissertation. First, I am entering a 
conversation with the interdisciplinary scholarship on recognition, multiculturalism, and 
pluralism, including its critics. I contend that medical and psychological anthropology are 
uniquely positioned to contribute to the debates in the multiculturalism literature over 
how recognition is achieved, contest, and renegotiated – especially by questioning what is 
meant by “recognition” in different contexts (Fraser 1997; Hefner 2001; Honneth 1996; 
Kymlicka 1995; Modood 2013; Parekh 2002; Shweder, Minow, and Marcus 2004; Taylor 
1992). I further argue that the critics of liberal multiculturalism (Appiah 2005; Benhabib 
2002; Brown 2006; Hale 2005; Povinelli 2002), who take the recognition paradigm to 
task for its potential to reify group boundaries, erase internal variation, and smuggle in 
implicit hierarchical notions, assume too neat a correspondence between the 
government’s agenda, the actions of the government’s agents, and the consequences for 
ordinary people. The reality may be more complex and not as overdetermined as this 
approach would have it. In the case of the clinic, it is hardly a hermetic bubble with its 
own laws, but neither is it a complete microcosm of the outside world, and the 
government’s understanding of recognition is not fully mirrored in either clinical training 
or practice, both of which allow for complex, nuanced, multiple modes of recognition. 
Second, I challenge a long-standing trope in social sciences and cultural criticism 
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that portrays psy disciplines as tools of social control or state power, employing and 
propagating discourses that individualize and de-politicize human suffering (Foucault 
2006; Goffman 1961; Szasz 1961; Lasch 1980; Rieff 1966; Turkle 1979). While these 
critiques were very important and largely apt in the 1960s and 1970s, the general 
sentiment they express does not describe the contemporary state of psy disciplines quite 
as accurately. Similarly, some recent scholarly work portrays psy discourses as a conduit 
for the models of subjectivity that have been linked to the rise of neoliberal 
governmentality5 (Binkley 2011; Brown and Baker 2012; Rimke and Brock 2012). It is 
true that psy disciplines, and psychiatry and psychology in particular, have had a troubled 
relationship with incorporating structural and societal considerations into their models. 
However, as my dissertation shows, psy practitioners can and do engage with political 
issues throughout the diagnostic and therapeutic processes, although this does not happen 
in consistent ways.  
Furthermore, it is also true that a certain – and often very strong – affinity exists 
between some of the discourses about the self found among psy practitioners and the 
models of subjectivity that have come to be identified as “neoliberal”, i.e. the ideal of the 
self-managing, responsible, efficient, and entrepreneurial subject. However, I would 
contend that this affinity is neither complete nor historically inevitable (Foster 2015), and 
that psy discourses contain multiple, contradictory potentialities. As shown by my own 
research in Israel, the studies of psy practices in the age of “managed care” (Bondi 2005; 
                                                      
5 Although this is not the focus of this dissertation, it is also important to note that the notion of “neoliberal 
subjectivity” or “neoliberal self”, while sometimes heuristically useful, may ultimately lump together 
distinct discourses that have different historical genealogies and different effects on the present. 
  
7 
Donald 2011; Robins 2001; Ware et al. 2004), and critiques penned by psy practitioners 
themselves (Cushman 2015; Layton 2014; McDonald and O’Callaghan 2008; Rustin 
2015; Samuels 2001; Sugarman 2015), psychiatrists, psychologists, psychoanalysts, and 
others often see themselves as resisting neoliberal forms of governance rather than 
upholding them. It would, therefore, be a mistake to lump all psy disciplines together or 
to assume homogeneity within them when it comes to how they imagine human 
subjectivity or draw connections between the personal and the social/political.   
Finally, I both build on and pose a challenge to the more recent developments in 
anthropological literature on psy institutions, practitioners, and discourses. In contrast to 
the early critiques that highlighted the repressive potential of psy power, many studies in 
the last three or so decades focus on its generative nature. This scholarship explores the 
new forms of subjectivity and sociality generated by the global spread of 
psychotherapeutic discourses and practices (Behrouzan 2016; Duncan 2017; Fassin and 
Rechtman 2009; Zhang 2017), the expanding use of psychopharmaceuticals (Jenkins 
2010; Meyers 2013; Schlosser and Ninneman 2012), and the deepening hold on 
neuroscientific imagery on popular imagination (Dumit 2004; Pickersgill, Cunningham-
Burley, and Martin 2011; Rose and Abi-Rached 2014). The dominant view of psy 
institutions and practitioners has also shifted, and the accounts published in the last two 
decades (Brodwin 2013; Davis 2012; Giordano 2014; Kitanaka 2008; Lloyd 2008; 
Luhrmann 2001; Saris 2008) are less sweeping and often concerned with portraying psy 
disciplines in a more sympathetic vein, as “thoroughly socialized and humanized” 
(Young 2008, 299).  
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I see my study as building on and contributing to this growing area of scholarship. 
However, a few notable and fascinating exceptions notwithstanding (Brodwin 2008; 
Brodwin 2011; Brodwin 2013), this literature has not afforded enough sustained and 
explicit attention to the complexities of both moral reasoning and ethical self-fashioning 
in psy disciplines or engaged with the ongoing “ethical turn” in anthropology at large 
(Fassin and Leze 2013; Faubion 2011; Keane 2015; Laidlaw 2014; Lambek 2010; 
Mattingly 2012; Robbins 2013; Zigon 2008), even though more and more recent 
ethnographic studies are exploring such concepts as “responsibility” (Davis 2012), 
“moral agency” (Myers 2015), or “the ethics of care” (Lester 2009).6 This is especially 
strange given that medical anthropology more generally has certainly not abstained from 
participating in the “ethical turn” – indeed, one of the most exciting and prolific figures at 
the forefront of this trend has been Cheryl Mattingly, a medical anthropologist herself 
(Mattingly 2012; Mattingly 2013; Mattingly 2014) – but  most of this engagement has 
focused on such subjects as bioethics (Banner 2014; Sharp 2014) and medical 
humanitarianism (Fassin 2012; Redfield 2013; Ticktin 2011; Willen 2011b), and less so 
on psy disciplines, where ethical deliberation and moral reasoning are so crucial and 
explicit. It is my contention that the anthropology of psy disclines can benefit from 
drawing on the theoretical and conceptual contributions of the ongoing “ethical turn”, and 
I aim to provide one – tentative and limited – example of such engagement in this 
dissertation. 
                                                      
6 Important to note here, too, is the recent work of Arthur Kleinman and his students that has also taken the 
moral/ethical idiom as its basis (Yang et al. 2007; Kleinman and Hal-Clifford 2009; Kleinman et al. 2011). 
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Nervous Conditions: Unpacking the Title 
The title of this dissertation, Nervous Conditions, was inspired by a particular set 
of words I kept encountering while in the field. The adjectives “atzbani” in Hebrew or 
“asabi” in Arabic – as well as the cognate nouns “atzbanut”/“asabiyyah” and verbs 
“lehitatzben”/ “ta’assaba” – peppered the everyday interactions of clinicians and patients 
at the two clinical fieldsites where I did my research. Both of these are derived from 
“atzav”/“asab”, meaning “nerve” in contemporary Hebrew and Arabic, respectively. To 
characterize someone as “atzbani” or “asabi” can mean that this person is high-strung, 
irritated, jumpy, stressed, or angry.7 In both languages, this idiom of distress (Nichter 
1981) is ambiguous and polyvalent, allowing for vastly different uses that can, with equal 
ease, link “nervous agitation” to marital conflict, stressful work situation, or experiences 
of discrimination.8 
While I was not aware of Tsitsi Dangarembga’s eponymous 1988 novel, Nervous 
                                                      
7 The Arabic “asabi” has been borrowed by many non-Arabic-speaking Muslim peoples in the Middle East 
and is used, with very similar meanings, among Persian, Dari, Kurdish, and Turkish speakers in 
Afghanistan (Miller et al. 2006), Iran (Dejman et al. 2011), and Turkey (Arzu Wasti 2008).  
8 The term “asabiyyah” might be familiar to the reader from the work of Ibn Khaldun, a prominent 
medieval Arab historian (1332-1402). In his best-known work, Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun uses the concept 
of asabiyyah to describe a sort of group feeling that is based on a belief in common descent/kinship. 
Asabiyyah promotes social solidarity, cohesion, and loyalty in a group. According to Ibn Khaldun, state 
formation is a cyclical phenomenon wherein tribal, nomadic groups, powered by asabiyyah, would conquer 
a sedentary civilization and adopt an urban way of life. Gradually and unavoidably, they would lose their 
original sense of asabiyyah, and their urban society would become vunerable to a new wave of conquerors, 
starting the cycle anew. On a superficial level, it might appear that “asabiyyah” in Ibn Khaldun’s 
understanding has nothing to do with the concept of “asabiyyah” I am describing here. However, both go 
back to the same three-letter root, ‘asab. While in contemporary Arabic “asab” means “nerve”, in classical 
Arabic it had a broader meaning, sometimes referring to ligaments, as well. The verb “asaba” could mean 
“to bind” – hence, “asabiyyah” as a feeling of solidarity that binds a group together. 
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Conditions, until very recently, on some level my research does resonate with the thrust 
of her work. This semiautobiographical novel explores the “nervous conditions” of 
colonial Rhodesia, connecting the inner turmoil and struggles of its several female 
protagonists to the social and political shifts underway in Zimbabwean society on the 
brink of independence. While I do not specifically focus on gender or employ a 
postcolonial paradigm, my title is meant to convey the interrelatedness of subjective 
experiences, clinical categories used to make sense of these experiences, and the larger 
societal structures and processes. 
 
Why Israel? Situating the Israeli Case Historically 
 A major assumption that I am making in this dissertation is that Israel is not just 
one possible location to investigate the politico-therapeutic juncture in the times of 
culturespeak, but that it is one of the best locations to do so. It is in Israel that the 
contradictions of the cultural competence movement and, more broadly, the “culturalist” 
language are manifested particularly sharply, because the Israeli nation-building project 
is so relatively recent, and the tensions between universalism and particularism – as well 
as inclusion and marginalization – are ever-present.  
To situate the micro-level clinical interactions that most of this dissertation 
focuses on are historically, I devote the rest of the section to a brief overview of some of 
the long-standing categories, stereotypes, and images evoked in these clinical dramas. 
Instead of striving to provide a comprehensive overview of Israeli history, which is an 
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inherently fraught and nearly hopeless undertaking9, I concentrate on two specific 
questions: What are the roots of the contradictions and inter-group tensions at the core of 
Israeli society? And how have various labels and categories that refer to different groups 
constituting modern Israel emerged and changed over time? 
 
Jewish Responses to Modernity: 18th-19th Centuries 
Some of the most fundamental tensions found in contemporary Israeli society can 
be traced back to the period well before the establishment of the State of Israel – to the 
political-economic and sociocultural context of Jewish communities in Europe in the late 
18th to the late 19th century. In the late 18th century, following the spread of the 
Enlightenment ideas and the rise of centralized secular nation-states, European countries, 
starting with the Revolutionary France, began lifting the century-old restrictions on Jews’ 
rights (Karsenti 2017; Katz 1973; Vital 1999). In parallel, some Jewish Enlightenment 
thinkers, or Maskilim, unleashed a critique of traditional Judaism and the insularity of 
Jewish communal life, proposing instead that Jews become equal citizens of their 
countries of residence, fully integrated into political, economic, and social life.  
Haskalah, Jewish Enlightenment, thus called for a dual emancipation – from the 
limitations imposed by European states on their Jewish residents and from the shackles of 
                                                      
9 In the late 1980s to mid-1990s the standard Zionist historiographic approach to the history of Israel in 
general and the Israeli-Arab conflict in particular was challenged by the so-called “New Historians” (Benny 
Morris, Ilan Pappe, Simha Flapan, and Avi Shlaim), who painted a much more critical and unflattering 
picture of both the Yishuv and the Israeli state in its first decades – among other things, laying the blame 
for the Palestinian refugee problem on the Jewish leadership. This has led to a wide-ranging and often 
acrimonious debate in both the academia and the public space over Israeli history and collective memory. 
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rabbinic law and traditional institutions. In practice, the effects and manifestations of 
Haskalah varied depending on the place and the time period, and it cannot be reduced to 
the simple tradition vs. reform dichotomy (Birnbaum and Katznelson 1995; Feiner 2004; 
Feiner and Sorkin 2001; Litvak 2012). While some Jews pursued complete assimilation 
into the Christian majority, others sought to balance participation in secular life with a 
practice of Judaism (giving rise to the Reform, Conservative, and Modern-Orthodox 
movements). Yet others, rejecting both assimilation and Judaism, strove to create a 
vibrant secular Jewish culture, either in Yiddish or Hebrew. Even those numerous Jews 
who rejected Haskalah were galvanized by it, forming the social base for ultra-Orthodox 
Judaism (which, like the more liberal forms of Judaism, is a distinctly modern 
phenomenon rather than an heir of the unbroken religious tradition). 
The Zionist movement of the late 19th century was made possible by all these 
political, sociocultural, and intellectual developments. The ideal of a secular democratic 
state built on the principles of civic equality and participation in the public sphere was a 
major intellectual underpinning of the Zionist project. However, Zionism is indebted as 
much – if not more so – to cultural nationalism and the resurgence of anti-Semitism in 
Europe in the second half of the 19th century. Most obviously, the wave of anti-Semitic 
sentiments at that time threatened to undo the legacy of emancipation, prompting some 
Jews to doubt the prospects of their social and political advancement in Europe (Avineri 
1981; Laqueur 2003; Shimoni 1995). But on a subtler level, what Zionism had in 
common with European nationalism of the second half of the 19th century was the notion 
of a culturally defined people, bound by common history and heritage (and, in the case of 
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religious Zionism, by a common fate – to bring forth the coming of the Messiah). 
Combined together, these developments gave rise to the idea that Jews, as a separate 
people with a distinct fate, cannot – indeed, should not – seek integration in European 
societies, but instead should found a state of their own.  
The major divisions that emerged and deepened within Jewish communities in 
Europe between the Enlightenment era and the rise of Zionism are still visible in the 
fabric of contemporary Israel. Most crucial here is the tension between Haskalah and its 
offshoots, on one hand, and ultra-Orthodox Judaism, on the other. Many tropes that are 
regularly employed in Israeli public discourse, including in clinical settings – such as the 
stereotype of ultra-Orthodox Jews as archaic, conservative, and off-putting – can be 
traced back to this period. On a different level, the contradictions between the universalist 
and particularist strands underlying the Zionist project can still be discerned not only in 
the debates over the “Jewish and democratic” character of Israel, but also in clinical 
settings, as I show in the rest of the dissertation. 
 
From the First Aliyah to Statehood 
The pre-State period in Palestine was the crucial time for the emergence and 
elaboration of some of the most intransigent and culturally salient categories of Israeli 
society – between the Old Yishuv and the New, Jews in the Eretz Israel and the Diaspora, 
Ashkenazim and Mizrahim10, and, of course, Jews and Arabs. Although the first wave of 
                                                      
10 Mizrahi (Heb. “Oriental”) Jews, also referred to as Mizrahim and Edot ha-Mizrah (“communities of the 
East”), are those Jews who trace their origins back to the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, Central 
Asia, and the Caucasus. In contemporary Israel, the term “Mizrahi” is often used in a broad sense, to 
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Jewish migration to Palestine, the so-called First Aliyah, is conventionally dated 1882, 
European Jews started coming to Palestine in large numbers as early as the 1860s and 
1870s. They soon proclaimed themselves to be the New Yishuv (Heb. “settlement”), 
named so in opposition to the Old Yishuv11, the Jewish population of Ottoman Palestine 
that existed before the start of the Zionist Aliyah12 and was mainly comprised by two 
distinct communities, Sephardi Jews whose settlement in Palestine dated back to the 
aftermath of Jewish expulsion from Spain and Portugal in the 15th century and Ashkenazi 
Jews, many of them Hasidic13, who started arriving from Europe in the 18th century for 
religious reasons, others opposed to Hasidism (Reinharz 1993).  
                                                      
encompass Sephardi Jews, as well. Strictly speaking, however, “Sephardi” (from Heb. Sfarad, “Spain”) 
describes the Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal in the late 15th century and their descendants.    
11 Although “the New Yishuv” and “the Old Yishuv” have since entered the general usage by historians, 
some historiographers of Jewish settlement in Palestine have pointed out the problematic and inaccurate 
nature of the term, arguing that it lumps together distinct communities and carries a connotation of the Old 
Yishuv inferiority in comparison with the New (Bartal and Kaniel 1981). 
12 In modern Hebrew, two words for immigration are routinely used. One, hagira (the cognate of the Arabic 
hijra), is neutral and refers to immigration in general or to the migration of non-Jews to Israel. Aliyah (Heb. 
“ascent”), by contrast, only refers to the immigration of Jews to Israel, who are, in turn, referred to as olim 
(sing. oleh). Israeli historiography uses the term as a designation for the waves of massive immigration to 
Eretz-Israel before and after Statehood, starting with the First Aliyah in the 1880s. The term “aliyah” has an 
overwhelmingly positive valence, and the corresponding term for Jewish emigration from Israel, yeridah, 
literally means “descent,” with all its respective connotations. “Aliyah” also carries unmistakably religious 
and cultural connotations: an aliyah in the context of Jewish religious service refers to being called up to 
recite a portion of the Torah or deliver a blessing, whereas in the times before the destruction of the Second 
Temple it referred to the act of piligrimage to Jerusalem on the occasion of the three major festivals in 
Judaism.  
13 Hasidism (the followers are called Hadisim, sing. Hasid) is a form of Judaism that emerged on the 
territory of contemporary Ukraine and Poland in the 18th century and spread rapidly throughout Eastern 
Europe. The backdrop for the emergence of Hadisim was the weakening of traditional Jewish communal 
institutions and the tumultuous political upheavals in Europe. Originally, Hadisim was a popular religious 
revival movement that encompassed numerous groups headed by charistmatic leaders (rebbes), drew 
extensively on the Kabbalah (the Jewish mystical tradition), and emphasized spontaneous expressions of 
spirituality and joy over traditional learning and authority. This anti-establishment spirit led to the split 
between Hasidim and Mitnagdim (literally, “opponents”), the latter concentrated in Lithuania. Both groups 
were brought together by their shared opposition to Haskalah and Zionism, as well as the bitter losses they 
suffered in the Holocaust. Despite this rapprochement and the significant internal fragmentation of 
Hasidism into sects, the Hasidic vs. non-Hasidic division is still prominent in ultra-Orthodox Judaism. To 
simplify greatly, contemporary Hasidic Jews differ from other Haredim (see below) in their devotion to 
rebbes, a greater commitment to the study of mystical aspects of the Torah, and distinct rituals and dress.    
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The modern/traditional dichotomy that emerged during Haskalah has further 
deepened during this time, expressing itself in the internal rifts in the Yishuv. When 
Zionist immigrants explicitly set themselves in opposition to the preexisting Jewish 
communities in Palestine, they were creating a judgment-laden dichotomy. For them, the 
New Yishuv, a community of modern, enlightened, politically engaged pioneers 
committed to productive life in Palestine was light years ahead of the Old Yishuv with its 
apathetic poverty, religious fanaticism, and sheltered life style. The reality, of course, was 
more complex, as the first Jewish agricultural colony was actually founded in Petach 
Tikvah by Hungarian Jews of the Old Yishuv, and there were several leaders in 
Jerusalem and elsewhere committed to improving the living conditions and educational 
levels of Jews in Ottoman Palestine. In a sense, contemporary negative perceptions of 
Haredim14 – portrayed in some sectors of Israeli society as inherently opposed to 
modernity, secular education, and productive labor – echo this old tradition/modernity 
binary from the Yishuv era, although they are hardly entirely reducible to this historical 
precedent, and the debates over the status and role of Haredim in contemporary Israel 
engage the current-day political and cultural struggles in the country (Cohen and Susser 
2000; Finkelman 2014; Peled 1999; Stadler, Lomsky-Feder, and Ben-Ari 2011) rather 
than simply mirror the 19th century Yishuv context.  
 The Zionist movement, at least in its dominant secular, socialist form, was 
similarly contemptuous of the Diaspora Jewry. In a twist of bitter irony, many of the anti-
                                                      
14 The Terms “Haredi” and “ultra-Orthodox” are generally used interchangeably. Haredi is a Hebrew 
adjective derived from the Biblical hared (the one who trembles [before God]) and is a cognate of the 
modern Hebrew word for anxiety, harada.  
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Semitic stereotypes in wide circulation in the 19th century Europe – portraying Jews as 
weak, cowardly, incapable of physical labor, offputtingly bookish – entered the 
imaginary of the Zionist movement, but applied to characterize Diaspora Jewry rather 
than Jews as a whole. A mode of thought known as “negation of the diaspora” (shelilat 
ha-golah in Hebrew) depicted Jewish life in the Diaspora as miserable and pointless and 
held up the Aliyah to Israel as the only meaningful, morally acceptable Jewish choice 
(Schweid 1984; Raz-Krakotzkin 1993). 
 The pioneers of the Zionist Aliyah thus saw themselves in opposition to the two 
dominant Jewish self-identifications of the time, rejecting the lifestyles of both 
assimilated and observant Jews (Weissbrod 2002). As the Jewish community in Palestine 
grew, the Zionist movement implemented various policies in order to foster a particular 
sense of Jewishness and silence or erase other, less desirable manifestations. They sought 
to form a new “Hebrew” culture, which involved the forced abandonment of Yiddish, too 
closely associated with the “degenerate” shtetl life, in favor of Hebrew, the adoption of a 
Sephardic accent seen as more authentic than the Ashkenazic one, and the dropping of 
Eastern European sounding names in favor of Hebrew ones (Even-Zohar 1981). Indeed, 
although Eastern European Jews and their Palestine-born descendants formed the 
politically and culturally hegemonic group in Palestine and later the State of Israel, many 
characteristics of Eastern European Jewish culture were purposefully downplayed or 
erased altogether. In other words, while Ashkenazi Jews came to dominate Israeli society, 
only a particular kind of Ashkenazi cultural repertoire was valued and legitimated.  
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 The spirit of the “new Jew” that the Zionist movement strove to inculcate in the 
Yishuv was based precisely on the negation of the Diaspora and a selective appropriation 
of a very specific kind of Ashkenazi culture of the pioneers (halutzim) – largely secular 
and affiliated with the Zionist and Socialist causes15. In the 1920s and 1930s, as the 
second generation of Jewish immigrants to Palestine was coming of age, a new cultural 
ideal emerged, the sabra (Heb. tzabar, after a prickly pear cactus). In contrast to the 
degenerate Jew living in exile, the sabra, who was born in Palestine or came there in early 
childhood and thus never tasted the exile, was supposed to be “young and robust, daring 
and resourceful, direct and down-to-earth, honest and loyal, ideologically committed and 
ready to defend his people to the bitter end” (Zerubavel 2002, 116). The mythological 
image of the sabra became particularly prominent in the Yishuv culture in the 1930s and 
1940s, peaking around the time of the first Israeli-Arab war, and was reflected in 
literature, press, and the arts (Almog 2000). 
The pre-state period was also when the foundations for the ambivalent place of 
the Palestinian and Mizrahi Others in the Israeli psyche were laid. When Zionist pioneers 
came to encounter Palestinians and Sephardi Jews of the Old Yishuv, they began to see 
them with an Orientalist gaze, equally romanticizing and disparaging them as primitive. 
Palestinians in particular were portrayed as backward and likely to benefit from the new 
opportunities, especially employment, brought by the Zionist pioneers. This 
                                                      
15 The secular hegemony was never complete, and religious settler movements, such as Hapoel 
HaMizrachi, did exist (eventually giving rise to the modern-day religious Zionism). Furthermore, the extent 
to which the self-proclaimed secular Zionists were indeed secular has since been called into question in 
scholarly literature, with some historians pointing out the spiritual, ecstatic, and quasi-mystical themes in 
the “secular” culture of the Halutzim (Katriel 1998; Neumann 2011; Paine 1993). 
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“modernization discourse” (Sa’di 1997) assumed the existence of a homogeneous, fixed 
Arab culture that was hierarchically subservient to the European society and could thus 
only benefit from the progress that the Zionist movement would bring. A more romantic 
riff on the same theme of Arab backwardness consisted of portraying Palestinians as 
“noble savages” of sorts – brave, independent, and rooted in the land of Eretz-Israel, 
unlike the dispossessed, corrupted Jews of the Diaspora (Swedenburg 2003, 47-48).   
As for the Sephardim, the dominant Zionist discourses similarly portrayed them 
as in dire need of modernization after centuries of stagnation brought on by coexistence 
with Islamic neighbors, a narrative that belies a blatantly essentializing and Orientalist 
notion of Islam (Piterberg 1996). Sephardi Jews were hardly passive in the face of such 
representations: Many staunchly critiqued mainstream Zionist policies toward 
Palestinians and, indeed, positioned themselves as natural mediators between European 
Jews and Palestinians, by virtue of their hybrid Oriental identity (Naor and Jacobson 
2016).  
The Orientalist representations of Palestinians, Sephardi, and Mizrahi Jews also 
found expression in visual arts and literature of the pre-state period. For example, the 
Bezalel School, a fusion of art nouveau, classicism, and decorative arts that emerged in 
the early 20th century in Jerusalem with the purpose of developing an authentic Jewish art 
in the Land of Israel, produced multiple idyllic images of Palestinians and Mizrahi Jews, 
especially Yemenites. Palestinians were usually presented in a stereotypical, stylized 
fashion, as shepherds riding a camel or playing a flute, depicted almost as part of the 
landscape rather than active characters (Manor 2001). In the 1910s and 1920s, the figure 
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of the Palestinian Arab also became a prominent trope in the Hebrew literature of the 
Yishuv, in some ways – especially in relation to the connection to the land – actually 
invoked as the model for “the new Jew” (Peleg 2005, 34). Palestinians were portrayed in 
a fairly favorable light, but also with a touch of paternalism, as “distant, if rather 
backward and ineffectual cousins” (Laqueur 2003, 230).  
As the Arab national movement in general and Palestinian resistance in particular 
became a presence to reckon with in the early 20th century, and especially by the 1930s 
when the tensions between Jews and Palestinians reached a boiling point during the 
1936-39 Arab revolt, the paternalistic and romanticizing images gave way to the 
representations that emphasized the dangerous, treacherous, and primitive nature of 
Palestinians. Whereas the revolt had a strong anticolonial and anti-British character, 
Zionist accounts of that time characterized it as a riot of a gang of bandits and criminals, 
funded by foreign money, and possibly even mired by connections with Nazism and 
Fascism (Bauer 1966, cited in Swedenburg 2003, 14). 
 
Israel in the Late 1940s to mid-1960s 
 All these trends – the emphasis on the figure of the “new Jew,” the negation of the 
Diaspora Jewry, and the combination of paternalism and hostility toward Mizrahi Jews 
and Palestinians – continued and gained momentum in the years immediately preceding 
the founding of the State of Israel and its aftermath. New developments during this period 
were linked to the changing status of Haredim, the arrival of Jewish olim from 
Holocaust-decimated European communities as well as the Middle East and North 
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Africa, and the troubled position of Palestinian Arabs who remained within the borders of 
Israel.  
The main framework for managing difference at the time was a strongly 
assimilationist nation-building policy that was constructed by the Ashkenazi-dominated 
elite and aimed to integrate newly arrived immigrants in the society, even at the expense 
of erasing their cultural traditions. The assumption behind this policy was that Jews, 
dispersed across the world, can be made a unified nation living in their homeland again. 
This framework, although usually referred to as the melting pot, after its American 
counterpart, also has a Hebrew name, mizzug galuyot (Heb. the fusion of the exiles) – a 
process that was supposed to take place after kibbutz galuyot (Heb. the ingathering of the 
exiles), or the arrival of Jewish olim from all over the world.  The emphasis on 
homogeneity as the goal was even reflected in the name of the ministry charged with 
managing the adaptation of the olim to Israeli society, misrad haklita (the ministry of 
absorption16). The intended result of this assimilationist policy was to create a new Jew, a 
mythological character introduced in the previous sections. The schools of the New 
Yishuv already laid the groundwork for inculcating the sabra spirit in the new generation, 
and the educational system of the State of Israel continued this mission (Almog 2000).  
Although the Zionist movement was generally quite contemptuous toward 
religious Jews in the Diaspora and Palestine, it became increasingly open to the idea of a 
compromise with the religious Jews in the 1930s (Gershon Shelef 2010, 123). As the 
                                                      
16 The three-letter root at the base of the word “haklita” also has connotations of reception (in the 
phone/radio context), understanding (as in slang phrase “kolet”, “getting it”), and recording. 
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prospect of an independent Jewish state was becoming more and more certain in the late 
1940s, political expediency demanded some sort of a unified secular-religious front. In 
June 1947, the Zionist Jewish Agency, led by David Ben-Gurion, and the anti-Zionist 
religious party Agudat Israel achieved an agreement stipulating that Israel was going to 
be a Jewish state with both religious and secular characteristics. As a concession to the 
Haredi leaders, Ben-Gurion promised that public institutions in Israel would observe the 
Sabbath as a day of rest, abide by kashrut (Jewish dietary rules), and accept Orthodox 
supervision over family law (the matters of marriage, divorce, and burial). Furthermore, 
Haredi yeshiva students were to be exempted from military service and the Haredi school 
system received autonomy. The status quo agreement became the cornerstone of the 
religious-secular cooperation – and conflict – in Israel for the decades to come and only 
started to be actively challenged in the late 1970s. Although it turned out to be so 
enduring, many in the Zionist elite saw the status-quo agreement as a temporary, tactical 
compromise that will become obsolete as religion gradually falls away in the relentless 
march of modernity (Cohen and Susser 2000; Gershon Shelef 2010).  
Around the time when the Israeli political elite reached a compromise in which 
the Haredi community received a both powerful and circumscribed role in social life, it 
encountered a new challenge, the massive wave of Jewish immigration from Europe and 
the Middle East and North Africa. Many of the European Jews entering Israel were 
Holocaust survivors, deeply shaken by the catastrophe they witnessed, but Israeli society 
at that time had little ability to listen to their voices. Although the Holocaust was used by 
the official rhetoric as a justification that the Zionist movement was right all along and 
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eventually crystallized into a major part of Israeli national consciousness, the actual 
survivors of the catastrophe were marginalized and stigmatized. A common trope in 
public discourse at the time was to depict European Jews as victims who passively went 
to their deaths in the Holocaust “like sheep to slaughter” because they failed to realize 
that Jewish existence anywhere but the Land of Israel was a dead end. These 
unsympathetic images were pitted against the figure of the heroic sabra who fought for 
independence of the Jewish state (Klar, Schor-Eyal, and Klar 2013; Solomon 2005). 
Although the government inaugurated a Holocaust memorial center (Yad Vashem) and a 
national day of remembrance, until the late 1960s the scope of public commemoration 
was limited, and the dominant narrative focused on the armed struggle against the Nazis 
(Navon 2015). Many Holocaust survivors suppressed their traumatic memories and 
abstained from sharing them even with their children, which only started to change in the 
1970s and 1980s (Kidron 2003; Kidron et al. 2009; Solomon 1998). 
At the same time as European Jews were entering Israel, in the late 1940s and 
1950s the immigration of Mizrahi Jews, who were first settled in the infamous immigrant 
camps (Heb. ma’abarot) was also gaining momentum. These communities, hailing from 
across the Middle East and North Africa, varied widely in terms of culture and 
socioeconomic status and were also treated differently upon arrival: Jews from the 
Middle East, especially Iran, Iraq, and Yemen, who arrived during the first years of 
Israeli statehood, settled near major urban centers and enjoyed access to social services, 
whereas North African Jews, arriving later, were directed to the periphery with inferior 
resources (Smooha 2008). The large-scale project of building new “development towns” 
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in Israel’s periphery was lauded as a tool of progress by Zionist narratives, but critical 
perspectives point out that these policies created a Mizrahi ethno-class with a low 
socioeconomic status and little political capital (Yiftachel 2000).  
The cultural capital of the newly arrived Mizrahi Jews was also very limited, as 
they were widely associated with cultural backwardness and underdevelopment, seen as 
dangerously close to Israel’s Arab enemies (Massad 1996; Shohat 1988; Shohat 1999). 
Jews from the Middle East and North Africa, who were coming from communities with a 
rich history and even richer gamut of cultural traditions deeply influenced by their 
Muslim neighbors in the region, were expected to assimilate into the Ashkenazi, Hebrew-
speaking mainstream. Official accounts of the history of the Jewish people gave a very 
limited space to the histories of Mizrahi communities, and their unique holidays and 
observances were largely unrecognized on the public level. The social cohesion of these 
communities was often ruptured or at least disrupted, families and kin groups scattered 
upon immigration and resettlement17. 
The assimilationist policy toward Mizrahi olim did not erase the Ashkenazi-
Mizrahi distinction, but rather exacerbated and institutionalized it. On one level, this 
expressed itself in the spatial segregation, achieved via the above-mentioned policy of 
settling Mizrahi newcomers in peripheral development towns. But another factor 
contribution to the segregation was the structure of the state-sponsored educational 
system. Not only did Mizrahi children settled in development towns go to homogeneous 
                                                      
17 See Alanna Cooper’s (2012) historical and ethnographic account of Bukharan Jews for one fascinating 
example of this dynamic. 
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schools, but even in mixed locales they were enrolled in separate schools or sometimes in 
separate classes in the same school. This created a de-facto separate educational system 
for Mizrahi children that did not receive the same amount of government funding or the 
same quality staff and engaged in the practice of steering Mizrahim toward vocational 
schools, seen as more appropriate and feasible for this community (Dahan and Levy 
2000). This dual nature of the education system, along with the development town 
phenomenon, contributed to the transformation of Mizrahim into an underclass, 
socioeconomically weak and culturally marginalized, and also sowed the seeds of the 
resentment against the Ashkenazi establishment that came to full bloom in the 1970s and 
later. 
During the first decades of its statehood, Israel had to deal not only with the 
Jewish Others, but with its “Palestinian problem,” as well. While more than 700,000 of 
the Palestinians who lived on the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine either fled 
or were expelled in 1948-1949, approximately 160,000 remained within the Green Line 
borders (the area that became Israel after the 1948-1949 war), many of them internally 
displaced. Those who remained were granted Israeli citizenship and were entitled to vote 
in the Knesset elections and run for office. Nevertheless, they were severely demoralized 
by the war, disruption of family ties, exodus of political and cultural elite, loss of land, 
and forcible relocations (especially in the case of the Bedouin). Until 1966, Palestinians 
in Israel lived under the martial law that was imposed for security reasons and restricted 
their movement and civil rights. In the social scientific accounts of this period (Cohen 
1965; Marx 1967) the Palestinian minority is treated not so much as a threat to the 
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stability of the state, but rather as an island of “tradition” in the modernizing sea, 
although they neglect to analyze how the dramatic political-economic shifts of the 
previous few decades have contributed to the revitalization of “traditional” institutions. 
While the emphasis on the community’s traditional ways has given way to a more 
nuanced discourse about Palestinians in Israel being caught between tradition and 
modernity, the trope of Palestinian citizens as a danger is still alive in the public sphere 
today (as recently as the Second Intifada of the 2000s some Israeli media referred to the 
group as “the fifth column”). 
In sum, the first two decades of Israeli statehood are marked by the further 
consolidation of the normative Israeli identity (the sabra), defined in opposition to the 
multiple Others, both non-Jewish (Palestinians) and Jewish (Mizrahim, Haredim). 
 
Israel from the Six-Day War to the Late 1970s 
The Six-Day War of 1967 and its aftermath radically reshaped the fabric of Israeli 
society and raised new questions about what it meant to be Israeli and what different 
ways of being Israeli were. The hegemonic assimilationist policy started to unravel in this 
period, as voices at the margins of Israeli society began to increasingly clamor for 
attention. The central event of these two decades, the annexation of new territories – East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Sinai Peninsula – created a complex mix of 
nationalist and religious fervor. Religious Zionism had existed side by side with secular 
Zionism since the late 19th century, but the Six-Day War truly revitalized and mobilized 
observant Jews who viewed the establishment and expansion of the State of Israel 
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through a religious lens, as the first step to the messianic age and redemption. In their 
view, the entirety of “the Land of Israel” was promised by God to the Jewish people, and 
thus the “liberation” of large swaths of this land in the Six-Day War was a miracle, a sign 
of God’s benevolence (Aran 1988; Lustick 1988). 
If the Six-Day War brought with it an atmosphere of enthusiasm and optimism, 
the 1973 Yom Kippur war is widely associated with a profound crisis of identity in Israeli 
society (Beit Hallahmi 1992). The surprise attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces stunned 
Israel and generated the feelings of gloom, defeat, and insecurity, raising questions about 
the viability of the Jewish state (Liebman 1993). Furthermore, some sectors of the Jewish 
population in Israel were getting increasingly dissatisfied with the political course of the 
secular, socialist Labor Party. One manifestation of this crisis of identity and growing 
disenchantment with the ruling elites was the movement encouraging secular Jews to 
“return” to religion (Heb. hazara betshuvah). The phenomenon received a considerable 
public attention, especially when several high-profile celebrities embraced an Orthodox 
way of life. In parallel, the settler movement truly gained momentum after the Yom 
Kippur war: the newly formed Gush Emunim (Heb. for “block of the faithful”), 
concerned about the land relinquished after the 1973 war, set itself a goal of establishing 
permanent Jewish settlements on the land captured in 1967 with an eye on eventual 
annexation of these territories (Newman 1985).   
The Six-Day War also had a galvanizing effect on the Arab citizens of Israel. 
After the martial law was lifted in 1966 and the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East 
Jerusalem were annexed in 1967, the Arab minority recovered from the decades of 
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demoralization and, influenced by contacts with Palestinians in the occupied territories, 
increasingly embraced a revitalized, radicalized Palestinian identity. The sense of 
alienation from the state increased when it became clear that Israel had no intention of 
ceding the occupied territories, and Israeli defeat in the Yom Kippur war gave rise to the 
sentiments of Arab nationalism. By the mid-1970s, a new generation of charismatic 
political leaders took over, as the Communist Party became the dominant force in Israeli 
Arab politics at the national level and radical organizations also emerged on the local 
level (Reiter 2009, 36-39). The Land Day of 1976, a wave of strikes, demonstrations, and 
violent clashes with police in response to the Israeli government’s announcement of 
extensive land expropriations, was the watershed. Ever since, the date has become the 
focus of ritualized commemoration among Israeli Arabs, symbolizing a transition from 
the passivity and divisive sectarian politics of the post-1948 era to political mobilization 
and Palestinian national unity (Sorek 2015, 50).   
The mid-1960s and 1970s were also marked by the rise of the Mizrahi opposition 
to the Ashkenazi cultural and political domination. Expressions of Mizrahi culture – such 
as public festivities like Mimouna and Mizrahi music – became prominent, and school 
curriculum was expanded to incorporate some coverage of Mizrahi cultural heritage and 
history (Picard 2017). On the political level, a protest movement of second-generation 
Mizrahi Jews, called the Black Panthers after the African American group, emerged in 
Jerusalem in the early 1970s and swept the country. The Black Panthers rallied against 
ethnic discrimination and socioeconomic gaps between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, but 
the protest turned out to be short-lived, as its leaders were either persecuted by the regime 
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or successfully coopted by the establishment (Lavie 2014). Nevertheless, the broader 
cultural impact of the Black Panther movement was to bring the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi split 
to the forefront of national politics.  
While their counter-establishment initiatives were less than successful, Mizrahi 
involvement in electoral politics was on the rise and had a momentous impact on the 
country. Mizrahi communities in the development towns, previously heavily dependent 
on the Labor party, started to vote for the right-wing Likud party. The culmination of this 
development came in 1977, when the Likud party, supported by a large number of 
second-generation Mizrahim, won the parliamentary elections, wrestling the political 
dominance away from the Labor Party. Various interpretations of why the Mizrahim 
came to support Likud exist, among them that Likud tapped into the Mizrahi resentment 
against Palestinians, provided more opportunities for Mizrahi political leadership, and 
openly acknowledged Mizrahi grudges against the regime (Ghanem 2010, 65-66). 
However, it is indisputable that a sense of resentment against Ashkenazi dominance 
played a prominent role. 
Major shifts in Israeli identity took place in the 1960s and 1970s, as religious 
Jews, Mizrahim, and Arab citizens of Israel started to increasingly question the status 
quo. The cultural hegemony of the so-called AHUSALs (Ashkenazi, secular, socialist, 
nationalist, veteran) hardly became a thing of the past, but it could no longer be taken for 
granted. 
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Israel in the 1980s-1990s 
 In the 1980s, Israel confronted two novel challenges associated with two new 
massive waves of immigration. Ethiopian and Soviet Jews, each group driven by different 
motivations and faced with even more different prospects for integration, transformed the 
fabric of Israeli society in remarkable ways. This, in combination with the intensified 
tensions along the existing fault lines created a sense in Israeli society that it was no 
longer a unified nation-building project (assuming it ever was such a thing), but an 
amalgam of self-contained communities, at best having little to do with others, at worst 
vying for power and resources. The split deepened as the Israeli society became more 
divided over the issues of Occupation and the peace process.  
 Whereas Soviet Jews started arriving in Israel as early as the mid-1960s, this first 
wave of immigration was limited in scope, largely driven by ideological motivations, and 
characterized by the newcomers’ willingness to integrate. By contrast, the mass 
immigration that started in the late 1980s reshaped the structure of Israeli society, 
creating new challenges of accommodation and raising questions about the meanings of 
Israeli (and Jewish) identity. Several groups in Israeli society, for very different reasons, 
felt threatened by the newcomers. The Arab minority and Mizrahim, who had just started 
to experience upward social mobility and increasingly enter the middle class, feared 
Soviet Jews, who tended to have superior educational credentials and occupational skills, 
as competitors for jobs and governmental resources. The religious establishment was 
apprehensive about the impact of predominantly secular immigrants on the Jewish 
character of the state, whereas many members of the Ashkenazi elite had qualms about 
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the right-wing political leanings of the newcomers (Kimmerling 2005, 108). By the late 
1990s, Jews from the former USSR became one of the most economically successful 
groups of olim, and yet they displayed little interest in dissolving into the cultural 
mainstream, and instead ended up holding on to the Russian language and the social 
networks made up of former compatriots. 
 The Soviet Aliyah thus called into question the place of religious practice in the 
definition of Israeli Jewish identity, as well as created a powerful precedent wherein a 
new immigrant community was able to achieve significant economic and political 
success while also actively resisting cultural assimilation. The waves of the mass 
immigration of Ethiopian Jews (or Beta Israel) in the 1980s and 1990s presented Israeli 
society with an unprecedented challenge of “absorbing” a group that was publicly 
perceived as extremely alien from the dominant culture. The problem of the so-called 
Feres Mura community, the descendants of Ethiopian Jews who had converted to 
Christianity and were now claiming the right to return to Judaism and immigrate to Israel 
(Seeman 2010), further complicated things, amplifying the questions about the roles of 
religious practice, individual self-identification, and descent in the definitions of 
Jewishness that were already on the public agenda due to the Soviet aliyah. Significantly, 
the absorption efforts were marked by the rhetoric that warned against the excessively 
aggressive assimilation policies of the past and called for the preservation of Ethiopian 
traditional culture (Kaplan and Salamon 2004). Taken together, the experiences of Soviet 
and Ethiopian olim exemplified the first signs of the tentative, halting retreat of Israeli 
state from the “melting pot” imperative of the past, with its forceful absorption policies. 
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As the homogeneous, state- and elite-promoted public culture of Israeli society 
continued to dissolve, political parties and movements began to increasingly appeal to 
groups bound by ethnic and religious identities rather than political ideologies (a trend 
that started in the late 1970s). During the 1981 election campaign, both Labor and Likud 
explicitly played on ethnic stereotypes to mobilize their supporters, and populist ethnic 
parties – such as Israel b’Aliya and Israel Beitenu that represented the interests of 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Shas, vying for the votes of Sephardi and 
Mizrahi Jews – became a prominent feature of the political landscape.  
During this time, Mizrahim in Israel maintained, and even extended, their support 
for right-wing parties. Eager to escape from the “development towns” and gradually 
priced out of real estate in most urban centers, Mizrahim welcomed Likud’s efforts to 
improve the infrastructure in the Mizrahi periphery. Even more promising was the 
government’s campaign to expand settlements in the occupied territories, including 
Jerusalem: These new enclaves held a promise of reasonably-priced, well-maintained 
single-family homes that lower-middle class Mizrahim would be unlikely to secure 
anywhere else (Lavie 2011). Not all Mizrahim supported Likud or other right-wing 
parties, however. Indeed, the 1980s saw a new wave of radical Mizrahi activists, many of 
them feminists, who challenged the right-wing political agenda by laying claim to 
solidarity with Palestinians, but also criticized what they saw as the Ashkenazi Left’s 
marginalization of Mizrahi voices (Dahan-Kalev 2000; Lavie 2011; Shalom Chetrit 
2000).  
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Another trend in the 1990s had to do was the growing politicization and 
mobilization of the Arab citizens of Israel. Partially this was a response to the First 
Intifada in the occupied territories (1987-1993) that galvanized Israeli Arabs in a display 
of outrage and solidarity. During this time, political Islam, increasingly visible in the 
West Bank and Gaza, begins to spread among Israeli Arabs, as well, especially those in 
the economically insecure Little Triangle region in Central Israel. The return of Labor 
Party to power in 1992 and the signing of the Oslo peace accords in 1993 had an even 
more momentous effect. For the first time since the founding of Israel, Arab parties were 
included into the coalition government, and the prospect of an independent Palestinian 
state – that nowadays is increasingly elusive – seemed just within reach. Israeli Arabs 
were now pushing, in a turn of phrase coined by prominent politician and intellectual 
Azmi Bishara, for Israel to become “a state for all its citizens”, as well as advocating for 
national and/or cultural autonomy. The importance of this change should not be 
underestimated: Although Israeli Arab protests in support of civil rights can be traced 
back to the 1970s, the 1990s, with its calls for Israel to recognize its Arab citizens as 
“members of a distinct, separate nation in Israel” (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 64), saw the 
start of the Israeli Arab collective politics of recognition. 
 By the late 1990s, “multiculturalism” (rav-tarbutiyut in Hebrew) had entered 
common use as a catch-all label for the challenges to the status quo mounted by Israeli 
Arabs, Mizrahi activists, new olim from the f. USSR and Ethiopia, and others. At that 
time, the government tasked two committees of prominent social scientists and other 
academics with formulating a proper policy response to this new reality. The resulting 
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reports presented an unequivocally dire picture: Israeli society, long held together by the 
unifying forces of its absorption policies, was now in danger of coming apart at the 
seams. The state, the reports’ authors suggested, should ensure that Israel remains a 
society built on solidarity rather than sectarianism by promoting a common political 
culture (rooted in “cultural Zionism”) and adopting a centralized approach toward 
managing “cultural assets.” One concrete consequence of these reports was the adoption 
of a new budgetary policy for cultural matters that earmarked separate funds for the 
“national institutions” (the national theater and the national orchestra), while also creating 
a secondary and less well-funded category for “ethnic” cultural enterprises. Thus, the 
state officials adopted a framework that made space for a limited accommodation of 
some cultural differences, but as secondary or subservient to “the core (Western) culture” 
(Gutman 2014, 57).  
Tikva Honig-Pamass (2011, 150-151) notes that many of the academics who had 
authored the reports held allegiance to the Zionist Left ideology. One way of looking at 
these documents, therefore, is to view them as one example of Israeli political and 
cultural elites trying to make sense of, cope with, and gain a measure of control over the 
changing public culture. At a deeper level, though, they reflect Israeli society as a whole 
grappling, more deeply than ever before, with what Virginia Dominguez terms “the 
paradox of peoplehood”: “Can a people really exist without a culture by which they can 
be identified and distinguished from others? Can a people really be culturally 
pluralistic?” (Dominguez 1989, 101). 
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Israel in the 21st Century 
 As of April 2017, Israel’s population has reached approximately 8.7 million 
people, 74% of them Jews, 20.8% Arabs, and 4.5% “Others” (Israel’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2017). Out of the total Jewish population, 75% were born in Israel (so-called 
“Sabras”). Among Jews, 44% defined themselves as secular / non-religious, 24% call 
themselves traditional and “not so religious,” 12% are “religious traditional”, 11% are 
“religious,” and 9% are ultra-Orthodox. Among Arabs, the overwhelming majority are 
Sunni Muslim, with a significant Christian minority. A small Arabic-speaking Druze 
minority exists, as well. Foreign workers from Southeast Asia who started arriving in 
Israel in the 1990s as a replacement for the Palestinian day workers during the First 
Intifada and, since the mid-2000s, asylum seekers from Africa have also become part of 
Israel’s social landscape. 
By the beginning of the 21st century, the “melting pot” immigration policies of the 
earlier decades were either abandoned or rolled back. The secular Ashkenazi hegemony 
of the early decades of Israeli statehood, with its restrictive definition of Israeli identity, 
has given way to a new reality, wherein certain forms of cultural difference are tolerated 
and even celebrated more readily. And yet, this toleration and celebration has very strict 
parameters and boundaries. Israeli society is undeniably plural, in the sense that it is 
criss-crossed by multiple rifts (see also Ben-Porat et al. 2008). However, it can hardly be 
called pluralistic, by which I mean tolerant of deep differences – except, perhaps, in a 
very circumscribed sense of special accommodations extended to the Ultra-Orthodox 
community (which are highly controversial and increasingly challenged in contemporary 
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Israel, both by secular and national-religious Jews). Indeed, in light of the legislative bill 
currently making its way through the Knesset that seeks to redefine Israel as the nation-
state of the Jewish people, which many in Israel see as threatening to uproot the 
“democratic” part of Israel’s “Jewish and democratic” self-definition, it appears that the 
limits of tolerance may be actually shrinking. 
 In this section, I have provided a brief overview of how the major divisions of 
Israeli society, many of them preconfigured, but not overdetermined, by developments in 
the Yishuv and even the 18th and 19th century Europe, have formed and changed over the 
last seventy decades. This history is important, because it provides the context for the 
more recent developments that I tackle in my dissertation, including the emergence of the 
“cultural competence” discourse in Israeli health care. Furthermore, the clinical 
encounters that I describe unfold against this backdrop of plurality, uncertainty, and 
contestation. In the rest of this introduction, I summarize my research methodology, 
discuss how positionality has shaped my research, and provide a brief overview of the 
dissertation’s structure. 
 
Methodology 
 My dissertation is based on fourteen months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted 
in Israel between 2013 and 2016, including two pilot visits in the winter of 2013-2014 
and in the summer of 2014 and twelve consecutive months in 2015-2016. During the first 
pilot trip to Israel, I visited several psychiatric hospitals, general hospitals with a mental 
health care wing, and outpatient clinics in the central and northern parts of the country in 
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order to decide where best to locate my fieldwork. I also conducted my first observation 
of a cultural competence training workshop and discussed the matter of cultural 
competence with clinicians across the country (some of this material is included in 
chapter 1). At this time, I settled on two institutions that later became my major fieldsites: 
the Kfar Shaul Hospital in Jerusalem that serves and is staffed by an ethnically and 
religiously diverse population and the “Karim” mental health care center for children, 
youth, and families in Balad il-Ghabar, a large Muslim city in central Israel, where Arab 
citizens of Israel work alongside Jewish ones.18 This community center also has a smaller 
branch in Hilweh, a predominantly Muslim town in northern Israel with significant 
Christian and Druze minorities. I also became interested in an outpatient clinic located in 
an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood of Jerusalem. Run by a Modern Orthodox psychiatrist 
and primarily serving the overwhelmingly ultra-Orthodox population of North Jerusalem, 
this clinic seemed to constitute an interesting counterpoint to “Karim,” both of them 
providing services to patients from the two groups that are most commonly “Othered” in 
the Israeli society.  
 During a longer pilot trip in the summer of 2014, I spent a month and a half doing 
preliminary fieldwork at Kfar Shaul and the North Jerusalem clinic. At this time, I 
realized that including three major fieldsites in my study would be unwieldy. While I 
found the North Jerusalem clinic fascinating, I decided to drop it as a fieldsite. Partially 
this was because I worried that I would have little to no chance of gaining access to the 
                                                      
18 “Karim,” Balad il-Ghabar, and Hilweh are pseudonyms. I decided to keep the original name of the Kfar 
Shaul Hospital in the text, because its character is too distinctive for me to conceal. All personal names in 
the rest of the dissertation, including my interlocutors at Kfar Shaul, are pseudonyms. 
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Ultra-Orthodox patients and their families. More crucially, however, I also discovered 
through my observations and interviews with clinicians that the opportunities to observe 
clinical discussions – my primary object of interest – were limited and would become 
even more so. With the managed care model on the rise, the employees at the clinic felt 
an increasing pressure to maximize their “patient hours”, leaving little time for formal or 
even informal staff discussion of diagnosis and treatment. 
My main period of my fieldwork, between June 2015 and June 2016, was divided 
into two parts. During the first stage (June 2015 to December 2015), I was based at 
“Karim”, conducting participant-observation at the primary branch in Balad il-Ghabar, as 
well as – intermittently – at the Hilweh branch. I conducted semi-structured interviews 
with staff members and, in a few cases, family members of the patients; observed and 
occasionally participated in staff meetings, workshops, and trainings; and observed group 
therapy for children and parents.  
During the second stage of fieldwork (December 2015 to June 2016), I did 
participant-observation and semi-structured interviews at Kfar Shaul. I was primarily 
based at two of the main wards, the closed ward (for patients in acute states such as 
psychotic breaks) and the open ward (for more stabilized patients), but I also spent time 
at the emergency room and the day hospitalization unit. I was interested in attending the 
acute closed ward, as well, but the staff members were wary of the presence of an 
outsider taking notes, and I excluded this ward from my study19. As part of my fieldwork, 
                                                      
19 The two geriatric wards were also excluded from my study, primarily due to the ethical and practical 
difficulties of involving cognitively impaired individuals in my research.  
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I interviewed clinicians and, in a few cases, patients, attended staff meetings and case 
presentations, observed group therapy sessions, and participated in various informal 
interactions. In my interviews with clinicians both at Kfar Shaul and “Karim,” I collected 
general information about my interlocutors’ personal and professional background, 
before eliciting their approaches to handling cultural differences in therapeutic work. 
In addition to my fieldwork at these clinical sites, I also analyzed documents 
related to the issue of health care disparities and cultural competence in Israel issued by 
the Ministry of Health and various non-governmental organizations, observed cultural 
competence training workshops for clinicians organized by the Center for Cultural 
Pluralism in Israel, and interviewed individuals involved in the design and 
implementation of these training sessions. I have also been a subscriber and follower of 
several Israeli e-mail lists about cultural competence (frequented primarily, but not only, 
by clinicians). 
 
Navigating the Field: The Challenges of Positionality 
The vicissitudes of my personal background have affected the genesis and 
execution of this research in significant ways, which warrants a commentary. I have been 
interested in the Israeli-Arab conflict and fascinated with both Palestinians and Israelis 
since my teenage years – for no other reason I can pinpoint but the continuous coverage 
of the Second Intifada in the news at that time. It was this initial interest that made me 
pursue two degrees in the Middle East Studies, during which time I investigated the 
history of Palestinian national identity and, later, the positionality of Israeli Arabs, as well 
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as did freelance work for the local mosque. Impatient to experience the places I had been 
reading and writing about first-hand, I entered a PhD program in anthropology. 
My initial research project was supposed to concentrate on Israeli Arabs and their 
experiences in the mental health care system. At the time, I espoused a rather simplistic 
perspective on critical medical anthropology and expected to discover that the clinical 
settings mirrored, more or less, the reality of the larger society, with all of its inequalities 
and discrimination. I implicitly assumed that psychiatrists and other clinicians would act, 
consciously or not, as oppressive agents of the state. After a pilot visit and consultations 
with my advisor, I decided to expand my focus beyond Arab patients, to encompass a 
wider spectrum of patients that would be seen as cultural ‘Others’ in the Israeli clinical 
settings.  
This was not the only shift, however. Over the course of my initial visits, I 
discovered that my implicit model was too simplistic and restrictive, not only failing to 
account for the internal diversity of psy disciplines and the heterogeneity of clinicians’ 
backgrounds and political persuasion, but also not even providing a truly sophisticated 
understanding of the power dynamics in Israeli society (which, I found, were sometimes 
all the more insidious for being subtle). I also felt intermittently pulled between 
competing allegiances and angry at all sides. I believe that I went into the field with set of 
romanticizing notions about Palestinians, and these immature and unrealistic expectations 
soon turned into bitterness. For instance, I started boiling with resentment when a 
Palestinian friend, in a cell phone conversation, quipped to someone: “You are saying her 
plane just landed in Israel? Did you mean to say, ‘occupied Palestine’?” – and then felt 
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guilty about this reaction. On the other hand, my time in Jerusalem brought with it its 
own set of uncomfortable feelings, and I had to confront the very strong negative 
reactions I had to the various plentiful manifestations of right-wing political sentiments 
and to the ultra-Orthodox presence in the public space.  
Another dimension of positionality is how my interlocutors reacted to the various 
strands of my identity, some of which were obvious from my appearance, while others 
would come out in a casual conversation or, conversely, only if I chose to disclose them. 
I am a first-generation American and I see myself as an American anthropologist in 
training and in outlook, but I was born in Russia and lived there until I was twenty-one. 
Although I am not Jewish and there is no Jewish ancestry on either side of my family, I 
speak near-fluent Hebrew and have a fairly extensive knowledge of Judaism and Jewish 
cultural references. Furthermore, as I indicated before, I developed an interest in Islam 
and Muslim cultures during my undergraduate studies, when I concentrated on Arabic, 
the history of the Middle East, and international relations.  
 These features of my personal identity have made a difference, in both positive 
and negative ways, at every stage of my fieldwork. Most crucially, my Russian identity 
and language skills have helped me establish rapport with interlocutors and facilitated my 
access to the field in some cases. Specifically, I suspect that many of the Russian-
speaking mental health care professionals I encountered at the psychiatric hospital in 
Jerusalem spoke a bit more honestly with me than they would have if I were a US-born 
anthropologist with no Russian connection. Interestingly, my “Russianness” had a 
positive impact at the first stage of my fieldwork, in the Israeli Arab locales, as well. I felt 
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that clinicians at the mental health care center where I did research were intrigued by my 
background (a non-Jewish person with very good Hebrew and a strong interest in Israel), 
and this curiosity helped overcome some initial awkwardness in conversations. 
Moreover, I noticed a significant change – toward a less guarded, more curious attitude – 
whenever I revealed to new acquaintances, be they patients at the clinic or people in the 
street, that I was Russian and not Jewish. Very often the immediate reaction would be a 
smile, some sort of positive comment about Putin “sticking it” to “the Americans,” or a 
barrage of questions based on the assumption that I must be married to a local Arab man. 
This change in attitude is not surprising: Many Israeli Arabs have a cautious attitude 
toward Russian Jews (stereotypically perceived as conservative or even racist), but at the 
same time they can be quite enthusiastic about Russians. Some have studied in the Soviet 
Union or Russia, others know Russian women who married Arab men or are themselves 
married to a Russian woman (hence their assumption about me), and yet others simply 
approved of what they saw as Russian opposition to the US hegemony. Whatever the 
case might be, I would usually abstain from sharing my critiques of Putin and instead 
pragmatically – some would say, cynically – respond in a vague, non-committal way in 
order not to undermine the barely established good faith. 
 My non-Jewishness played into the dynamics of my interactions with other 
interlocutors, as well. Throughout my research, various acquaintances and interlocutors 
assumed that I must be Jewish or suggested that I had some Jewish roots I am unaware 
of. I was similarly strategic about revealing my non-Jewish identity to my interlocutors, 
which was complicated by the fact that me being not Jewish was not even the full story. 
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At the time of writing this, I am separated, but through graduate school and in the early 
stages of fieldwork I was married to a Jewish American man (who stayed back in the US 
when I went to Israel). During my marriage, I discovered non-Orthodox forms of Judaism 
and became drawn to them. I felt such a strong sense of belonging that, despite my then-
husband’s ambivalence and my own agnosticism, I decided to convert. By the time I went 
to the field, I had found a sponsoring rabbi and finished an introductory class for 
conversion candidates, but otherwise I put this process on hold. As a result, I had to think 
pragmatically every time an interlocutor asked: “Are you Jewish?” In some cases, I 
simply responded that I was not. In others, I would bring up my circumstances – 
sometimes my marriage only, sometimes my interest in conversion – and this would 
stimulate curiosity and help establish rapport.  
 The American part of my identity also played a role. I suspect that my affiliation 
with Boston University bolstered my credentials and helped me gain access to various 
fieldsites. However, my “Americanness” did not have an unambiguously positive effect. 
One significant factor has to do with the timing: My fieldwork coincided with the heated, 
acrimonious debate in the American anthropological community around the idea of 
boycotting Israeli academic institutions. Because in Israel this topic was widely covered 
in the media, I expected it to come up more than it actually did. Nevertheless, in one case 
it was explicitly brought up as a concern: In the beginning of my fieldwork at the 
Jerusalem psychiatric hospital, I went to a staff meeting at the closed ward to introduce 
myself and acquire consent from the clinicians for doing participant-observation and 
interviews there. After my introductory speech, the head of the closed ward asked me to 
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talk more about my methods and, despite my explanations, appeared unconvinced that 
my research had a scientific merit without questionnaires. A few staff members chimed 
in, pointing out that I was doing qualitative research and it was a new, “fashionable” 
trend. Begrudgingly, he conceded, but immediately brought up another concern: In light 
of the boycott debate, “it is a question – and a big question! – if we [the hospital] should 
cooperate at all.” Although he did not do anything to actively prevent me from doing my 
research, he turned down several requests for an interview and would occasionally 
inquire what I could possibly be writing in my notes (sometimes implying that I tended to 
start scribbling furiously whenever a disagreement or conflict came up). 
 Finally, I would be amiss – not to mention, contributing to the stigma around 
mental illness in academia, which would be especially ironic for this dissertation – not to 
briefly discuss my own struggles with depression and anxiety, and how they have 
affected my fieldwork. In the spirit of radical disclosure, I have to admit that the 
fieldwork year was the darkest one in my life. The feelings of isolation and inadequacy 
that so often accompany fieldwork (Irwin 2007; Pollard 2009) were prompted, in my 
case, by the extremely volatile situation at my first fieldsite (“Karim”), as well as by the 
agonizing experience of my marriage falling apart. After relocating to Jerusalem, I felt 
like I had to hide these emotions even more thoroughly than before, because of how 
insignificant this misery seemed in comparison with the scope of suffering I encountered 
at my second fieldsite, the hospital. At one of the lowest points, I sought outpatient 
counselling and ended up working with an American-born therapist, a Modern Orthodox 
woman. Despite my initial ambivalence about having a religious therapist, this 
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experience not only helped me get through the rest of the year, but also gave me an 
immediate taste – more than any research could – of what a therapeutic encounter across 
cultural lines could be like. I wonder if this played a role in reshaping my initially critical 
stance toward psy disciplines toward a more sympathetic one.  
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of an introduction, six chapters, a conclusion, and two 
vignettes that precede chapters 3 and 5 and introduce the reader to my two main 
fieldsites, the Kfar Shaul Hospital in Jerusalem and the “Karim” community mental 
health care center in the Muslim city of Balad il-Ghabar located in the lower Galilee (as 
well as its smaller branch in the northern religiously mixed town of Hilweh).  
In Chapter 1, I focus on the phenomenon of cultural competence in Israel’s health 
care system. I argue that the push for cultural competence in Israel’s health care should 
be analyzed within the larger context of the governmental efforts to address health 
disparities since the mid-2000s that are themselves rooted in the complex political-
economic transformations that have been reshaping Israeli society since the late 1970s. I 
further situate these policies against the backdrop of the ongoing ethical debates in Israeli 
society over its self-definition.   
In Chapter 2, I follow the cultural competence policies into the clinic by focusing 
on an organization that has shaped cultural competence training in Israel, the Center for 
Cultural Pluralism in Jerusalem. I argue that the CCPJ discourses of cultural competence 
are plural, pragmatic, and situationally variable, which is related to the organization’s 
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political agenda. With an extended case study of a cultural competence workshop at a 
Jerusalem hospital, I show that this training has multiple political potentialities: While it 
sometimes construes structural issues in the individualistic idiom of “cultural 
differences,” it does not erase politics entirely, as many anthropological critiques would 
have it – indeed, it actually smuggles in a quietly subversive agenda. In other words, the 
government’s approach to recognition does not necessarily neatly translate into efforts on 
the ground, even when these efforts are sponsored or enabled by the government.  
Chapter 3, together with the preceding vignette, introduces the reader to the Kfar 
Shaul Hospital in Jerusalem. After discussing the poignant and controversial history of 
the hospital (located on the grounds of a Palestinian village whose inhabitants were killed 
or expelled in 1948), I provide a sense of the everyday atmosphere at the hospital by 
describing its spatial and organizational structure, professional divisions and styles of 
interaction among the staff, and the living conditions and social life of the patients. I 
claim that the structure of hospital life provides opportunities both for interactions across 
the lines that are rarely crossed in the Israeli society and for (self-)segregation along these 
lines. In the rest of the chapter, I describe divergent clinical perspectives on the 
importance of cultural difference in clinical practice, showing how both the embodied 
moral sensibilities and the explicit ethical deliberation that clinicians at Kfar Shaul 
engage in are rooted in what Keane (2014; 2015) calls “ethical affordances” of the 
clinical training. 
In Chapter 4, I provide an extended analysis of the contrasting case studies of two 
patients at Kfar Shaul, a Palestinian Muslim woman from East Jerusalem and a Jewish 
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Orthodox man from a West Bank settlement. Grounding my analysis of the clinical 
process in the notion of recognition, I show both similarities and differences in the 
workings of recognition across these two cases. This chapter serves as the main locus of 
my intervention in the interdisciplinary conversation around recognition and pluralism, as 
I contend that psychological and medical anthropology are uniquely positioned to 
problematize and deepen the scholarly uses of “recognition” as an analytical lens.  
Chapter 5, preceded by a vignette, describes the second major clinical site where I 
conducted research, a community mental health care center “Karim” that is located in 
Balad il-Ghabar, an Arab Muslim town in central Israel. In order to provide context for a 
focused exploration of clinical discourses about Arab families and culture at the center of 
the following chapter, I discuss Balad il-Ghabar as the key location for my study, provide 
a general picture of the state of mental health care services in the so-called Arab sector, 
and then describe the everyday atmosphere and routines at “Karim.” I argue that “Karim” 
occupies an ambivalent political space: Although the clinic was created with an 
unmistakable political agenda of providing services to an underprivileged group in Israeli 
society, its everyday realities are overtly de-politicized and increasingly affected by the 
bureaucratic demands of HMOs. I show that clinicians at “Karim” are engaged in ethical 
decision-making and deliberation that is shaped by these competing concerns and argue 
for the importance of accounting for moral emotions involved in everyday clinical 
practice.  
In Chapter 6 I focus on the two interpretative frameworks that the clinicians at 
“Karim” use in making sense of their patients’ concerns. I argue that these mental health 
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care professionals alternate between a “structural” model and a “familial-psychologizing” 
model in their diagnostic deliberation. Whereas the former connects the mental health 
conditions and social problems of the patients to the vulnerable situation of the Arab 
minority in Israel, the latter frames suffering as a matter of familial, not social or 
political, pathology, as well as lays blame on the problematic features of “Arab culture.” I 
posit that these two frameworks, though at first glance very different, are both rooted in 
the complex positionality of Israeli Arabs. I further argue that the self-deprecating 
discourses about Arab families and Arab culture that circulate among Israeli Arab 
clinicians at “Karim”, or negative culture-talk, should be understood not as a simple 
“internalization of oppression”, but as an emergent effect of my interlocutors’ 
positionality as middle-class Israeli Arabs trained in psy discourses and trying to 
negotiate their own personal and professional identities as members of a mixed Jewish-
Arab clinical team. 
In the conclusion of the dissertation, I summarize my main findings, provide a 
sustained reflection on the theoretical interventions of this work, and discuss implications 
for further research. 
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PART I 
CHAPTER ONE: CULTURAL COMPETENCE AND ITS (DIS)CONTENTS: 
TARGETING HEALTH DISPARITIES IN ISRAEL 
In December 2013, I was preparing for my first pilot field trip to Israel. I recently 
learned that just two years prior the Israeli Ministry of Health had issued a directive 
obliging all health care institutions to become “culturally competent.” My graduate 
coursework had attuned me to the many debates within anthropology about the meanings 
of “culture,” including the more recent critical takes on the validity of the concept, and I 
was eager to investigate what “cultural competence” could mean in practice, especially in 
the conflict-ridden sociopolitical landscape of Israel. As a psychological and medical 
anthropologist with a strong interest in mental health and illness, I was particularly 
concerned with the effects of this new policy on the mental health care system.  
Planning to visit multiple sites across the country before settling on a specific 
location for my dissertation fieldwork, I contacted several directors of psychiatric 
hospitals, psychiatric wards of general hospitals, and mental health care clinics in the 
country. In these e-mails, I described my research as focused on “how Israeli mental 
health care providers understand and take into account patients’ cultural backgrounds” 
and, specifically, “how clinicians are trained in cultural competence and how they apply 
cultural categories in clinical practice on a daily basis.” In most cases, I got a polite reply 
with an invitation to visit or no reply at all. In one instance, however, a psychiatrist 
working at a hospital in a major Israeli city replied swiftly, writing that he was about to 
answer all my questions all the spot, sparing me the visit not only to the hospital, but to 
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Israel itself! He proceeded to explain that no clinicians at his hospital were trained in 
cultural competence or had reliable access to interpreters. “Sad but true,” he ended his e-
mail. Excited to talk to someone with strong opinions, I followed up about my interest in 
visiting, but the clinician shot back, “Are you the type of person who wouldn’t take no 
for an answer? The answer is NO!”. 
 This exchange conveyed to me at a very early point in my fieldwork that “cultural 
competence” could be a contentious topic – and that, despite some evidence of its 
decline, the dugri (‘straight’/blunt) speech style associated with Israeli sabras (Katriel 
1986; Maschler 2001) was not a thing of the past just yet. As I continued investigating 
cultural competence (and learning not to take my Israeli interlocutors’ gruffness too 
personally), I discovered that, in order to understand the meaning and motivations of the 
policy, I needed to extend my analysis much further back than 2011 and to attend to the 
larger phenomenon of the Israeli establishment’s increasing concern with health 
disparities. In this chapter and the next one, I grapple with the paradoxes of “cultural 
competence” in Israeli health care, focusing first on the policy itself and then (in Chapter 
2) on the discourses and practices of cultural competence training.  
I start by situating my approach within the larger critical literature on cultural 
competence in anthropology. After a historical overview of various governmental efforts 
to promote cultural sensitivity and reduce health disparities in Israeli health care from the 
mid-2000s on, I analyze the motivations behind these efforts, contending that the roots of 
these policies can be traced back to the momentous political-economic shifts in Israel 
since the 1980s. I argue that the implementation of these policies can be regarded as a 
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compromise: While they acknowledge the discontent among Israelis over the rise of 
social inequalities in health (and other areas of public services), they frame the solution in 
terms of cultural accommodation and stop short of targeting the creeping privatization of 
the health care system. In other words, these interventions are primarily driven by a 
neoliberal economic agenda that is embraced by a significant faction of Israeli political 
elite, including the current Ministry of Health leadership. 
I end this chapter by contending that the efforts to address health disparities and 
promote cultural competence in Israeli health care are shaped by a competition between 
multiple public ethics – of cost efficiency, ethno-national citizenship, and solidarity – all 
of which make different, and often incompatible, assumptions about the right to health 
and the causes of health disparities. The tensions between these competing ethical 
orientations are not limited to the health care sphere and play out, in some form, in all 
spheres of Israeli society where divergent understandings of difference, belonging, and 
justice – above all, what makes a good society – come together and collide. 
 
 Cultural Competence: History and Anthropological Critiques 
Cultural competence is not a unified movement so much as a trend, mainly 
concentrated in North America and Western Europe, that calls for reforming health care 
and medical education systems to accommodate a diverse body of patients. A complex 
and polyvalent phenomenon with conservative, liberal, and more radical political 
genealogies, the most immediate origins of cultural competence can be traced back to the 
first several decades following the Second World War. In this section, I briefly outline 
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the emergence of the cultural competence discourse and discuss some of the 
anthropological engagements and critiques.  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the use of the race concept as a 
scientific, biological category increasingly came under fire, now mired by its associations 
with Nazi eugenics. Exemplifying this shift, the United Nations Education, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) launched a committee, at first primarily made of 
cultural anthropologists, that was tasked with developing the organization’s official 
position on race (Hazard 2012). Between 1950 and 1967, UNESCO published four 
official statements (UNESCO 1969) and a series of smaller publications detailing its 
stance on the issues of race and racism. This stance did not remain unchanged through the 
years, however, and it has been characterized with significant ambiguities. For instance, 
the first statement proclaimed the fundamental unity of mankind, called for abandoning 
the term “race” altogether in favor of “ethnic groups,” and declared race to be “not so 
much a biological phenomenon as a social myth” (UNESCO 1950, 3). After these radical 
formulations drew criticism from biologists, geneticists, and biological anthropologists 
(Thornberry 2016, 22-23), the second statement “rolled back” some of the earlier 
proclamations about race as a fiction, shifting the emphasis to denying the existence of 
superior or inferior races instead (UNESCO 1951). To replace race as a criterion for 
understanding human diversity, UNESCO spearheaded the focus on “culture” or 
“ethnicity”. Although ostensibly opposed to the older racist discourses, UNESCO’s 
approach, summarized as “culturalism,” has been criticized as recasting of racial 
assumptions about human groups as bounded and homogeneous, but in the idiom of 
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culture (Lentin 2005). Very similar critiques, as I will show below, have since been 
waged at the cultural competence initiatives. 
While UNESCO’s discourse on race was a turning point in the post-war global 
discourse on race and an important historical antecedent, the more immediate roots of the 
cultural competence trend in health care lie in the 1960s and 1970s, when the rise of the 
Civil Rights and other sociopolitical movements in the United States and Canada20 thrust 
the unequal treatment of ethnic and racial minorities, women, gays and lesbians, and 
people with disabilities into the limelight. These movements affected such fields as 
medicine, nursing, social work, and psychotherapy, and activists across these and other 
professions started developing both theoretical and practical approaches for tackling 
health care disparities. Some practical early interventions consisted of involving 
interpreters and cultural brokers (Putsch III 1985; Schwab, Drake, and Burghardt 1988), 
as well as proposing and implementing various approaches to the training of clinicians. 
The theoretical models that were developed during this period included “cross-cultural 
sensitivity”, “ethnic-sensitive practice”, “cross-cultural awareness practice”, “ethnic 
competence”, and “ethnic minority practice” (McManus 1988). 
However, it was only in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the term “cultural 
competence” itself became ubiquitous in the health care system’s lexicon in the United 
States. Legislative efforts to institute the standards for culturally competent services 
started in the 1990s on a state level and accelerated in the 2000s. In 2001, the Office of 
Minority Health published the Culturally and Linguistic Appropriate Services standards 
                                                      
20 For the sake of concision and continuity, I only concentrate on the US developments below. 
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that outlined a range of obligatory and recommended measures for health care 
organizations (Office of Minority Health 2001). In the early 2000s, the Institute of 
Medicine published two landmark reports on racial and ethnic disparities in health care 
that recommended an inclusion of cultural competence training in medical school 
curricula (Institute of Medicine 2001; Smedley, Stith, and Nelson 2003). By the mid-
2000s, New York, New Jersey, Washington, California, and several other states started 
requiring from practicing physicians, as well as residents and medical students, to take 
courses in cultural competence in order to obtain or renew their licenses. According to a 
study that surveyed 8,000 graduate programs in medicine in the United States, 50.7% 
offered some sort of training in cultural competence in 2003-2004, which was a 
significant increase in comparison with 35.7% in 2000-2001 (Brotherton, Brockey, and 
Etzel 2004, cited in Betancourt et al. 2005).  
Anthropologists have had an uneasy relationship with cultural competence, and a 
substantial literature documents this engagement (Delvecchio Good et al. 2011; Jenks 
2011; Kirmayer 2012b; Kleinman and Benson 2006; Mattingly 2014; Santiago-Irizarry 
2001; Shaw 2005; Taylor 2003; Willen and Carpenter-Song 2013). While 
anthropologists, including such prominent figures as Arthur Kleinman, have been 
involved with the various attempts to implement cultural sensitivity in medical education 
and clinical practice from early on, they have also been active in criticizing these 
initiatives both on philosophical and practical grounds. It is important to note here that 
the rise of cultural competence as a discourse coincided in time with the emergence of 
medical anthropology as a subdiscipline in its contemporary form. The trajectory of 
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anthropological engagements with cultural competence has been unfolding in the larger 
institutional and intellectual context of medical anthropologists negotiating the nature of 
their emerging subfield and debating what stance it should take toward the field of 
medicine. 
Anthropologists subjected the early cultural competence efforts to particularly 
harsh critiques, as these interventions often framed “cultures” as neat groupings of people 
with set boundaries and shared core beliefs, and depicted cultural competence as a 
technical skill applied to these bounded groups. These early initiatives also perpetuated a 
problematic assumption that it was the patients and their families who were the ones in 
possession of culture, whereas medical practitioners and medical spaces were neutral, 
scientifically grounded, and devoid of culture (Taylor 2003). As an alternative, 
anthropologists proposed more sophisticated and flexible models of culture, advocating 
for the inclusion of anthropological concepts and methods in medical training, and 
especially the training for mental health care professionals (Hahn and Kleinman 1983; 
Kleinman 1982b; Kleinman, Eisenberg, and Good 1978).  
As these conversations were happening, medical anthropology was caught up in a 
debate over its identity between the so-called critical and clinical perspectives, and the 
outcomes of this debate had direct bearing on the changes in anthropological engagement 
with cultural competence over the next two decades. During the late 1980s and early 
1990s, critical medical anthropology emerged as a perspective – or a range of 
perspectives – that called for attention to power relations at the level of both clinical 
encounters and health care systems in general (Baer 1997; Baer, Singer, and Johnsen 
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1986; Singer 1989; Singer 1995). As more and more anthropologists at the time were 
entering clinical settings for fieldwork, proponents of the critical perspective cautioned 
against anthropology itself becoming “medicalized” – driven by and unreflectively 
accepting biomedical categories and assumptions (Browner 1999). Perhaps unavoidably, 
even the terms of the debate themselves – the meanings of “clinical” versus “critical” – 
eventually became actively contested, and a several visions of a potential rapprochement 
were offered (Morgan 1990; Scheper-Hughes 1990). 
By the early 2000s, approaches to training in cultural competence not only had 
become increasingly heterogeneous, but also began to incorporate many of the earlier 
anthropological critiques by shifting its focus from culture-specific instruction to 
inculcating more general skills and habits of mind (Jenks 2011) and expanding the 
working definition of culture to encompass the professional culture of medicine itself 
(Boutin-Foster, Foster, and Konopasek 2008). At the same time, anthropological 
engagement with the subject, previously largely confined to general critiques and 
prescriptive statements, grew to include ethnographic studies of specific cultural 
competence initiatives on the ground (Carpenter-Song et al. 2007; Delvecchio-Good et al. 
2011; Gregg and Saha 2006; Santiago-Irizarry 2011; Willen and Carpenter-Song 2013). 
Transcending the earlier focus on the patient-clinician dyadic interactions, 
anthropologists also started exploring culturally appropriate health care practices as “new 
technologies of knowledge and power that mobilize demands for cultural authenticity and 
produce new forms of expertise” (Shaw 2010: 537). Finally, some researchers began 
questioning the utility of cultural competence in medical education altogether, advocating 
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instead for a turn to “structural competence”: a framework that emphasizes the role of 
structural forces – political violence, poverty, racism, etc. – in shaping clinical 
interactions, interventions, and outcomes (Metzl 2012; Metzl and Hansen 2014).  
I believe that the developments reviewed above are a testimony to medical 
anthropology largely overcoming – or at least bridging – its earlier clinical/critical split. 
In its current form, anthropological engagement with cultural competence generally 
combines a critical angle with a more nuanced, sympathetic, and constructive stance 
toward medicine (Whitley 2014). In this dissertation, I both draw on the conventional 
anthropological critiques of the problematic, essentialist assumptions that often underlie 
cultural competence discourses and practices and embrace the more recent forms of 
anthropological engagement with cultural competence – namely, the focus on specific 
initiatives in the larger political-economic context. I contend, however, that a lot more 
attention should be devoted to the complex and often contradictory agendas that drive 
cultural competence efforts in health care. Specifically, I argue that there needs to be a 
more systematic and rigorous investigation of the relationship between the rise of cultural 
competence, the erosion of the welfare state and the spread of neoliberal policies, and 
other, country-specific, political transformations. The rest of the chapter, focused on 
Israel, provides a tentative example of what this analysis could look like. 
 
Health Disparities and Cultural Competence in Israel: A Policy Overview 
In Israel, “cultural competence” as an official governmental policy in the health 
care field is a very recent – and rather modest and small-scale – development, largely 
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launched by the 2011 Ministry of Health directive (Israel’s Ministry of Health 2011). At 
least a decade earlier, however, several grassroots initiatives emerged that sought to make 
health care services more inclusive and culturally sensitive. In the mid-2000s, 
professional medical interpreting started to take off in Israel. At that time, a small NGO 
began working on a range of initiatives to promote the access of patients with a limited 
and non-existent command of Hebrew to medical services. The first major achievement 
of this and other organizations was the establishment in 2007 of a phone interpreting 
service that was supposed to connect professional interpreters, Hebrew-speaking health 
care providers, and Amharic-speaking patients (more languages have been added since 
the launch of this program). These interpreters underwent a rigorous selection process, 
pursued additional training, and received a salary for their services. Thus, it was very 
different from the usual state of affairs in which it was relatives, staff members, and even 
random patients who happened to speak the language who did the translating. 
In the same year, 2007, Bar Ilan University in the Tel Aviv district launched a 
course in medical interpreting. Although they could not exclusively major in medical 
interpreting, students who spoke Russian, Amharic or Arabic could receive an additional 
specialization in interpreting and translation for language minorities and even receive a 
small scholarship if they decide to do so. In 2008, the first course in medical interpreting 
for clinical professionals opened at a children’s hospital in Jerusalem, Shemesh, initially 
only for Arabic and Russian speakers. Later it expanded to many other hospitals and 
clinics in the city (Jerusalem remains the center of any and all cultural competence 
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initiatives). The majority of those who take such courses are paramedical staff members 
(nurses, technicians, and administrative personnel) who are already bilingual21.  
In parallel, in the late 2000s the Israeli health care establishment, including the 
Ministry of Health, turned its attention to health disparities – an issue that did not receive 
a lot of attention in the preceding decades (Avni, Filc, and Davidovitch 2015). In 2008, 
Israel Medical Association22 issued a position paper on health disparities in Israel (pic. 1), 
making it the first institution within the Israeli health care establishment to call for a 
comprehensive plan to systematically tackle this problem on the national level (Avni, 
Filc, and Davidovitch 2015, 121).  
In this document, the IMA frames the issue of health disparities as a growing 
problem with “the most severe consequences” that requires urgent and coordinated action 
by state institutions (IMA 2008, 2). Data are then provided on disparities in life 
expectancy, general and infant mortality, disease prevalence (with a focus on diabetes 
and mental illness), healthy life style, and utilization of health care services. The bases of 
comparison are inconsistent and keep changing throughout the report: Some focus on the 
disparities between Jews and Arabs (with an additional breakdown by sex and age), while 
others concentrate on regional differences, and a few also compare rates for Arabs, 
natives of Europe/America, and natives of Asia/Africa, sometimes specifically focusing 
                                                      
21 Despite these developments, up to this day, the majority of hospitals and clinics in Israel do not employ 
formal interpreting services, and most of their medical professionals do not have any training in 
interpreting. Reliance on a relative, a child, or a staff member familiar with the patient’s language is not 
uncommon. 
22 Founded as a labor union in 1912, the IMA is the only representative professional organization of 
physicians in Israel that is influential in the training of physicians and the planning of national health care 
policy.   
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on the disparities affecting Ethiopian Jews. Especially interesting is the document’s 
section on the roots of health disparities. Here, the authors write (IMA 2008, 13): 
There is no doubt that the main causes of health disparities are related to the large 
(and expanding) gaps in social and cultural characteristics (income, education, 
religion and religiosity, residential area, sex, etc.) of different population groups, 
and to the lack of attention and action by the establishment to correct this 
situation. But, despite all the importance of these aspects, they are not within our 
control or responsibility as physicians.  
 
Following this declaration, the document proceeds to outline two domains in 
which the health care system and individual medical professionals can help reduce health 
inequalities: (1) improve medical infrastructure in the peripheral regions and (2) address 
economic and cultural barriers by improving the affordability of medication, providing 
translation services, and training staff in cultural competence (IMA 2008, 13). As Avni, 
Filc, and Davidovitch (2015) point out in their critical analysis of the IMA’s discourses 
on health disparities, the organization has supported, with some exceptions, the ongoing 
trend toward the privatization and deregulation of the health care services in Israel. While 
the IMA has opposed the privatization of some health care services and campaigned for 
expanding the basic basket of health services, it has also lobbied for the expansion of 
private services provided in public health care institutions. In other words, the IMA both 
acknowledges the importance of addressing health disparities and supports policies that, 
many would argue, ultimately exacerbate them.   
The IMA’s approach, with its implicit and sometimes contradictory assumptions, 
has been a key source of influence on the Ministry of Health policies in this area. In 
2009, the Ministry of Health launched a campaign to reduce health disparities, creating a 
specialized unit to address this problem (Horev and Avni 2016). In the following year, 
  
60 
the Ministry published its first report focused specifically on health disparities (Israel’s 
Ministry of Health 2010a) and listed their reduction among its strategic objectives for 
2011-2014 (Israel’s Ministry of Health 2010b), outlining the following pathways of 
action: 
(1) reducing economic barriers that impede access to health care,  
(2) improving the availability of medical professionals and enhancing physical 
infrastructure in the peripheral regions of the country (the Negev and the 
Galilee),  
(3) systematically gathering and disseminating information about health care 
inequalities on the governmental and public levels, 
(4) establishing incentives and accountability for HMOs, hospitals, and other 
stakeholders, and 
(5) narrowing health disparities due to cultural barriers by creating national 
standards, ensuring the availability of translation services, and enhancing 
the cultural competence of health care staff (emphasis mine). 
In the winter of 2011, the Ministry of Health published a directive that was 
supposed to put in place a framework for implementing this latter goal (Israel’s Ministry 
of Health 2011). The document obliged all medical institutions receiving state funding to 
take steps toward improving the cultural and linguistic accessibility of health care 
services, starting in February 2013. The directive identified five cornerstone principles 
underlying its recommendations (Israel’s Ministry of Health 2011, 2-3):  
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(1) Health care organizations must create an infrastructure that would support 
ongoing efforts to promote accessibility and help formulate internal 
organizational policies. 
(2) Health care organizations must translate all documents intended for patient 
use into “additional languages” and provide access to translation over the 
phone. 
(3) Medical and administrative staff in hospitals and clinics must be trained in 
cultural accessibility (the document does not specify the parameters of such 
training).  
(4) An appropriate physical infrastructure (signs, directions, “suitable 
equipment”) must be developed. 
(5) It is recommended that these measures are implemented in accordance with 
“cultural and linguistic mapping” [mippuy lashoni ve-tarbuti] of the target 
population in each specific location.  
Since the publishing of the directive, the Ministry of Health has taken several 
major steps toward implementing the policy. In 2013, it opened a telephone medical 
translation center offering services in Arabic, Amharic, Russian, and French. In 2014, 
after a successful pilot run in several parts of the country, the services were extended to 
the national level. The same year, the Ministry developed a training kit for health care 
organizations that included theoretical material about cultural competence, lesson plans, 
and video simulations. The Ministry is also currently finalizing a database with various 
standard information sheets and forms translated into Arabic, Russian, and English. 
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Roots of the Changes 
How do we make sense of the cultural competence policy, as well as of the larger 
trend toward addressing health disparities in Israel? I argue that a confluence of several 
intertwined forces has been at play, including the enormous political-economic shifts in 
Israel since the 1980s (and their specific effects on the health care system) and, possibly, 
the more recent considerations related to Israel’s membership in international 
organizations. I contend that the efforts to address health disparities, including the 
cultural competence policy, can be seen as a compromise measure that seeks to 
demonstrate good will while also allowing for multiple interpretations and not 
challenging the increasingly privatizing infrastructure of Israeli health care.  
First, we must understand the Israeli health care reform and how it affected the 
relative status and influence of the Ministry of Health in setting national policy, the 
relationship between the Ministry and the party politics, and the power shift between the 
public and the private sectors in Israeli medicine. Although the health care reform started 
in the 1990s, it was itself engendered by two interrelated processes – namely, the late 
1970s’ shift of power from the Zionist Labor to the right-wing Likud and the subsequent 
neoliberal restructuring of Israeli economy in the 1980s and 1990s23. Originally, health 
care insurance coverage and health care services in Israel were primarily provided by 
four private, not-for-profit, voluntary sick funds (kupot cholim, sg. kupat cholim) that had 
                                                      
23 The neoliberal restructuring included such changes as introducing deep cuts in the budgets allocated for 
social services, the curbing of the power of labor unions, and the privatization of public companies and 
services.  
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been established in the Mandate-era Yishuv. The largest of these, Clalit, was owned by 
the Histadrut labor federation and, due to its strong links with the ruling Labor Party, 
exerted significant influence on health care policies. The responsibility for the financing, 
planning, and provision of health care services was distributed between the sick funds 
and the Ministry of Health, with the latter also in charge of in-patient and public health 
services, including psychiatric care. The Ministry had no legal authority to regulate or 
oversee the sick funds, and a competitive and dual relationship between the state and the 
sick funds became the mainstay of Israeli health care system (Gross and Anson 2002). 
By the late 1980s, 95% of the population had voluntarily enrolled with one of the 
sick funds. Despite this near-universal coverage, discontent with the health care system’s 
pitfalls started gaining momentum over the course of that decade. Following the rise of 
Likud, Clalit, previously at a great advantage due to its links with Labor, lost its 
disproportionate influence on the health care system. This allowed other sick funds to 
attract healthy and young members, leaving Clalit in charge of a large proportion of the 
elderly, poor, and chronically ill. By the mid-1990s, the financial and organizational 
instability of Clalit was starting to jeopardize the entire health care system. Furthermore, 
the public was growing dissatisfied with the long waiting lines and with the lack of free 
choice in sick fund enrollment. This discontent was amplified by the ongoing financial 
crisis and labor unrest in the country (Chernichovsky and Chinitz 1995). 
In the 1990s, the state started a formal inquiry into the condition of the health care 
system that culminated in the passing of the National Health Insurance Law in 1994. The 
law mandated universal health care coverage for all residents (incorporating the 5-7% of 
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the population that were previously uninsured), obliged all four sick funds to provide a 
standard basket of services24 (eliminating the previously existing significant variation in 
coverage), and replaced the system of membership dues with a health income tax (thus 
making the state rather than the sick funds financially responsible for health care 
provision). From the standpoint of ordinary Israelis, this meant that they could freely 
choose the sick fund of their preference and the sick funds could no longer take health 
status or preexisting conditions into consideration when granting membership. 
The long-term political significance of these changes runs deep. The reform 
drastically redistributed the balance of power from sick funds toward the Ministry of 
Health that had previously been seen as a “weak” ministry, overshadowed by Clalit in its 
ability to set and implement national policies. The link between Clalit, Histadrut, and the 
governing Labor party that defined Israeli health care system for decades was broken 
(Zalmanovitch 2002). The Ministry of Health was now in charge of overseeing and 
regulating sick funds, and its influence on national health care policies increased. 
As the Ministry of Health assumed an elevated status, it also became a more 
important bargaining chip in coalition politics25. Throughout the 1990s, Shas, the party 
that represented the interests of the ultra-Orthodox and religious sectors of Sephardi and 
Mizrahi communities, expanded its control over various governmental ministries, 
reflecting its growing influence in Israel’s political life. In addition to the Interior 
                                                      
24 The sick funds were also allowed to offer supplemental insurance for an additional charge, covering 
benefits that were not covered by the standard basket of services. 
25 This change should not be overstated: The Ministry is still generally perceived as weak and undesirable 
by political parties vying for distribution of governmental posts. 
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Ministry and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Shas assumed control of the Labor and 
Social Welfare Ministry and the Ministry of Health. This generated a strong undercurrent 
of public opinion that accused Shas of clientelism and disproportionately catering to its 
political base (Sarfati 2014, 74-75). The actual proclamations by Shas-affiliated Ministers 
of Health did not help: Shlomo Benizri26, in one of his first public statements after 
assuming the post in 1999, promised to appoint hospital rabbis and kashrut supervisions, 
and Nissim Dahan, Minister in 2001-2003, spoke enthusiastically about the impending 
prospect of Israel becoming “a Halakhic state” (Makover and Freilich-Tzvi 2001, 26 
cited in Ben-Yehuda 2010, 204). 
In this context, it is interesting to note that the efforts to address health disparities 
and institute cultural competence started under the first Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox deputy 
minister27 and head of the Agudat Israel party, Yaakov Litzman (in office between 2009-
2013 and from 2015 to this day). Although this is speculation on my part, the time 
coincidence makes me wonder whether Litzman was trying to distance himself from his 
Mizrahi ultra-Orthodox predecessors and increase his political capital by encouraging 
measures that serve the interests of all Israelis. (Indeed, Litzman seems to cultivate his 
image as a surprisingly popular minister, viewed positively by the entire spectrum of 
Israeli population, including secular Jews.) 
                                                      
26 In 2008, Benizri was tried and convicted of accepting bribes, breach of public trust, obstructing justice, 
and conspiracy to commit a crime. 
27 Due to the vicissitudes of ultra-Orthodox politics, his official post was called “deputy minister” (with the 
Prime Minister at the time acting, in name only, as the Minister of Health). 
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On the surface level, it may seem that the health care reform had a very 
universalist agenda. And yet, it actually opened the door for the privatization of the health 
care system. Although 1994 the NHI law created a single-payer system with universal 
coverage, the subsequent changes in legislation drastically shifted the burden of spending 
onto individual households through the increase of out-of-pocket expenses (Gross 2014). 
Furthermore, private medical services offered in public hospitals and clinics started 
expanding. The rising tensions between public and private sectors came to a head in 
2013, when Minister of Health Yael German, a center-left politician, formed a committee 
to investigate the state of Israel’s health care system. After the committee’s report came 
out in 2014, German proclaimed in a press conference, “Our goal is to turn the clock back 
and to increase public spending on health at the expense of private medicine” (Linder-
Ganz 2014). It was in the beginning of German’s tenure that mitigating health disparities 
was removed from the list of the Ministry’s strategic goals, replaced with a more general 
focus on “health promotion” (Horev and Avni 2016). Litzman was an acrimonious critic 
of German and, when in 2015 he assumed the Minister of Health post again, he rolled 
back all of her radical reforms and returned health disparities to the list of priorities. 
 This change of agendas may seem puzzling or even incomprehensible: It appears, 
at first glance, that both Ministers were concerned with the same problem of equity. Why, 
then, pit addressing health disparities against the strengthening of the public sector in 
medicine? After all, a central argument against the privatization of health care has to do 
with the inequalities that a two-tiered system can foster. I argue that these two goals 
implicitly align with a split of the Israeli political elite between two opposite ideological 
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and political poles, embodied in the confrontation between German and Litzman. 
German, a secular woman with center-left political views, represents the part of the older 
Israeli political establishment that is ambivalent about unbridled neoliberal policies. 
Litzman is part of the new heterogeneous political elite that emerged in the 1970s in 
opposition to the Labor Party and generally supported neoliberal policies, aiming to 
undermine the influence of Labor and to increase its own political capital by filling the 
niche created by the retrenchment of the welfare state (Sarfati 2014, 72-73).  
 With this party politics in mind, the seemingly paradoxical juxtaposition of 
tackling health disparities and strengthening the public sector no longer appears 
paradoxical. Litzman’s policy of reducing health disparities addresses the growing public 
awareness of gaps between population groups in their access to health care. (One 
prominent example of this rising awareness of social inequalities in Israel were the mass 
protests of 2011 that involved demonstrators expressing grievances over the rising cost of 
living and the deteriorating state of public services, including health care.) At the same 
time, with some exceptions, the Ministry of Health has largely supported the expansion 
of private services into the public health care realm28. Cultural competence and other 
related measures may thus be understood as the product of a compromise: They address 
the perceived need to do something about the growing gaps, but without touching the 
increasingly privatizing infrastructure of Israeli medicine.  
                                                      
28 In terms of exceptions, Litzman pushed for the inclusion of dental services for children in the basic 
health basket. While some lauded this move, others suggested that Litzman was simply catering to his key 
constituency, Haredi families (that tend to have a large number of children and low incomes and would 
thus benefit from not having to pay out-of-pocket for their children’s dental treatments). In order for the 
measure to pass, the budget for the basic basket of services had to be reduced in other areas, which also 
contributed to discontent. 
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While the internal changes and power shifts in Israel provide a powerful 
explanation for the growing attention to health disparities, another factor bears 
mentioning. From this standpoint, these policies may also be understood as a pragmatic 
step on the part of the Israeli government that is seeking to fulfill the formal bureaucratic 
requirements for its membership in international organizations and especially the OECD. 
In 2007, amidst the rising indicators of economic growth, the OECD invited Israel to 
begin membership negotiations that ended with Israel joining the organization in 2010. 
The membership was important for the Israeli political establishment as it not only 
promised a boost to Israeli economy, but also mitigated the public concerns over the 
state’s perceived international isolation (Pal 2012, 201). 
However, the OECD expressed several concerns about the state of Israeli labor 
market and social policies, including significant social gaps between Arabs and Haredim, 
on the one hand, and the rest of the society, on the other (OECD 2009; OECD 2010). The 
2012 OECD Review of Health Care Quality in Israel commended the government for its 
proclaimed commitment to reduce disparities between socioeconomic and cultural 
groups, but stated that “health promotion and health education services for disadvantaged 
groups, and culturally competent care, should be strengthened further” (OECD 2012: 
129). In this context, the range of policies that Israel has issued in the second half of the 
2000s to reduce socioeconomic disparities in the spheres of health care, education, 
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employment, and welfare can at least partially be understood as related to the demands of 
the country’s new membership in the OECD.29  
In what appears to be an incidentally simultaneous process, Israeli hospitals have 
been undergoing accreditation by the Joint Commission International (JCI), an 
international branch of the US Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care 
Organizations. JCI accreditation, sought after by health care facilities worldwide, has 
become a declaration that health care services are of international quality, which is 
especially significant for Israeli hospitals interested in attracting international medical 
tourists30. From this standpoint, by embracing the policy of cultural competence Israel is 
also seeking to maintain and increase the influx of medical tourists from abroad. 
 
 Cultural Competence Policies and Competing Public Ethics 
 Are the policies to address health care disparities and institute cultural 
competence in Israel a sign of Israeli society becoming truly inclusive? Or are they an 
insignificant blip on the radar – perhaps, even, an instance of window-dressing? I would 
argue that neither of these characterizations is accurate. There is a sizable body of critical 
sociological and anthropological literature, mostly focusing on the ongoing debates in 
                                                      
29 At the current moment, it is not entirely clear to me to what extent the OECD requirements had a real 
bearing on Israeli policies and legislation. It is entirely possible that the impact was rather limited in 
comparison with the internal factors (such as Israeli coalition politics). In my follow-up research, I would 
like to investigate this and other potential influences on the cultural competence legislation more 
systematically. 
30 Interestingly, I was told that, although compliance with cultural competence guidelines constitutes a 
criterion for receiving accreditation, several hospitals have already received it without taking any relevant 
steps. Moreover, if in the United States compliance with the 2001 Cultural and Linguistic Accessibility 
Standards (CLAS) is a strict requirement for receiving federal funding, in Israel its counterpart is 
essentially “empty” – with no risk associated with ignoring it other than the possibility of losing 
accreditation. 
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Israeli society over the right of migrant workers to health care, that shows that the public 
discourses over right to health in Israel engage multiple and competing “logics”, such as 
cost efficiency, public health, solidarity, and ethno-national citizenship (Filc and 
Davidovich 2005; Gilbar and Marmor 2008; Willen 2011b). Building on this insight, I 
propose that it would be more apt to talk about competing public ethics that emphasize 
divergent values or concerns (Barth 1993). Furthermore, the extent of ethical deliberation 
is not limited to the debates over the immigrant workers’ right to health care – instead, it 
permeates the entire discourse about health care in Israel and, in fact, stretches beyond 
the health care field to Israeli public sphere in general, where competing visions of the 
good society are constantly debated and contested. The current efforts to address health 
disparities and institute cultural competence in Israel should be understood in the context 
of these debates and contestations. 
The first tension is between the ethic of solidarity, which many liberal Zionist 
Israelis imagine as the foundational ethos of Israel, and the ethic of cost efficiency, 
espoused by proponents of neoliberal reforms. As described in this chapter, the 1990s’ 
health care reform created a single-payer system with universal insurance coverage and 
set binding standards for the type and quality of health care services. However, various 
amendments following the 1994 law shifted a significant part of the financial burden onto 
patients by imposing out-of-pocket fees. Although the power of the Ministry of Health 
grew significantly as a result of the reforms, it was – and is – still subservient to the 
Ministry of Finance’s budgetary decisions, and only the Ministry of Finance has the right 
to approve budgetary increases or funding for new programs.  
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It is this tension that underlies the practical limitations of the 2011 cultural 
competence directive. Because the state does not allocate any additional funding for these 
initiatives or spell out a mechanism by which to enforce compliance, medical institutions 
have few incentives to implement any changes, and the responsibility for the modest 
changes that are happening often falls on the shoulders of individuals who have already 
been pushing for greater sensitivity for years, if not decades. I have no doubt that many, 
if not all, individuals behind these policies had benevolent intentions, but the scope of 
these reforms is bound to be limited as long as the bottom-line considerations of the 
Ministry of Finance (cost efficiency) override the guiding principles of justice, equity, 
and mutual aid (solidarity) declared in the NHI law. 
The second, and more fundamental, tension is between the ethics of inclusive vs. 
ethno-national citizenship. Israel’s foundational self-definition, affixed in its Declaration 
of Independence, is that of a “Jewish and democratic” state. The last four decades of 
Israeli history have seen a spate of challenges to this self-definition. The “Jewish” part 
has been contested from numerous sides: Israeli Arabs calling on Israel to become “a 
state for all its citizens”, Mizrahi and Ethiopian activists advocating a more inclusive 
definition of Jewishness that extends beyond Ashkenaziyut, and secular (including 
immigrants from the f. USSR who are not halachically Jewish) and non-Orthodox Jews 
challenging the dominant Orthodox definitions of “Jewishness.” The “democratic” part 
has similarly become an object of contestation. As the influence of religious Zionists on 
the society and the government continues to expand, an ethno-nationalist vision of Israel 
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as first and foremost a Jewish nation-state is expressed and discussed more widely in the 
public sphere.  
As I am writing this (in the February of 2018), the two visions of Israel are 
clashing in the most immediate way. In response to the highly controversial bill, currently 
under consideration in the Knesset where it is backed by right-wing parties, that seeks to 
enshrine the definition of Israel as a Jewish nation-state in a Basic Law (thus giving it 
constitutional weight), Dr. Yousef Jabareen, an Israeli Arab member of Knesset, 
introduced counter-proposal that calls for Israel to define itself “a democratic, 
multicultural, and egalitarian state.” Whereas the Jewish nation-state bill seeks to strip 
Arabic of its official language status, obligate the Supreme Court to consider “Jewish 
tradition” in the absence of legal precedent, and restricts the right to national self-
determination to Jewish people only31, Jabareen’s proposal explicitly refers to the 
Canadian model of multiculturalism in its calls for total civil, cultural, and national 
equality between all citizens of Israel32. 
In light of this analysis, the reforms I discussed in this chapter can be seen as a 
response to an increasingly polarized debate over Israel’s self-definition. The language of 
the cultural competence directive does not embrace a strictly ethno-nationalist ethic: 
Indeed, the first sentence of the cultural competence directive proclaims that “the 
                                                      
31 The English text of the current version of the nation-state bill, as well as its previous iterations, can be 
accessed via Marginalia Los Angeles Review of Books forum on recent attempts to determine Israel’s 
character, http://marginalia.lareviewofbooks.org/jewish-and-democratic-according-to-the-law/ . I provided 
the English translations for the forum. 
32 This bill, introduced into the Knesset in the last week of January 2018, has not been translated into 
English at the time of my writing (late February 2018), but it has already received some coverage in 
English-language press (Harkov 2018). 
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population of Israel is a heterogeneous population comprised of groups that differ on 
issues such as religion, culture, and language,” each of them characterized by a unique 
“tradition and lifestyle, as well as perceptions of health and illness, health behavior, 
patterns of use of health care services, morbidity patterns, and various health indicators” 
(Israel’s Ministry of Health 2011, 1). And yet, the discourse of the directive cannot be 
identified with the ethic of inclusive citizenship, either. By invoking “lifestyle” and 
“tradition” and resorting to the language of “heterogeneity,” this statement paints a 
politically neutral picture of a multicultural mosaic and obscures the power imbalances 
between communities. It also fails to consider how the existing health disparities and 
barriers to access can, to a significant extent, be traced back to deliberate governmental 
policies, such as the internal displacement of Palestinians (Daoud et al. 2012) or the 
systematic settlement of the far-flung and underserved “development towns” with 
Mizrahi olim (Yiftachel 2000). It goes without saying that there is no acknowledgment, 
in any of these documents, of the ongoing occupation and its effects on the health of 
Israelis (due to the costs of the military and settler presence in the Occupied Territories 
and the stress, injury, and loss of life during the violent stages of the conflict), not to 
mention the Palestinians.  
An analysis of the recent governmental efforts to address health disparities and 
institute cultural competence in Israel in light of public ethical deliberation over 
competing visions of the good provides a deeper insight into both the motivations and the 
limitations of these initiatives. One advantage of this lens is that it helps us avoid the trap 
of either idealizing these measures or dismissing them as nothing but empty rhetoric or a 
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sinister tool of social control and propaganda. Instead, the rather modest scope of these 
policies results from the situation wherein the ethic of solidarity is overshadowed by the 
more salient concerns with cost efficiency and the ethics of inclusive and ethno-national 
citizenship are clashing, ever more vigorously, in the public sphere. Without becoming 
something more than an afterthought on the government’s agenda and addressing the 
structural causes that go to the heart of Israeli regime and its contradictions, these policies 
are bound to have a limited, palliative effect. 
In the next chapter, I will turn to the discourses and practices of training in 
cultural competence for health care professionals and show that these do not fully align 
with the official model that seeks to construe structural disparities as problems of 
“cultural difference”, to be solved by making health care settings more “culturally 
sensitive”. In fact, the people behind the training have their own – politically ambiguous 
and often surprising – agendas and viewpoints. 
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CHAPTER TWO: TRAINING IN CULTURAL COMPETENCE: ERASING 
POLITICS? 
 In the preceding chapter I analyzed the substance of and motivations behind the 
efforts to address health disparities and promote cultural competence that have been 
taking place in Israel over the last decade. I now turn to the key component of the cultural 
competence policies – the training of health care professionals. The first section of this 
chapter discusses an NGO that has been a major player in the cultural competence 
movement in Israel, the Center for Cultural Pluralism in Jerusalem. Most of this chapter 
is devoted to an in-depth case study of a cultural competence workshop organized by the 
CCPJ. First, however, I discuss the complex political positioning of this organization that 
colors its approach to cultural competence, using for illustration two vignettes from my 
observations at a conference on “Jerusalem as a culturally competent city” that the CCPJ 
organized in 2016.  
 
The Center for Cultural Pluralism in Jerusalem 
 The CCPJ is one of the major proponents of cultural competence in Israel. 
Founded in 1999, the CCPJ is headed by Dr. Alon Barak33, who was originally trained in 
neuroscience and then pursued training in educational leadership, with a focus on 
multicultural models. On its website, the CCPJ defines its goal as making sure that all 
residents of Jerusalem can become actively involved in shaping the future of their own 
                                                      
33 In this chapter, I use pseudonyms for the names of individuals involved in CCPJ, the organization itself, 
and the two hospitals where I observed training in cultural competence.  
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communities, as well as Jerusalem as a whole. To achieve this, the CCPJ works to 
promote city-wide cultural competence in all public spheres (including health care) and 
cross-cultural community engagement. In 2008, the CCPJ launched its first cultural 
competence in health care program at the Shemesh Hospital, a pediatric and adolescent 
rehabilitation facility in a southwestern neighborhood of Jerusalem. Since 2011, the 
CCPJ has been working with the Ministry of Health on the formulation and 
implementation of the cultural competence policies. It not only provided guidance during 
the drafting of the 2011 directive, but also came up with the idea of training “cultural 
competence coordinators,” specialized staff members tasked with promoting cultural 
competence within their organizations. The CCPJ also organizes training for regular 
employees, in order to catch them up on the meaning of cultural competence policies. 
The main source of funding for the CCPJ is the Jerusalem Foundation (Ha-Keren 
L’Yerushalayim), an independent philanthropic organization founded in 1965 by Teddy 
Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem at the time. Frustrated with the limited national and 
municipal budgets available, Kollek created an organization that raised funds 
internationally (namely from Jewish contributors in the Diaspora) for aesthetic, social, 
and cultural projects in Jerusalem. Two years later, when Israel occupied East Jerusalem 
during the course of the Six-Day War, the Foundation came to serve a crucial role in the 
transformation the city, funding projects that the city otherwise would not be able to 
afford (Sharkansky 1984). Due to his dual position as the city mayor and the Foundation 
president between 1965 and 1993, Kollek was able to successfully appeal to both foreign 
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donors and Israeli officials at the municipal and national level to push for various 
projects.  
The ambiguous discourses of the CCPJ-organized cultural competence training 
can to a large extent be traced to the politics of the Jerusalem Foundation and Kollek 
himself. In Israeli memory and imagination, Kollek stands as a larger than life figure, 
“king of Jerusalem” and its “greatest planner since Herod,” who turned the rather decrepit 
city into a truly modern place. While he was alive, however, Kollek’s policies 
antagonized and angered people across the entire spectrum of Israel’s numerous divides. 
While constantly voicing his commitment to coexistence and expanding municipal 
services to East Jerusalem, he was also criticized for not doing enough in this respect. A 
secular, centrist politician and a member of the Labor party, he vehemently opposed 
militant religious Zionists and their plans for Jerusalem. Nevertheless, he was also 
adamant about the city as a “multicultural mosaic” that should never be divided again and 
supported the building of Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. If from a right-wing 
standpoint Kollek was suspect as too friendly toward the Palestinians, from a more leftist 
perspective the only difference between Kollek and his opponents was that he used the 
rhetoric of coexistence as a fig leaf to cover up the reality of creeping annexation and 
long-standing neglect of East Jerusalem (Klein 2001, 75-76). In other words, Kollek was 
a shrewd and effective politician who appealed to multiple constituencies without fully 
aligning himself with any of them and occasionally playing them against one another. 
The Foundation itself has fielded similar criticisms. Since 1965, it has funded 
over 4,000 projects in West and East Jerusalem, including libraries, museums, theaters, 
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shelters, community centers, playgrounds, and parks (Jerusalem Foundation, 
“Accomplishments”). The official rhetoric of the foundation emphasizes that it caters to 
all Jerusalem residents, in all neighborhoods, and strives to empower its “weakest 
communities” (such as Arab residents of East Jerusalem and the Haredim). At the same 
time, its discourse does consistently describe Jerusalem as “unified,” and the words 
“occupation” or “occupied” are nowhere to be found on its official website (unless used 
in the context of job market). Some left-wing critics of the Foundation, Palestinian and 
otherwise, further highlight its involvement with projects in Jewish neighborhoods across 
the Green Line and in controversial archeological excavations in the City of David, 
accusing the organization of whitewashing the occupation. Depending on the political 
lens of the observer, then, the Jerusalem Foundation can be seen either as a progressive 
organization that seeks to improve living conditions of all the city’s residents or as part of 
the Zionist establishment that trades in progressive rhetoric to normalize the status quo. 
My own view is that neither of these extreme characterizations is entirely right – or that 
both are, in a sense. In the current political climate, when Israel is not only maintaining, 
but actively expanding its presence in East Jerusalem and other territories beyond the 
Green Line, it is not surprising that a large part of the public discourse is devoted not to 
disputing this presence itself, but to debating on what conditions – humane or otherwise – 
this presence should continue. 
The CCPJ’s political agenda, and especially its stance on pluralism and conflict, is 
a reflection of this state of the discourse. During my fieldwork, this played out in a 
particularly clear fashion at the day-long conference, “Jerusalem as a Culturally 
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Competent City,” that the CCPJ organized in May of 2016, in collaboration with the 
Jerusalem Foundation. The conference, held at the Jerusalem Cinemateque, lasted from 8 
am to 5 pm and was co-hosted by the CCPJ Director, Alon Barak, and the East Jerusalem 
Projects Coordinator of the Jerusalem Foundation, Haneen Mgadlh. The “festive 
opening” included brief speeches by Nir Barkat, mayor of Jerusalem, and Yohanna 
Arbib-Perugia, president of the Jerusalem Foundation, which was followed by the 
performance of the YMCA Jerusalem Youth Chorus that brings together children from 
West and East Jerusalem. After a presentation by Uzma Shakir, Director of the Office of 
Equity, Diversity and Human Rights of the City of Toronto, the conference broke into 
several parallel sessions, the topics of which included setting and implementing cultural 
competence policy in an organization, cultural competence in Jerusalem public space, 
cultural competence activities of the community, and coping with social and political 
tensions in a multicultural city. The lunch break followed and the participants 
reassembled for a plenary session on cultural competence in major organizations in the 
city, the speakers of which included Director of the Jerusalem Mental Health Care 
Center34, President of Hadassah College, commander of the Old City police precinct, and 
a Jerusalem municipality official. After another break, a final slew of parallel sessions 
followed, on topics such as providing culturally competent health services, culture and art 
in a multicultural city, developing citywide tolerance in a multicultural city, and 
education and higher education in a multicultural city (Jerusalem Foundation 2016).   
                                                      
34 Kfar Shaul, the hospital described in the following two chapters, is part of the JMCC, along with another 
hospital (Eitanim) and a network of community mental health care centers. 
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What immediately struck me upon entering the conference was that each 
participant was provided with a special set of headphones that could be tuned to a 
Hebrew or Arabic channel. The rationale was to make sure that any Arabic speaker could 
tune in to the Arabic channel for simultaneous translation of talks delivered in Hebrew – 
and the other way around for a Hebrew speaker. The actual practices I observed, 
however, were quite different from this envisioned ideal. At the outset of the conference, 
its two hosts delivered opening remarks and introduced the speakers, one of them (the 
CCPJ director) speaking in Hebrew, the other (the Jerusalem Foundation representative, a 
Palestinian woman) – in Arabic. Although during the conference registration the 
participants received instructions about using the headphones, when I scanned the room 
during the Arabic sections of the opening ceremony very few people were wearing them 
and some were looking around with annoyance or bewilderment. During the rest of the 
conference, some native speakers of Arabic did rely on the interpreting services to 
translate their remarks, while others chose to use Hebrew or to accompany their 
comments in Arabic with a Hebrew translation. 
Another poignant moment came at the end of the plenary session, during the 
Q&A. A Palestinian resident came up to the microphone and, after acknowledging the 
translation services, proceeded, in Hebrew, to raise two questions: Does multiculturalism 
[rav-tarbutiyut] encompass political and religious issues in Jerusalem? What does it mean 
to talk about a “culturally competent” municipality or police if they are not properly 
serving him, “a Palestinian resident of Jerusalem”? He provided specific examples, 
criticizing Israel Police for “protecting” the Jewish extremists who try to enter the 
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Temple Mount in violation of the status quo35 and taking issue with the Municipality’s 
limited involvement in improving infrastructure in East Jerusalem neighborhoods, 
including the one where he lives. The Israeli Police commander responded in a defensive 
manner, heavily implying that the person who asked the question was disrespectful and 
asserting that his policemen are culturally accommodating in “a very precise way” and 
detain anyone in violation of the status quo rules, be they Jewish or Muslim. The 
Municipality employee, personally acquainted with the Palestinian audience member, 
responded in a gentler fashion, acknowledging his grievances and assuring him that the 
Municipality was trying to do its best with the limited resources available. After this 
exchange, Barak (the CCPJ director) thanked the audience member for mentioning “the 
elephant in the room”. The rest of his remarks are so noteworthy that they deserve to be 
provided verbatim: 
The question is not whether the police or the municipality are political. But the 
fact is that they are perceived [he emphasizes this word] as political. And this 
political dynamic is tense. <…> There is a difficult dynamic. [Addressing the 
police commander:] Doron, Israeli Police is the fairest it can be, but you know 
very well that in the reality of ihtilal [“occupation” in Arabic], of kibush 
[“occupation” in Hebrew], residents look at police with suspicion. The Jerusalem 
Municipality can be doing what is within its ability – we can argue what comes 
out of it <…> – but the residents assume that the services are limited because of 
racism or because of the occupation. We can argue about occupation in Jerusalem 
for weeks, there are many discussions, but the bottom line [tachles] is, there are 
                                                      
35 In this context, the status quo refers to the arrangements regarding the status of the site known as the 
Temple Mount to Jews and the Noble Sanctuary to Muslims. Since the annexation/occupation of East 
Jerusalem in 1967, Israel maintains security control over the compound, while the Muslim waqf authority, 
controlled by the Jordanian government, oversees everyday operations. Jews are allowed limited access to 
visit the site, but all prayer is forbidden by the waqf rules. Additionally, the ruling of the Chief Rabbinate 
of Israel forbids Jews from entering the Temple Mount on the grounds of the ritual impurity. (Since in the 
temple days only a high priest was able to enter the Holy of Holies and the precise location of the latter is 
unknown, Jews entering this site could unknowingly be committing a serious religious violation.) However, 
some religious Zionist activists have been calling for Jewish religious access to Temple Mount and, in 
some cases, attempting to pray during their visit.  
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many tensions. <…> And it’s also true about Haredim. It is also true about olim 
from Ethiopia who think there is discrimination against them. <…> So how shall 
we act inside this tension and when the aim of the system is to be as fair as 
possible? This is definitely a dynamic that we should cope with, and it’s part of 
cultural competence. 
 
Barak then lamented that this problem – how to address social and political 
tensions – is not well-explored in the existing literature on cultural competence and 
implored the audience members to keep this question in mind and return to it during the 
closing part of the conference (which did not end up happening). 
How are we to make sense of these vignettes? The translation arrangement and 
reactions to it belies a profound imbalance in Israel’s language politics. While both 
Arabic and Hebrew are official languages of the State, the reality is that many Jewish 
Israelis speak or understand very little Arabic, but most Arab citizens of Israel use 
Hebrew extensively in everyday and professional life. As a result, Jewish Israelis (or, 
rather, the native Hebrew speakers among them) can generally trust that they will rarely 
if ever have to rely on translation, because everything is in their native tongue, whereas 
many Arabic speakers in Israel are effectively bilingual (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006; Landau 
1987). The simultaneous interpreting solution both provides an egalitarian vision and 
points to the power disparities that currently make this vision impossible, but does so 
indirectly. Similarly, Barak’s remarks acknowledge the legitimacy of the Palestinian 
audience member’s grievance, yet reframe the question as the matter of political 
sentiments that should be coped with rather than political disparities that ought to be 
resolved.  
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These two vignettes reveal that the CCPJ is trying to navigate between several 
competing discourses on coexistence and conflict, without fully fitting into any of these 
discourses. On one end of the spectrum is the extreme right-wing, neo-Zionist stance that 
upholds an exclusionary, ethno-nationalist vision of Israel and takes a skeptical or even 
hostile position toward coexistence efforts (framed as futile in the absence of a true 
“partner for peace” on the Palestinian side). On the other end can be found a critique, 
voiced by some Palestinians and post-Zionist Israelis, that pans coexistence initiatives, of 
the sort that the CCPJ promotes, for their contributions to “normalizing” the occupation. 
The argument goes, these initiatives concentrate on how to make the conditions of the 
occupation more tolerable rather than on changing the abnormal conditions themselves 
(Salem 2005).  
One possible intermediate position, and the one that the CCPJ espouses, is to 
reject ethno-nationalism without embracing a radical anti-occupation stance. Drawing on 
the language of human rights and participatory democracy, this position advocates 
focusing on improving the everyday life of all Israel’s residents instead of waiting for a 
comprehensive political solution. The CCPJ, then, does not so much ignore politics as 
reframe the meaning of the “political”. It presents itself as an organization that is outside 
of the political discussions and is merely concerned with improving the daily life of all 
Jerusalem’s residents – which is, of course, an inherently political position in itself. For 
instance, the CCPJ website describes it as a “non-partisan organization” that is able to 
“work equally with all parties” and “to retain an independent perspective when working 
with a mix of identities”. Similarly, when Middle East Eye, a news website that tends to 
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take a critical and pro-boycott position on Israel, reached out to the CCPJ to comment on 
its invitation of some officials and politicians that are involved with the settlement 
activity in East Jerusalem, Barak responded, “At the [CCPJ], we do not ask where the 
borders of the city of Jerusalem [are]. We are not a part of the political discussion. It 
means that even people of the suburbs [Jewish settlements] can be a part of this process.” 
He added that “it’s not about legitimizing or deligitimising anyone” (D’Amours 2016). 
 By taking this sort of stance, the CCPJ is able to engage in work that is, by 
almost any definition, political, such as promoting the ideals of coexistence and 
tolerance, pushing for the improved access of Palestinians to various municipal resources, 
and facilitating community dialogue between Haredi and non-Haredi Jews. By 
positioning itself as “not political” while doing all this, the organization lays claims to the 
image and the social capital that can enable the work conducted across a spectrum of 
political affiliations and visions.  
 
Cultural Competence Training: Discourses and Practices 
The complicated and nuanced political stance of the CCPJ has affected its 
approach to cultural competence training. During my long-term fieldwork in 2015-2016, 
I was invited to observe two CCPJ training sessions for the staff at two different hospitals 
in Jerusalem. One, Neve Geula, has an unofficial reputation as a “religious” [dati] 
hospital, due to not only a large number of religious patients and staff members, but also 
because its infrastructure is geared toward the comfort of religious Jews: the elevators do 
not work on Shabbat, during Shabbat rounds physicians delegate note-taking 
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responsibilities to others, etc. The second one, Shemesh, is a children’s hospital that 
considers itself one of the pioneers when it comes to the implementation of cultural 
competence. The sessions I observed were nearly identical in content and conducted by 
the same facilitators. In what follows, I describe and analyze the discourse of the training 
sessions, putting a special emphasis on the implicit messages about cultural differences 
and political tensions. To give a more vivid picture of the training, I concentrate on the 
Neve Geula example throughout the description. 
 
Cultural Competence Workshop at Neve Geula: A Case Study 
 The two organizers of the workshop in both cases were Dorit and Adina. Both are 
in their early forties, but their academic and professional background differs. Dorit, 
director of the CCPJ cultural competence desk, was previously trained in management 
and and worked on community meditation and municipal projects in various locations 
around Israel. Adina, the CCPJ’s senior consultant and facilitator in the area of cultural 
competence, has a PhD in translation studies and lectures at a university on medical 
interpreting and cultural competence.  
As mentioned earlier, the 2011 directive obliges all hospital employees – both 
medical and administrative staff – to receive training in cultural competence. In practice, 
however, the majority of the participants are often medical secretaries, some nurses, and 
paramedical staff. Physicians often either do not attend or attend in very small numbers. 
At Neve Geula, out of 30 participants present for the workshop, all but one were women, 
and the majority worked at the hospital as nurses or medical secretaries. The only male 
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participant was also the only (Muslim) Arab employee, while others were Israeli-born 
Jews, many of them Mizrahi in appearance, although there were also Russia- and 
Canada-born participants. About two thirds of the women were dressed in a modest 
fashion (wearing long skirts, long-sleeved blouses, and head scarves), although only a 
few were wearing dark colors and wigs, associated with the Haredi appearance.  
 The workshop starts36 on a tense note. As the participants are entering a 
conference room and settling in, a woman in her early sixties asks, “So where is coffee 
and cookies?” Dorit immediately replies: “This is an example of how to be culturally 
competent. Today is Ramadan, so there are no cookies or coffee.” Another woman 
interjects sarcastically: “This is really relevant to us.” Dorit shoots back, “What, it’s not 
relevant?” The animated participants spend the next few minutes discussing the decision. 
A few are resentful that they are not allowed to eat, while others disagree, saying that this 
is a nice gesture. The woman who asked about coffee and cookies takes out a package of 
waffles and shares them with a woman next to her. 
 The workshop finally begins, and Dorit introduces herself, the CCPJ, and its goal 
of making Jerusalem a culturally competent city. Defining cultural competence as skills 
and knowledge that enable the provision of services to people who come from different 
cultures, she starts with a bit of history. With increased globalization, she explains, 
businessmen started encountering problems, not knowing how to go about the simplest 
things – making deals, introducing themselves to foreign partners, even exchanging 
                                                      
36 The workshop is described in the present tense, to give the reader, as much possible, a sense of 
immediacy.  
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business cards – all of which are influenced by cultural codes [kodim tarbutiim]. She 
addresses the audience: “What could happen, if they don’t know these things?” 
Participants immediately chime in, suggesting that the businessmen could fail, offend the 
other side, lose money. Dorit picks up on the last suggestion: “The simplest thing, they 
lose money!” – and a participant summarizes pensively: “Everything begins and ends 
with money…” 
Dorit continues, saying that twenty years ago the movement for cultural 
competence started emerging in the health care sphere. She once again puts a question up 
for discussion: 
Dorit [D]: Why is it important for a health care institution to know how to work 
with people from different cultures? 
Audience [A]: To understand their codes! 
D: Why? 
A: So they don’t get offended by us! [With aggravation] Again I am telling you!  
D: So I got offended, so what? 
A: Compliance with the treatment! 
D: Oh, oh, this is a wonderful word. One moment: What is a hospital’s revenue? 
A: Everyone who comes here, every procedure that is done, it is money for the 
hospital. 
 
Dorit continues asking the audience about the relevance of cultural competence, 
and other participants bring up medical tourism, pointing out that the image of the 
hospital influences whether tourists from abroad would want to pursue treatment there. 
Dorit agrees, but emphasizes that compliance is the central issue, and that non-
compliance stemming from lack of cultural competence could result in death, injury, and 
subsequent financial losses on the hospital’s part.  
The most immediately interesting fact about this opening segment is how Dorit 
presented the origins of and motivations for cultural competence. Several different stories 
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could be told about this, tracing the movement back to the efforts of progressive political 
activists or, for that matter, medical anthropologists like Arthur Kleinman. However, 
Dorit chose to start with business and then draw a direct parallel to the uses of cultural 
competence in health care. In a very short amount of time, she crafted a narrative that 
framed cultural competence as a key tool that a health care organization can employ to 
ensure patient compliance and satisfaction and to prevent costly lawsuits. Or, rather, she 
structured her interaction with the participants in such a way that they articulated this 
narrative, with her prompting.  
As I discussed in the previous chapter, cultural competence training in the US 
context has been criticized for becoming increasingly rationalized, instrumentalized, and 
detached from its social justice origins, ultimately obscuring the structural causes of 
health disparities (Shaw and Armin 2011). While I think this critique is apt and 
legitimate, it is important to unpack what motivates this rhetorical shift. In the case of this 
workshop, the linking of the cultural competence enterprise to the discourses of cost 
efficiency and medical compliance implicitly established its legitimacy in tangible, 
“common-sense” terms (and also indirectly addressing the ambivalence – or even 
resentment – of some of the participants at having to participate in the workshop). In 
other words, this “repackaging” allow for a discrete smuggling-in of the social justice 
concerns without presenting an overly “political” stance. 
After briefly outlining the schedule for the day, Dorit goes into more detail about 
the goals of the workshop: 
Today we will talk, truly, about the subject of the tools that help us establish this 
communication with the patient, to achieve compliance, to manage the risks of the 
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hospital, to avoid frustration on the part of the staff: We will talk about <…>  
intercultural communication, where these gaps can be formed, we will talk about 
coping with political tensions that form all the time in this place, both among the 
staff, like right now the frustration that arose here that we have to fast because of 
Ramadan. This is frustration, and it’s okay. If we talk about it and don’t leave it in 
the belly [ba-beten], it’s excellent. We will talk about translation. <…> And we’ll 
talk about boundaries. <…> We’ll go with cultural competence as far as we can 
go, from a professional point of view. 
 
Here Dorit invokes, once again, the logics of compliance and managing financial 
risks, but she also incorporates the language that is more typical of the CCPJ’s discourse 
that I analyzed in the beginning of this chapter – specifically, via her references to 
“intercultural communication” and “coping with political tensions”. Just like Barak in his 
remarks at the conference, she brackets out the question of how the “political tensions” 
should be resolved and focuses on the quasi-psychological discourse of “coping” through 
talking about “frustrations” instead of letting them boil over.  
Before we split into small groups for the next stage of the workshop, Dorit shares 
a few more insights about the meaning of cultural competence. She begins with the good 
news: Everyone present already possesses some measure of cultural competence, without 
even knowing it, because otherwise they would not have survived “a single day in a 
system that is so complicated from a cultural point of view as a hospital, in general and 
hospital Neve Geula, in particular.” The not-so-good news, Dorit continues, is that, just 
like a person cannot be perfectly fit, it is also impossible to be perfectly culturally 
competent; cultural competence is a process that requires constant training and self-
improvement. Moreover, she says, cultural competence encompasses every encounter 
between a client and a medical/paramedical profession, “even if it seems to us that the 
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receiver of the services, the client, is from the same culture as we,” because every 
professional is shaped by the culture of their organization.  
Here Dorit implicitly anticipates and tries to counteract two critiques that have 
been directed at cultural competence training efforts. One is that such programs leave the 
internal diversity of the trainees untapped and treat them as blank slates that need to be 
instructed anew in the skill of cultural competence, ignoring their preexisting knowledge 
or ideas (Willen 2013). Another related critique (Taylor 2003a) targets the underlying 
problematic assumption that medicine itself is universal and acultural, and that the only 
culture that needs attending to is that of the patient. In other words, Dorit backtracks from 
her initial model in which the health care organization has to “deal” with culturally 
different patients, now incorporating two additional dimensions: the personal cultural 
backgrounds of the health care providers and the larger culture of the organization itself. 
Dorit goes on. When it comes to working with patients from distinctly different 
cultures, she says, cultural competence is more complex than learning a list of 
characteristics of different communities: 
This workshop, what we used to do is to do seminars of introduction – 
introduction to Arabs, and introduction to Ethiopians, and introduction to working 
with Russians, but essentially, for introduction to working with Russians, we 
would also have to do an introduction to working with olim from Uzbekistan, and 
olim from Ukraine… When we talk about introduction to Haredim, one has to talk 
about the Edah Haredit and about different forms of Hasidism. In short, this 
would never end. 
 
 Not only would this approach be logistically unfeasible, but it would simply 
“replace old stereotypes with new ones.” As a result, Dorit explains, the training now 
involves less talking about specific groups and more discussion of general principles and 
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skills for intercultural encounters. There is also a strong personal component to 
developing cultural competence. A provider, Dorit says, has to ask him- or herself: 
“Where am I in this encounter the entire time? What stereotypes do I have when I meet 
someone from another culture, and what do I do with generalizations?” Although we 
cannot avoid generalizations, she admits, we can nevertheless take them and use them as 
a tool to ask questions and understand the patient’s behavior, rather than as a basis for 
making expectations and decisions. 
 Here Dorit once again alludes to a traditional criticism directed at cultural 
competence training – that such efforts reduce cultures to stereotype-filled lists of traits. 
Many contemporary training programs consciously distance themselves from this “list of 
traits” approach, instead calling for an attitude of open-mindedness. In other words, they 
promote a cross-cultural approach, in which “the focus is on general methods for 
communicating with and caring for patients from diverse backgrounds,” over the older 
categorical approach, with its focus on specific groups (Jenks 2011, 216-217). (Of course, 
such an emphasis on open-mindedness does not guarantee – and, indeed, sometimes 
prevents – a discussion of the larger structural conditions that cause health disparities in 
the first place.) 
 To reinforce the point about the harmful nature of stereotypes, Dorit ends the 
introductory part of the workshop on a dramatic note. Framing this as a true case, she 
talks about a Haredi woman in her early 20s, who was pregnant and decided to go to the 
doctor after receiving worrisome test results. The doctor, a senior specialist in the field, 
interpreted the results to suggest that the child would most likely be born with brain 
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damage, but he did not even suggest termination of pregnancy to the woman, thinking 
that he could not possibly tell a woman from Meah She’arim37, seven months pregnant, 
“to kill the child in the womb.” He assumed that abortion was strictly forbidden among 
the Ultra-Orthodox, and even bringing it up would offend the woman. 
Dorit emphasizes that this doctor was acting in accordance with what he 
understood as cultural competence, but on the basis of a generalization. She asks the 
audience, “What would be some alternatives?” A participant suggests that perhaps the 
doctor should have mentioned the option to her, but also advised her to go to a rabbi. 
Dorit agrees, saying that in this sort of a case a rabbi would indeed recommend 
termination of pregnancy. But the doctor did not even consider this possible, so the child 
was born with a defect, the family sued, and the court ruled in their favor, compelling the 
hospital to pay 9 million shekels (approximately $2,250,000) in compensation. However, 
the parents still have to raise a child with a severe mental disability, who cannot do a 
thing by himself. There were sighs in the audience, and someone whispered, “Lord help 
them” [Ha-Shem yaazor]. On this solemn note, we break into two groups.  
To summarize what has happened so far: Dorit first invoked the discourses of the 
bottom line and patient compliance, both of which would likely seem familiar, common-
sense, and pragmatic to the participants. While she kept returning to these considerations, 
the rest of her presentation subtly wove in other concerns that are closer to the CCPJ’s 
vision. In a sense, Dorit ended up painting a more complex and wide-ranging picture of 
cultural competence than her opening pitch suggested: Cultural competence is not just a 
                                                      
37 A highly conservative Haredi neighborhood in Jerusalem. 
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set of skills that a provider employs to ensure compliance of the culturally different 
patient; it is applicable to tensions and frustrations among staff members, all of whom 
also come from specific cultural backgrounds. It is also not about memorizing checklists 
about various communities, so much as cultivating a sensitive and open attitude. All these 
considerations both echo and attempt to address (although, perhaps, not entirely 
successfully) the critiques that have been directed at cultural competence efforts by 
anthropologists and other critical observers. 
The second part of the workshop consists of activities in two groups, one 
supervised by Dorit (who I join), the other by Adina. We are now in a smaller room, with 
only fifteen people present. The first task is to think about a workplace intercultural 
encounter that went more or less successfully and then discuss, in pairs, what happened, 
what the cultural aspects were, challenges that came up, and what each of us did to 
confront these challenges. After each pair has spent a few minutes talking about specific 
cases, Dorit suggests that everyone go around the circle and introduce themselves, and 
then share a few of the stories that have just come up. A medical secretary shares a story 
about a doctor, originally from the US, who steadfastly refused to see a French family 
because they were five minutes late to the appointment. The family members were 
getting increasingly upset, and the secretary suggested that they go directly to the 
doctor’s superior and plead with him. Although this worked and the doctor ended up 
seeing them after receiving a call from the superior, he later got so mad at the secretary 
(“he boiled at me like a kettle”) that he even raised a hand at her. She later submitted an 
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official complaint, but was asked not to pursue this matter further, because the doctor had 
supposedly been given a warning and told not to act this way again.  
When Dorit asks the participants to identify the cultural aspects in the story, the 
secretary who has just been speaking immediately interjected that this situation had little 
to do with the culture of the patients. Dorit agrees, pointing out that in this case the issue 
had to do with the organizational culture and the “American culture” of the doctor. 
Rachel, the Canadian immigrant, immediately objects that it could simply be the extreme 
personality of this particular doctor, and Dorit does not dispute this. She concludes the 
discussion of this case by admitting that a number of factors were at play: the 
professional culture of physicians, the organizational culture of the hospital, and the 
cultural background and personality of this particular physician. This exercise can be 
understood as a reinforcement of Dorit’s message about “culture” as a characteristic of 
not only patients, but also providers and health care organizations.  
 Dorit now turns to a presentation that contains more specific information about 
cultural competence skills, touching upon three areas: interpersonal space and 
boundaries, direct/indirect communication styles, and attitudes to authority. To start, we 
watch a clip from Seinfeld, in which a “close talker” elicits comically different reactions 
from the regular characters (Dorit explains it as a metaphor for different attitudes toward 
personal space), and then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of small and large 
interpersonal space, illustrated by the examples of Japan and the West, respectively 
(Israel, Dorit says, is somewhere in between).  
  
95 
We then consider the influence of culture on communicative styles, with an 
emphasis on direct vs. indirect speech. Dorit displays on the screen a dialogue between a 
doctor and the patient’s son, in which the doctor proposes to intubate the patient, an old 
man in need of surgery. The son does not agree to the surgery directly at any point and 
instead utters various non-committal, but respectful statements, although in the end of the 
dialogue it appears that the doctor interpreted his reaction as partial consent. Dorit asks, 
“Did he agree?” Most participants answer no, someone says, “Partially.” Dorit 
enumerates the possibilities that have been brought up: Maybe the son really does need 
more time, or maybe he really doesn’t agree, but his culture “did not allow him to say no 
to the doctor.” 
Dorit brings us to the level of theory once again, drawing a connection between 
preference for small vs. large interpersonal distance and direct vs. indirect speech. She 
asks where we would put Americans, because they already came up in the discussion 
about physical interpersonal distance, and there is some disagreement, but the majority 
locate Americans closer to the “direct” pole, although not at the extreme end. When Dorit 
asks where we would put Israelis, numerous participants exclaim, “Direct, small 
distance.” She spreads her arms wide: “I would actually put them in a different room! We 
are so direct that we don’t understand when somebody talks indirectly.” (Participants nod 
and smile in agreement.)38 
                                                      
38 It is noteworthy that the “we” invoked by this presentation is implicitly, and yet very clearly limited to 
the Israeli Jewish majority and to the “dugri” (direct, often even confrontation style), as opposed to the 
Arab musayra, characterized as indirect, deferential, and conciliatory (Katriel 1986). 
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The final part of the presentation touches upon the topic of authority and 
hierarchy. As with the previous points, Dorit begins with an example meant to elicit a 
reaction before proceeding to the general points. We read a dialogue between two nurses. 
One says, “You won’t believe what just happened. A patient yelled at one of the 
volunteers, and I defended her [the volunteer]. She came up to me, tapped me on the 
shoulder and said: ‘You are okay! [at be-seder]’” The other nurse responds: “Wonderful! 
I know it’s hard for you, as a new employee here, to deal with the volunteers. So now 
they accept you as one of our own.” Dorit explains that the first nurse meant to complain 
about the encounter with the volunteer, perceiving the tapping on the shoulder as an 
inappropriately informal gesture that crossed professional boundaries, whereas the second 
nurse took the story in a very different key. Several participants begin to argue whether it 
was rude or not that the volunteer tapped the nurse on the shoulder, but Dorit reiterates 
that this is not the point: The dialogue was meant to convey that the same “informal” 
behavior could be viewed positively or negatively, depending on the culture. 
It appears that this example has backfired: Several participants did not “get” the 
underlying message and are offended by what they perceive as “negative” portrayal of 
volunteers. One launches into a passionate monologue about her love for the volunteers 
and how she treats them as her children. Dorit tries to put this example in perspective. 
Just like most doctors do not want to be called by their first names, this nurse felt that her 
authority was being undermined. This brings her to introducing yet another spectrum of 
cultural attitudes: from challenging authority [itgur samchut] to respecting it [chibud 
samchut]. It is not uncommon, she says, for the doctor to be in favor of challenging 
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authority and the patient to be someone who respects authority figures. “What happens 
during the appointment? The doctor asks the patient to address him by his first name, and 
asks, ‘What do you think is wrong with you?’ What does the patient think about such a 
doctor?” A participant who brought up the story about an American doctor earlier 
speculates about what would go through this patient’s mind: “What is this? I came in so 
that they would tell me what is wrong.” 
The last dialogue we read contains an exchange between a hospital secretary and 
a patient. After finding out that the patient came to the appointment by public transport, 
the secretary suggests that she can arrange for the patient to have a ride back with another 
clinic employee, who lives in the same community. Instead of being thankful, the patient 
reacts in a reserved, cautious manner. When asked to respond, several participants pitch 
in without much prompting on Dorit’s part, pointing out that perhaps the patient wanted 
to keep the treatment discreet and did not welcome the possibility of meeting someone 
from the same community and potentially risking their privacy. Dorit, in agreement, 
characterizes this as an issue of crossing boundaries [chatzayat gvulot] vs. observing 
boundaries [shmira al gvulot]. Quick to point out that both sides of the continuum have 
positive elements, she characterizes Israel as a very pronounced example of a boundary-
crossing culture. “Every time we see a boundary, we have to cross it [she makes a step 
forward to illustrate]”.  
The final part of this section of the workshop is meant to introduce the 
participants to the idea of explanatory models. Dorit prefaces it by saying: “There is no 
common sense, there is only cultural sense.” Even when a behavior appears negative, we 
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must find its cultural basis and give it a positive interpretation. Someone in the audience 
mumbles, “Nonsense, such nonsense [shtuyot, eyze shtuyot]”, but Dorit does not engage. 
The video itself portrays an encounter between a young Ethiopian woman and an 
Ashkenazi-looking doctor, a woman in her sixties. The Ethiopian woman came in to get a 
Provera injection as a form of birth control, but the doctor recommended looking into 
other options (especially an IUD, but also condoms), because injections have been shown 
to result in osteoporosis later in life. The woman disagreed every time, and even got 
visibly irritated, at some point muttering in Amharic (subtitled in Hebrew): “What a 
stubborn woman!” When pushed, she explained that she did not want an IUD because her 
neighbor knows someone who died from it (the device got lost in their body). When the 
doctor dismissed this as nonsense, the woman got offended: “Do you think she would be 
lying? Do you think I believe her because I am a new immigrant?” She needs an injection 
now, because her husband is used to getting sex whenever he wants; she can’t say no. 
The doctor wrote a prescription for the injection begrudgingly. As we are watching, some 
participants make comments, indicating surprise and annoyance with the Ethiopian 
woman. 
Dorit asks if we thought that the doctor was competent. Most nod and say yes, 
because she suggested several options and outlined the risks associated with the injection. 
A woman (the same one who complained about the imposed fasting earlier) says that this 
patient came in with a “closed mind,” and Ethiopians in general can’t step out of their 
“box” and are very fixed in their opinions. Dorit does not directly confront this, but rather 
observes that this illustrates the difference between cultures that believe in destiny and 
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cultures that emphasize personal initiative. She inquires, what are some things that the 
doctor did not understand? Participants say, that getting an IUD takes time, but the 
woman needs a solution right now. Dorit asks what they would recommend to the doctor? 
The suggestions include giving the woman a prescription right now, but making her 
promise to make an appointment to have the IUD installed, and possibly getting the 
husband involved (the only male participant, the Arab Muslim nurse who has not been 
speaking until now, nods in agreement). After this discussion is finished, Dorit introduces 
the concept of explanatory models, mentioning Arthur Kleinman briefly. 
 It is noteworthy that all of Dorit’s examples that involve culturally different 
patients follow the same plot, wherein the patient does or says something, and the 
clinician misunderstands the words or actions and/or reacts negatively to them. A further 
assumption is that the patient behaved that way because of his or her “culture” that 
dictates certain norms. In the three examples used by Dorit, it is “culture” that makes the 
individual abstain from challenging authority, affirm personal boundaries, or take a 
fatalistic approach to destiny, respectively. In other words, this part of the workshop 
illustrates a tension between two imperatives in contemporary forms of cultural 
competence training: While the goal may be to cultivate a general attitude of “open-
mindedness” and prevent stereotypes, the training discourses may also unwittingly 
encourage essentialist thinking. 
For the closing part of the workshop, we reassemble in the conference room. 
Consistent with the general trend of tacking back and forth between theory and practice, 
this part is more hands-on and involved an actress, a young Palestinian woman. For the 
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first situation, the actress, dressed in a long black robe and a scarf, plays a Palestinian 
woman who comes in to the doctor’s office with her husband (played by another 
Palestinian actor). We are told that she has just had a hip surgery, and is still in pain. She 
was given a sheet with a description of exercises at the hospital, but she has not been 
doing them. She does not speak Hebrew, so the conversation is conducted through her 
husband. A workshop participant volunteers to play the role of the doctor, and is later 
joined by another one. The husband, clearly meant by the scenario to have an agenda, 
does not translate everything properly, although the overwhelming majority of the 
workshop participants do not speak Arabic and thus cannot catch the specific 
mistranslations. The husband also intersperses his “translations” with disparaging 
comments about his wife, complaining that she is lazy, spoiled, and does not take care of 
herself. The “doctors” keep insisting that the woman needs to help herself, but they do 
not ask whether she understands the exercises; they also antagonize the husband. The 
same actor now takes up the role of a professional interpreter, but the situation is not 
much better: The doctor keeps talking to the “translator,” without looking at the patient. 
After the situation is done, the actress talks about her impressions. She says that she tries 
to filter out the Hebrew as much as possible and to imagine what it would be really like 
for a patient like that. She notes that she felt hurt that doctors kept implying that she is 
not taking care of herself, because in her book taking out time to come to the doctor is 
taking care of herself. She also observes that they asked her name something like five 
times. 
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For the second situation, the actress steps out and returns transformed into a 
Haredi woman: still wearing a dark skirt and shirt and a white scarf, wrapped differently 
this time. (As she reenters the room, participants look surprised by her transformation, 
and their astonishment deepens throughout the exercise.) The “plot” this time is that a 
Haredi woman wants to speak with a nurse (played by another workshop participant) 
about her son. In the beginning, she sits very still, not smiling, answering “Blessed Be 
God” [baruch ha-shem] to all inquiries. Then, after assuring the nurse that they are very 
happy with the hospital, she suddenly asks whether it would be possible to transfer her 
son to another one. The nurse does not ask where, but asks why; the woman doesn’t 
answer directly. The nurse “asks” the doctor (Dorit and Adina) whether it would be 
possible to fly the boy out and gets back with a categorical “no,” for medical reasons, but 
the woman continues to insist that she needs a signed letter to that effect. With some help 
from the audience and the trainers (although they are mostly impressed with her skills 
and tell her to just keep going), she asks whether the woman would prefer for her son to 
fly to England or stay in Israel, if it was possible to arrange the same kind of treatment 
here. The woman prefers the latter, and asks whether it would be possible to arrange for a 
separate room. When asked why, with some hesitation, she says that immodestly dressed 
women are in the room, and they do not want their son to see that. The nurse paraphrases: 
“So you want to guard his eyes [lishmor al eynav]?”, invoking a common phrase used by 
religious Jews. The woman concurs, and the nurse promises to do her best, although she 
cannot promise it with total certainty.  
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Everyone is very impressed with the nurse’s approach, including the actress. 
Unlike the first simulation, this one is deemed a success. As the actress prepares to leave, 
the participants chime in to thank her, saying things like “great job [kol ha-kavod]” and 
“simply wonderful [pashut madhima]”. They look like they have been moved by the 
experience, more so than at any of the preceding stages of the workshop. 
 
Making Sense of Cultural Competence Training 
 The cultural competence training session that I described and analyzed above 
reveals both how complex the CCPJ’s approach is and how distinct it is from the cultural 
competence policy formulated by the Ministry of Health. The training discourse is 
flexible, pragmatic, and occasionally sophisticated. At first, cultural competence is 
justified as a means to improve patient compliance and reduce the risk of costly, lengthy 
lawsuits, but, as the session continues, the focus shifts to such considerations as equality 
and empathy. The workshop organizers have also anticipated and incorporated some of 
the anthropological critiques of the early cultural competence initiatives: They explicitly 
repudiate the “list-based” or categorical approach to cultural competence, encouraging 
instead a reflective and open-minded stance to intercultural clinical encounters. “Culture” 
itself is defined in a broad sense that goes beyond ethnicity or religion and encompasses 
generational differences and professional socialization.  
 At the same time, it is also true that the discourses and practices of the training are 
internally inconsistent and often problematic. Most strikingly, the workshop organizers 
did not follow up on their declaration that they do not treat the participants as blank 
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slates: There were no structured exercises or discussions in which the clinicians were 
asked to critically reflect on their own identity or cultural knowledge. Even when the 
workshop leader asked questions that relied on the participants’ understanding of 
intercultural encounters, she did not encourage any sustained epistemological reflection 
(i.e. what assumptions is this understanding grounded in and how valid these assumptions 
are). Furthermore, the initial focus on avoiding stereotypes was directly contradicted by 
the subsequent presentation wherein culture was universally presented as the determinant 
of the patients’ strange/irrational/non-compliant behavior. 
 In light of these internal inconsistencies, two contrasting interpretations are 
possible, and the difference between them is the matter of relative emphasis. One 
approach would be to critique cultural competence training in Israel on the same grounds 
as the cultural competence policy itself. This line of argument would assert that, while 
cultural competence training implicitly challenges the assimilationist ideology that 
requires all Jews to accept the terms of the Ashkenazi, Hebrew-centric hegemony and 
excludes Palestinian citizens of Israel altogether, it ultimately stops short of overt 
engagement with politics or structural issues. In fact, the discourse of training construes 
the barriers to medical services that such diverse communities as Palestinian citizens of 
Israel, Ethiopian Jews, Russian Jews, and ultra-Orthodox Jews face in the idiom of 
culture, and by doing so it ignores the immense differences between these communities 
with regards to political power, language rights, and status in the ethnic, religious, and 
national stratification of Israeli society. By proposing to eliminate these barriers via 
expanding an “intercultural” dialogue or increasing the cultural sensitivity of individual 
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providers, proponents of cultural competence may end up depoliticizing the issue and 
overlooking the systemic impediments associated with the structures of inequality 
endemic to Israeli society. It could also be argued that the discourse of cultural 
competence, with its emphasis on individual clinicians’ skills and affective orientations, 
echoes the rise of the new forms of subjectivity in Israel, recently documented by 
anthropologists in such areas as life coaching (Kaneh-Shalit 2017), economic 
empowerment projects (Sa’ar 2016), and resilience-building interventions (Yankellevich 
and Goodman 2017), that partially – although not entirely – draw on neoliberal ideals of 
the self-managing subject. 
While I think there is a lot of validity to these concerns, I believe that a more 
productive and interesting interpretive approach would be to turn this critique on its head. 
For instance, does the ostensibly apolitical discourse of the workshop erase and 
depoliticize the structural inequalities between Jews or Palestinians, or does it, in fact, 
partially legitimize Palestinian grievances by including Palestinians in the discussion 
alongside such groups as Haredim and Ethiopian Jews? In other words, could it be that 
this covertly political discourse has the potential to resonate with clinicians precisely 
because it circumvents politics and foregrounds the “common sense” narrative that 
culturally different patients should receive culturally competent care? In this context, the 
simulation exercise acquires a certain subversive quality. Not only does the Palestinian 
actress directly confront the cluelessness and prejudice of the workshop participants by 
providing feedback on the outcomes of the first simulation, but she also seamlessly 
transitions into a Jewish role, transgressing, if only symbolically and temporarily, the 
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boundaries that are ordinarily so fraught and salient in Israeli society. Perhaps, similar to 
the economic empowerment projects for low-income Israeli women described by Sa’ar, 
cultural competence workshops “simultaneously harness apolitical, individualistic 
subjectivities, and open spaces for agency and empowerment” (Sa’ar 2016, 172). 
One of the core tasks of this dissertation is to question simplistic linkages between 
psy disciplines and apolitical thinking. This chapter shows that cultural competence 
training is potentially polyvalent: While it has a strong potential to depoliticize structural 
inequalities that is well-documented and aptly critiqued in anthropological literature, 
there also is – or there can be – a quietly subversive element to it, even when the overtly 
political idiom is absent (or perhaps precisely because it is absent). In the rest of my 
dissertation, I follow the concept of culture into clinical spaces by analyzing how 
clinicians at two very different mental health care institutions – the Kfar Shaul hospital in 
Jerusalem and the “Karim” community mental health care center in Balad il-Ghabar, an 
Arab town in central Israel – understand and deal with cultural differences. As I will 
show, the discourses of the official policy and of the cultural competence training hold 
little sway in these spaces, and clinicians display a dazzling variety of approaches to the 
slippery problem of “culture”. 
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PART II: KFAR SHAUL 
Kfar Shaul39 is perched on a hillside overlooking the Jerusalem Forest and the 
Judean hills, in the western end of Jerusalem. Located in a bustling, mostly Jewish 
Orthodox neighborhood, it is surrounded by industrial warehouses, office buildings, and 
chain stores – many of the latter targeting the large religious population of the area and 
promising everything from Shabbat candles to modest clothing. The busy two-lane 
thoroughfare that runs from the Central Bus Station and dissipates into a maze of narrow 
streets near the hospital used to be a dirt road, connecting the western outskirts of 
Jerusalem with the neighboring Arab villages. One of these villages was at the exact 
same spot where the hospital now lies, and its crumbling one- and two-story stone 
buildings house the majority of the hospital’s wards and divisions. The name of the 
village40 is familiar to almost every Israeli, Jew or Arab, although there is no consensus 
over what actually happened there in 1948.  
Soon after 29 November 1947, when the UN adopted its Plan for the partition of 
Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, fighting between Jewish and Arab militias 
broke out in Jerusalem, a city that, along with Bethlehem, was supposed to be placed 
under international rule according to the UN plan. Amidst the Arab blockade of 
Jerusalem and the fighting that split the city in half, Jerusalemite Jewish families, 
displaced from their homes, and the families of Jewish soldiers started to settle in the 
                                                      
39 I decided to keep the original name of the hospital instead of using a pseudonym because the institution 
is instantly recognizable based on its location and description. 
40 In a sad twist of irony, the current name of the hospital can be translated from Hebrew as “a borrowed 
village.” 
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abandoned Arab houses in West Jerusalem. In the fall and winter of 1948, the newly 
arrived olim also started pouring into the abandoned Arab districts of Jerusalem. One of 
the places where they were directed was the village of Deir Yassin.  
Deir Yassin was a Palestinian village of approximately 600 people and 144 
houses that sat on a hill on the western outskirts of Jerusalem, overlooking the major 
highway that led into the city. In January 1948, the village struck a deal with the 
members of the nearby Jewish community of Givat Shaul, promising, in exchange for 
peaceful passage to Jerusalem, to notify them if Palestinian militiamen ever entered the 
village. Although the peace pact held for a significant part of winter and spring of 1948, 
there were occasional skirmishes between the villagers and their Jewish neighbors. On 
April 9, 1948 fighters from Irgun and Lehi, two Jewish paramilitary organizations, 
entered the village, in an effort to relieve the ongoing blockade of Jerusalem. During the 
battle that broke out, more than a hundred of villagers, including women and children, 
were killed, and there are allegations that mutilation and rape took place, as well. 
Surviving villagers fled, but some were taken prisoner and paraded through the streets of 
West Jerusalem on the following days. Learning of the massacre, Haganah, the main 
Jewish paramilitary organization and the core of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 
condemned the actions of Lehi and Irgun, and the Jewish Agency sent a letter of apology 
to King Abdullah.  
In November 1948, a group of doctors from the District Health Commission 
arrived in Deir Yassin to evaluate whether it was structurally sound enough to be 
converted into a temporary camp for new olim, and eventually a decision was reached to 
  
108 
turn the village premises into “Beit Ha-Olim” (the house of the olim), run by the Jewish 
Agency. According to Benny Morris (2004, 393), some prominent intellectuals at the 
time, including Martin Buber and Akiva Ernst Simon, protested the decision in a letter to 
Ben-Gurion in very strong language: 
The Deir Yassin episode is a black stain on the honor of the Jewish people… It is 
better for the time being to leave the land of Deir Yassin uncultivated and the 
houses of Deir Yassin unoccupied, rather than to carry out an action whose 
symbolic importance vastly outweighs its practical benefit. The settlement of Deir 
Yassin, if carried out a mere year after the crime, and within the regular 
settlement framework, will constitute something like… approbation of the 
slaughter. 
 
 However, Ben Gurion ignored this plea, and the plan moved forward. First olim 
started arriving to Deir Yassin in June 1949: As many as 900 were settled just in the first 
days, and by the end of 1949 a total of 1,832 olim, most of them Holocaust survivors 
from Eastern Europe, were housed there (Kenner 1993, 25). The life of Beit ha-Olim 
revolved around labor: men were enlisted to do road-paving, construction, and carpentry 
jobs, and women were mostly involved in domestic work. In parallel, the olim were also 
studying Hebrew, looking for housing and employment outside of the village, and in 
general trying to adapt to the new social environment.  
 During the year after Beit ha-Olim opened, 2,400 olim passed through it, most of 
them moving on after spending a short time spent there, either to apartments outside of 
the camp or, in the case of elderly immigrants, to nursing homes. In July 1951, while the 
administration was starting to consider different options for the future of the camp, the 
Ministry of Absorption issued a directive to close Beit ha-Olim. However, although most 
residents had vacated the premises of the camp by then, a small group of sick, disabled, 
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and elderly olim was unable to find accommodation elsewhere. The final arrangement, 
put into force in August 1951, was to leave the lower part of the village under the 
authority of the Ministry of Absorption and to transfer the upper part to the Ministry of 
Health for the creation of a psychiatric hospital. The first patients of the newly created 
institution were the 20-30 camp residents who were deemed to have mental health 
problems. In October of the same year, it was decided that Ministry of Health would take 
over the entire territory of the camp, in exchange for the promise that it would provide 
care to the remaining 328 olim (Kenner 1993, 48).  
Since 1951, Kfar Shaul has functioned as a psychiatric hospital. In the 1980s, it 
became part of the larger organizational framework, Jerusalem Mental Health Care 
Center, that also includes Eitanim (another psychiatric hospital located on the outskirts of 
Jerusalem – interestingly, the place was an Arab orphanage before 1948) and an 
extensive network of outpatient clinics all over Jerusalem.  
Deir Yassin has, arguably, become the most famous and contested symbol of the 
1948-1949 war. In Palestinian collective memory, the massacre is the turning point of the 
hostilities that instigated a mass exodus from Palestine. It is seen by some as part of a 
premeditated campaign to scare Palestinians into leaving their homes – effectively, to 
carry out the slogan commonly – and controversially41 – associated with the Zionist 
slogan, “a land without a people for a people without a land”. The Deir Yassin events are 
portrayed in this narrative as merely the most notorious and well-documented instance in 
                                                      
41 See Muir 2008 and Garfinkle 1991 for discussion of why the attribution of this slogan to the Zionist 
movement remains a point of contention. 
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a whole series of massacres committed by the Jewish fighters during the war. According 
to some oral testimonies of the survivors, the Jewish militiamen not only expelled, killed, 
and captured villagers, but also exhibited especial brutality toward pregnant women, who 
were disemboweled and thrown into wells. This combination of barbaric physical and 
sexual violence has made Deir Yassin into the most poignant and traumatic symbol of the 
Nakba (the Palestinian term for the events of 1947-1949 that literally means 
“catastrophe”). 
Those Israeli historians who are unwilling to accept the Palestinian account of the 
Nakba approach the Deir Yassin events very differently. They either portray the massacre 
as an isolated, atypical outbreak of excessive cruelty by a fringe group or altogether reject 
the narrative of the slaughter and reframe the events as an “operation” or a “battle.” They 
also question the accuracy of the most shocking elements of the survivor testimonies and 
accuse Palestinians of embellishing the hostilities and exploiting the tragedy for political 
reasons. In contrast to the Palestinian narrative, these historians deny the role of the 
massacre in prompting a mass refugee exodus and dispute the existence of any 
premeditated plan to expel Palestinians.  
In the 1980s, Israeli historians such as Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappe, and 
others started publishing revisionist accounts of the 1948-1949 war, prompting a 
resurgence of the debate about Deir Yassin. Although they differed in their 
interpretations of the events, these historians questioned the traditional Israeli accounts of 
the Deir Yassin massacre and the 1948-1949 war in general. Despite the efforts of the 
revisionist historians, what happened in Deir Yassin on that April day in 1948 still 
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remains a point of major controversy in Israel. The large majority of the Israeli Jews are 
unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Palestinian narrative of the Nakba, so 
much so that in 2011 the Knesset authorized the finance ministry to withdraw funding 
from institutions that mark Israel’s Independence Day as a day of mourning. This 
effectively restricts the commemoration of Nakba, which traditionally falls on the 
Independence Day (May 15th), in the public space.  
Given this context, it is not surprising that the legacy of Deir Yassin haunts the 
hospital to this day. In 2011, a scandal broke out when the official invitations to Kfar 
Shaul’s sixtieth birthday described the hospital location as an “abandoned” Arab village. 
As Haaretz reported, the department head of a psychiatric hospital in Be’er Yakov wrote 
an open letter to the Kfar Shaul administration, interpreting the omission as a highly 
offensive attempt to rewrite and whitewash history. In response, the administration issued 
a statement justifying their decision by the desire “to be ‘smart’ and not ‘just’ in this 
matter” and avoid opening up old wounds on the day of celebration (Eldar 2011). 
 The employees of Kfar Shaul are well aware of the place’s history, and 
sometimes have strong emotions about it. An Israeli Arab employee shared that, when 
she came for her job interview, she was not aware “what this place was.” She found the 
quaint look of the hospital curious, but still did not give it much thought until, during the 
interview, it all came together for her: “This was Deir Yassin! I started crying…” A 
Soviet-born psychiatrist told me, ponderously: “People don’t agree on what happened 
here. Some say, nothing really happened, it’s all a lie. Others, that the streets were 
running with blood… I think, something bad did happen. But if they really had been 
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running with blood, if this kind of evil had been done, there is no way this place would 
feel so calm now.” With even more ambivalence, a psychologist candidly shared that he 
felt uneasy in his office at first, realizing that the space he came to occupy used to be 
someone’s home, and still looked very much like someone’s private quarters rather than a 
modern workspace.  
These days, the appearance and spatial structure of Kfar Shaul is profoundly 
affected and shaped by its complex history. All major wards, except for the geriatrics, are 
located in the old buildings left from the Deir Yassin period. The events that transpired 
here in the late 1940s make it difficult, if not impossible, to romanticize the hospital’s 
look. Nevertheless, it still retains something of a village atmosphere with a heavy dose of 
a certain haunting mystique42. The progressing decay of the old buildings and the 
difficulty of updating them in accordance with safety standards prompted the hospital to 
ramp up its renovation efforts. By the time I finished my fieldwork at Kfar Shaul, in June 
2016, a new tall edifice intended to house the closed ward was almost finished43. 
Modern-looking, with smooth white walls, and towering over the squat, beige stone 
houses, it looked like a much more comfortable facility for a psychiatric hospital, but also 
out of place in the general melancholy atmosphere of Kfar Shaul.  
 
                                                      
42 Indeed, an Israeli director, Udi Aloni, made a film that takes the haunting metaphor literally. Forgiveness 
(2006) takes place in a psychiatric hospital located on the ground of a Palestinian village where a massacre 
occurred during the 1948-1949 war. Ghosts of Holocaust survivors and Palestinian villagers both make an 
appearance as characters. 
43 The building was officially opened for use in March 2017. 
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CHAPTER THREE: GRAPPLING WITH “CULTURE” IN A JERUSALEM 
PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL 
This chapter and the one following it concentrate on Kfar Shaul, the first major 
clinical site where I conducted fieldwork. As I show in the preceding vignette, the 
hospital has a poignant and controversial history and to this day its location is charged 
with political and historical meanings that are rarely openly discussed, but occasionally 
erupt in everyday conversations. In this chapter, I start by providing a sense of the 
everyday atmosphere at the hospital and describing its spatial and organizational 
structure, professional divisions and styles of interaction among the staff, and the social 
life of the patients. I will argue that the hospital is one of the institutional and social 
spheres in Israel that provides opportunities for intensive interactions across the lines that 
mark group identity, as well as for (self-)segregation along these lines. Unlikely 
friendships and alliances are often struck within the hospital walls, but animosities and 
stereotypes from “the outside world” influence relationships as often, if not more so. 
I then devote the bulk of the chapter to an analysis of clinical discourses and 
practices in the treatment of culturally diverse patients. In doing this, I have two 
objectives. First is to convey how diverse, inventive, and ambivalent these clinical 
approaches are, and how much they differ from the dry and vague discourses of cultural 
competence expressed in the policy documents or even from the complex and 
occasionally subversive discourses of the cultural competence training that I analyzed in 
the preceding chapters. My second objective is to show how the conceptual apparatus 
associated with the recent “ethical turn” in anthropology (Fassin and Leze 2013; Faubion 
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2011; Keane 2015; Laidlaw 2014; Lambek 2010; Mattingly 2012; Robbins 2013; Zigon 
2008) can be productively employed to make sense of this material. Specifically, I argue 
that my clinician interlocutors are engaged both in self-conscious ethical deliberation and 
in what Zigon calls embodied moral discourse (Zigon 2008) and I draw on Keane’s 
notion of ethical affordances (Keane 2014; Keane 2015) to show how the two are 
interconnected.  
 
Organizational Structure, Everyday Routines, and Social Dynamics at Kfar Shaul 
Kfar Shaul is a large institution that provides services to patients from a diverse 
range of backgrounds – Israelis and foreigners, Jews and Arabs, religious and secular – 
who have issues ranging from deep, unremittent psychosis to neurodegenerative disorders 
to occasional bouts of depression. As a result, it consists of several distinct divisions: the 
emergency room (kheder miyun), the closed ward (makhlaka sgura) that usually accepts 
patients in the midst of an acute mental health crisis, the open ward (makhlaka ptukha) 
for patients in a more stable condition, two geriatric wards (makhlaka geriatrit), the 
chronic ward (makhlaka dalet) where the most intransigent cases are referred to for long-
term care, and the day hospitalization unit (eshpuz yom) for patients who do not require 
hospitalization, but still benefit from daily activities running through the afternoon. In 
everyday interactions, the wards are often referred to by Hebrew letters – “alef” for the 
closed ward, “bet” for the open ward, “dalet” for the chronic ward, etc. 
The staff of Kfar Shaul is made up of psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, 
nurses, occupational therapists, art therapists, and others. Since each ward is a multi-
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professional (rav-miktzoyi) unit, every day employees of a ward interact with clinicians 
from several other professional backgrounds, both as part of their workload and 
informally. In addition to these cross-professional ties, each professional community has 
a supervisor (chief psychiatrist, psychologist, nurse, etc.) and gathers regularly for routine 
meetings or special seminars and workshops. 
 The routines of the patients depend on the ward they are hospitalized in, but I 
observed a significant focus on group therapy and other collective activities. For 
example, on a given day, a patient in the open ward could spend several hours in the 
morning in occupational therapy (which in practice mostly involved working on arts and 
crafts), attend the general ward-wide discussion group before lunch, and participate in a 
psychiatrist-led group devoted to psychopharmaceuticals in the afternoon. The 
unstructured time could be spent socializing with other patients in the main ward building 
or the courtyard in front of it, taking walks on the hospital grounds (individually or part 
of the walking group), or at the gym. There were also more limited groups targeting 
special populations (such as sexual assault survivors) and areas of interest (such as the 
acceptance and commitment therapy).  
The spatial structure of the hospital and the group-centered nature of everyday 
routines provide opportunities for social interactions that transcend or confuse the 
boundaries of group identity that are so salient in the outside society, as well as for 
interactions that further reinforce these boundaries. The internal structure of hospital 
buildings and the external layout of the compound itself creates numerous opportunities 
for encounters. The spaces formally or informally designated for smoking are a 
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particularly illustrative example. Rituals and routines surrounding smoking, especially 
the sharing of cigarettes, have been described in sociological and anthropological 
literature as an important form of sociability in hospitals, clinics, and shelters (Desjarlais 
1997; Estroff 1981; Goffman 1961). At Kfar Shaul, there are several spaces where 
patients congregate for smoking: on the benches near the open ward, in front of the 
dining room, in the courtyard of the day hospitalization unit, and on a fenced off section 
of the closed unit. On numerous occasions, I observed patients from the groups that 
would rarely, if ever, mix in the “outside world”, especially not on friendly terms (such as 
Palestinians and ultra-Orthodox Jews). 
As Ester, a psychologist in the open ward, noted: 
 “[Me: Do you think that people from different backgrounds relate to one another 
better than outside?] Yes, the truth is that I think that yes, and in a surprising way, 
right?  I’ll tell you why. Because… I think that people come here because it is a 
hospital. Surely if this were a clinic, it would be different. Because it is a hospital, 
people come here… naked [arumim], metaphorically speaking. As if, in such a 
weakened state… Actually, not always weakened, but as if… dispossessed 
[menushalim]. <…> Dispossessed of everything they had in their lives, so it’s like 
a situation in which you… Somehow interactions start that, you know, if someone 
is very “anti”, very racist, very militant, but he comes here and he lost everything 
there was, so that as well he left outside…” 
 
This was a very common narrative that I heard in response to my inquiries. The 
shared experience of dispossession is portrayed as a unifying force, a source of deep 
commonality. While the experiences of boundary-crossing at Kfar Shaul were numerous 
and salient, I do not intend to romanticize it as an ideal microcosm of coexistence. In fact, 
the spatial organization of the hospital promotes and reinforces inter-group divisions as 
much it challenges them – among not only the patients, but also the staff.  
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A case in point to illustrate the latter is the self-segregation created by lunch table 
seating arrangements. Early on, I observed that Russian-speaking psychiatrists would 
often sit together and have a lively conversation in Russian. When other Israelis joined 
the table, this would occasionally result in awkward interactions. Once, at lunch, I joined 
the “Russian” table, just in time to overhear Dr. Litvinenko recount, in a lively fashion, 
her recent vacation in Eilat. At some point, she referred to a street performer she saw 
there as “negr” – a cognate of the English “negro.”44 Dr. Shamir, another Russian 
psychiatrist, jokingly corrected her: “Hey, we have an American citizen here at the table 
with us. Don’t say that word! Say, I don’t know, African American!” She responded: 
“African American? They totally went crazy in their America!” She then continued on 
with her story, finishing on a wistful note: “It was great to be away from those crazy 
patients for a bit.” At that time Dr. Chana Vered, another psychiatrist, but not a Russian 
speaker, joined the table, striking a conversation about a patient both of them were 
familiar with and found challenging to treat. Dr. Litvinenko characterized him as “such a 
psycho about his religiosity,” and described him spending 600 Israeli shekels 
(approximately $170) on a mezuzah45, because the apartment he moved to lacked one. 
                                                      
44 In contemporary Russia, the word is surrounded with controversy. Some think that it should be 
abandoned, just like “Negro” was in the English-speaking world, for its racist connotations. Others 
maintain that, since Russia never directly enslaved or otherwise oppressed Black people, this word retains 
its neutral connotation. This line of argument, invoked by Dr. Litvinenko, sometimes also ridicules the 
attempts to establish and enforce “politically correct” terms for various racial groups.  
45 A case containing a piece of parchment with a Hebrew verse from the Torah, the Shema prayer. It is a 
common Jewish practice to attach mezuzot (the plural of mezuzah) onto the doorways of the house. Some 
Jews also have a custom of touching the mezuza every time they go through a doorway, as a sign of 
respect. In Israel, one can see mezuzot on various public buildings, from governmental offices to 
restaurants.  
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Dr. Vered commented, “Well, this doesn’t seem like a very big sum…”, but did not 
pursue the issue further.  
This exchange both evoked and solidified intra-group boundaries. The use of 
Russian allowed these clinicians to exchange the jokes that many non-Russian speakers 
would find inappropriate and offensive. The comment about me as “an American citizen” 
had multiple meanings and functions in this context. While it is possible that Dr. Shamir, 
who also held an administrative position at the hospital, was serious to some extent and 
meant to caution those present to be more circumspect in their verbal expression, the 
comment was delivered in an unmistakably sarcastic tone, and the conversation then 
continued in the same caustic, irreverent vein. This interjection served to acknowledge 
my somewhat ambiguous and potentially threatening status, but also treated me as “in” 
on the joke. This move not only tacitly incorporated me into the Russian-speaking in-
group, but also, on a more general level, evoked the inter-group differences. Similarly, 
the exchange regarding the mezuzah signaled the divergence between those dyed-in-the-
wool Soviet-trained clinicians for whom all religious ritual is automatically irrational and 
suspect (which, to emphasize, does not describe all Soviet-born and trained clinicians at 
Kfar Shaul) and other Israeli clinicians, more well-versed in distinguishing norm and 
pathology when it comes to religious beliefs and behavior.   
 
Clinical Approaches to ‘Culture’ 
In the contentious space of Kfar Shaul, with its complicated history and a spatial 
and organizational structure that both reinforces intra-group boundaries and challenges 
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them, clinical work with patients from different cultural backgrounds is incredibly 
intricate and always politically fraught. In light of that, it is not surprising that clinicians 
take vastly different approaches to the meanings and significance of cultural difference 
for diagnostic and therapeutic processes46.   
In this section, I will present a range of these approaches, providing illustrative 
vignettes and/or excerpts from interviews. Most of my clinician interlocutors at Kfar 
Shaul did not take a strong interest in “cultural” matters or embrace a readily articulated, 
consistent position on this topic. Instead, when dealing with patients, staff members 
would often act in highly creative and situationally flexible ways, be it by adapting 
routine clinical tasks (cognitive status evaluations, intake interviews, etc.) to the patient’s 
cultural background or by focusing on the psychological significance of cultural symbols 
in individual narratives. These clinicians embodied particular moral sensibilities that 
guided their clinical judgment and decisions, but they would not necessarily be able to 
articulate the assumptions or theories underlying these actions. This does not mean, 
however, that they were not capable of self-conscious ethical reflection. As I show below, 
some of my interlocutors took highly original and elaborate critical perspectives on the 
meaning of “cultural difference”, the nature and value of “cultural competence”, and even 
the hidden cultural biases inherent in psy discourses and institutions. I end the chapter 
with an extended theoretical reflection that draws on the anthropology of ethics and 
morality – and more specifically, on the ideas of Jarett Zigon, Webb Keane, and Cheryl 
                                                      
46 The forthcoming analysis is based on participant-observation I conducted at Kfar Shaul in June and July 
2014 and from January to June 2016, as well as on semi-structured interviews with 30 clinicians, including 
psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, social workers, and occupational therapists. 
  
120 
Mattingly – to make sense of the ethico-moral dimension of clinical engagements with 
“culture”.  
 
Cultural Knowledge as a Diagnostic Tool 
I will start with an extended ethnographic vignette. It was late afternoon in 
February, and I was sitting at the nurse’s station in the emergency room, when a new 
referral showed up. A Haredi man, in his mid-forties, dressed in a dark suit and a hat, had 
a long, mostly white beard and a serene face. There was nothing overtly striking or 
extraordinary about him, but his wife, a Black (and, as it turned out, African American 
rather than Ethiopian) woman wearing a dark coat and a light purple headscarf, attracted 
a lot of attention from clinicians at the ward. The couple was accompanied by a white 
teenage girl, wearing glasses, a grey beret, and a cheerful-looking yellow coat.  
All three spoke English, which at first presented a problem for Svetlana, the 
Russian nurse on duty. After apologizing to them politely with her few English phrases, 
she then looked at me and asked if I would be willing to assist. I agreed, and Svetlana 
proceeded to rely on my interpreting “services” to ask the wife for some personal 
information and the reason for the referral. Instantly becoming agitated, the woman 
described the increasingly disorganized and bizarre behavior of her husband. The referral 
documents that she provided revealed that he had been in treatment since 2005, mostly 
with a Jerusalem psychiatrist whom I knew personally and who specializes in the issues 
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of Haredi mental health. Hospitalized twice before, once in the US and once at another 
psychiatric hospital in Jerusalem, the man has been taking Risperdal47. 
As it took a while for the psychiatrist on duty to show up, the family had to sit and 
wait for their turn for at least thirty or forty minutes. Most of the medical personnel 
circulating through the emergency room on that day happened to be Russian speakers, 
and they exchanged quite a few comments among one another and with Svetlana and me. 
Perhaps because they were sure that the couple would not understand them, many 
comments were made in a mocking tone. One clinician exclaimed, after seeing the 
family: “And who is this suntanned [zagorelaya] woman next to him? His wife? Some 
people are so lucky [vezyot zhe nekotorym]!” Another Russian nurse who came to take 
over Svetlana’s shift was less charitable, suggesting that the woman herself must not be 
quite in her right mind. She also found the referral letter, written in English, to be 
entertaining, proceeding to read the opening words aloud in an exaggerated “British” 
accent.  
Finally, Dr. Volodin showed up. A Russian speaker, he was in his forties, with a 
smooth, somewhat flirtatious manner. After learning that my research involved “cultural 
aspects,” he called the man up to the transparent window separating the waiting room 
from the nurse’s station and started asking him questions in English: 
Man: Excuse me, how much longer do we have to wait? 
Volodin: Are you in a rush to be somewhere? 
                                                      
47 A trade name of Risperidone, an atypical (or second-generation) antipsychotic drug used to treat 
schizophrenia and psychotic conditions. 
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M: I need to go to a synagogue, pray the mincha48. 
V: You think you don’t need a psychiatrist? 
M: Not really, no. I think I need spiritual help, I don’t need psychological. 
V [smirking]: Here it’s a hospital, we don’t distinguish between the two. If you don’t 
mind my asking, which current [zerem], which community do you belong to? 
M: Do you know Lubavitcher49 rebbe? 
V: Of course! 
M: Them, and also Breslavers50 a little bit. 
Volodin then proceeded to question the man about the Breslavers and the Lubavitchers, 
asking him to name the admor51 of both communities. When the man hesitated to name 
the Lubavitcher admor, Volodin jokingly egged him on: “Nu, so do Lubavitchers have an 
admor or do they not?” He then turned to me and said, in Russian, that “the guy is not 
very knowledgeable about religion” (because Breslavers famously do not have an admor 
and are, indeed, sometimes mocked as “dead Hasidim” by other groups). The questioning 
continued, with Volodin asking the man to name the Hebrew date and the Torah portion 
of the week [parshat ha-shavua], which he did correctly. 
V: Do you know the three most important things? 
M: What? 
                                                      
48 The afternoon prayer in Judaism. 
49 A Hasidic group, notable for not having had a living leader ever since the death of its founder, Rebbe 
Nachman of Breslav (1772-1810). 
50 One of the largest and most well-known Hasidic groups in the world, also known as Chabad. It is 
particularly famous for its outreach to unaffiliated Jews and for the controversy surrounding its seventh 
rebbe, Menachem Mendel Schneerson, who was regarded by some of his followers as the messiah. 
51 A Hebrew acronym for “adoneynu, moreynu ve’rabbeynu”, literally “our father, our teacher and our 
rebbe”. Used as an honorific in some Hasidic communities. 
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V: Prayer, tzedaka, and good deeds52. You got me? Repeat it to me! [The man repeats] 
Which ones have you done today? Have you prayed? 
M: Yes… 
V: How many times? 
M: Well, once in the morning, and also now… [He makes a gesture and moves his face to 
suggest that he needs to pray now but can’t. Volodin recoils, as if in shock, and makes 
disapproving noises with his tongue.] 
M [hastens to add]: Well, I also prayed at night, so I guess two times… 
V: And what about tzedaka? 
M: Tzedaka? Rabbi from Lubavitch says that it can also be spiritual… 
V: And I am not asking you if you gave money, I am just asking if you gave tzedaka. 
What about good deeds? 
M: I praised my wife! 
V: Good job [kol hakavod]! And now, go, and wait for your turn nicely. 
Turning to me, Volodin explained that it was less important to him what exactly 
the patient said than how he reacted to the questions. For example, some patients might 
have scoffed at the Volodin’s nagging about charity and good deeds, but this man took it 
seriously, which meant that he was prone to suggestion. The inquiries about the Hebrew 
date and the weekly Torah portion also served a purpose – to discreetly figure out 
whether the man was oriented in time and space. Volodin told me, “With any religious 
                                                      
52 Volodin here is referencing, imprecisely, a famous saying from a Mishnah tractate, Pirkey Avot, that 
contain pithy statements of didactic or ethical nature: “The world stands upon three things: Torah, charity 
[tzedaka], and good deeds [gemilut chasadim]”. 
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person, you can ask them what’s the Hebrew date today and what the weekly Torah 
portion is. And if they don’t know the Hebrew date or, God forbid [khas ve-khalila], the 
Torah portion…” 
When I attempted to get more information about Volodin’s tackling of this case 
and started asking him about the more minute differences between the sects of Hassidism, 
he quickly lost interest, and Valya, the Russian nurse on duty, pointed out to me: “This is 
not interesting to us, it’s culture for the sake of culture…” Despite losing the interest in 
talking more about this case, Volodin proceeded to share a smattering of miscellaneous 
facts about culture and mental health. For instance, a Georgian man in an Estonian 
hospital would be considered manic, but he is not manic, “he is just a Georgian.” A 
religious man suddenly facing away from you and starting to rock back and forth 
rhythmically is not catatonic or compulsive, he is simply praying. Finally, the gesture that 
Ethiopians make during greetings (putting one hand on the elbow of the other) may come 
across as very obscene to Russians, but all they are doing is showing respect. Similarly, 
the sound that some Ethiopians make, as if drawing in air sharply, is not a sign of asthma, 
but is rather intended to convey that they are hanging on your every word.  
 Volodin’s joking attitude and a certain degree of bravado conceals what is 
actually a rather ingenious clinical approach. Under the guise of light conversation 
conducted in a somewhat facetious tone, he managed to carry out a preliminary 
evaluation of the incoming patient. By asking him about the Hebrew date and Torah 
portion of the week, Volodin ascertained that the man was oriented in time and space. 
The inquiries about the man’s specific affiliations also served more than idle curiosity: It 
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was highly significant that he claimed to associate with both Lubavitchers and Breslavers 
and generally betrayed a lack of basic knowledge about these two communities. Given 
the well-known hostility between the two groups, the man’s ignorance about the topic 
meant that he was probably not an active participant in either of the two communities, but 
rather, possibly, a newly religious person (hazar be-teshuva) just starting to “learn the 
ropes.” If that were the case, it would be a clinically significant piece of information53.  
 In sum, while Volodin (or Valya the nurse, for that matter) was completely 
uninterested in discussing “culture for the sake of culture”, he displayed a significant 
clinical ingenuity in handling a “cultural” case. He embodied a particular kind of moral 
sensibility – one that treats cultural knowledge instrumentally, as a useful tool for more 
accurate diagnosis – without taking a self-consciously reflective stance on the matter.  
  
Cultural Symbols and the Power of Empathy 
In the approach exemplified by Dr. Volodin, each cultural factoid serves as an 
index of sorts (in Charles Peirce’s definition of an index as a type of a sign). The features 
of the patient’s cultural background are interesting to the extent that they correlate with or 
point to something in the clinical picture, and the emphasis is placed on deciphering the 
significance of each sign and correlating it with a symptom. A different approach would 
                                                      
53 Indeed, there was a large percentage of hozrei be-teshuva among religious patients at the hospital, and 
this fact provoked frequent comments among clinicians. There was no single interpretation that fit all the 
cases: The turn to religiosity could be seen as something aggravating the mental health issue (for example, 
due to stress arising from attempts to fit into a new environment, with its rigorous requirements and distrust 
of outsiders) or as the individual’s attempt to address their suffering through spiritual means. For 
commentary about the connections between mental illness and religiosity in the Jewish context, see 
Heilman and Witztum 2000. 
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be to attend to cultural information as symbols, multivalent and full of psychological 
significance for the patient. To gain insight into cultural symbols, from this standpoint, is 
essential for establishing an empathetic therapeutic relationship. When a patient’s 
narrative makes use of unfamiliar or even puzzling cultural symbols, clinicians strive to 
move beyond the general understanding of what these symbols mean in their respective 
cultural context and glean what they signify for this specific individual. Adopting a quasi-
anthropological sensibility, clinicians attend to private symbols (Obeyesekere 1981) or, to 
put it differently, look for the underlying meanings of the symptoms and how they relate 
to the system of social relationships wherein the patient is located (Kleinman and 
Kleinman 1986). 
The personal, emotional salience of cultural symbols can be difficult for clinicians 
to comprehend and appreciate. Dr. Mandel, a Soviet-born psychiatrist, told me that in his 
early years in Israel he often lacked the cultural points of reference that would allow him 
to understand his religious Jewish patients better. For instance, some of his patients 
mentioned their mixed feelings and even anguish at being chosen to be a shaliach tzibur 
(literally “messenger of the public,” a person who leads the congregation to prayer). Dr. 
Mandel was not aware that to be chosen as shaliach tzibur is considered great honor, and 
precisely because of this some people would experience significant anxiety about living 
up to the standards of the congregation: 
Until I understood what a shaliach tzibur was, I could not understand at all what 
they wanted from me. I couldn’t even understand what they were talking about. I 
could not understand what the problem was, because, not knowing the cultural 
language, I could not understand what problem they were talking about. Here ehh 
the problem is that <…> without knowing the context, you cannot understand. 
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An even more pronounced example of how understanding the personal 
significance of cultural symbols facilitates treatment comes from Ilan, a psychologist in 
his early 30s at the day treatment unit.  He told me about his patient Natan, a Haredi man 
preoccupied with the issues of sexuality, masculinity, and body image. Ilan noticed that 
during their sessions Natan would often quote at length from various Jewish religious 
texts. Each time this happened, Ilan found himself disengaged from the encounter: 
It’s not so much because this is religious content and it doesn’t interest me, 
because, quite the opposite, it does interest me. But because he uses it in a certain 
way. Eh, very disengaged emotionally, for escape, not speaking about himself but 
quoting… But eh my assumption was that maybe some of these quotations eh 
they don’t have so much eh weight. 
  
However, once Natan told Ilan a story that immediately drew his attention. They 
were discussing Natan’s concerns about his weight and how it negatively affected his 
masculine self-image, and Natan related the following story, found in the Babylonian 
Talmud. They say that there were once two rabbis who were very fat, so much so that 
when they stood in front of each other and their bellies were touching, an ox could pass 
underneath! Hearing this and drawing connections to their preceding conversation, Ilan 
suggested that the story reflects Natan’s anxieties about his weight. But Natan responded 
that, according to an interpretation in the Talmud, the rabbis’ fatness meant that they 
could not possibly have had sexual relations and their children were not theirs.  
Intrigued, Ilan looked for the story in the Talmud (even asking a friend to 
translate from Aramaic for him) and found yet another interpretation: When accused of 
not siring their own children, the rabbis responded that they are “well-equipped” 
[metzuyadim] and that love is sufficiently strong, so that their bellies are not an 
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obstacle54. Therefore, the story has a clear sexual element to it. In Ilan’s mind, this story 
acquired an additional, much richer meaning that related to Natan’s understandings of 
sexuality and masculinity, revealing his anxieties about sexual performance, fears of not 
being able to have children, and hopes that a truly authentic romantic connection would 
be able to overcome all these obstacles. As Ilan concluded, “I would have missed all this 
if I had treated it like the rest of his quotations.” 
Ilan implicitly assumes that cultural material can have a complicated relationship 
to the patient’s inner world. Sometimes it can serve as a “filler” in a therapy session, a 
way to pass time without conveying any truly significant personal material. It acts, 
therefore, as a form of defense. At other times, however, cultural symbols actually reveal 
deeply held, meaningful personal motivations, aspirations, and fears, and an empathetic 
clinician would be able to get at these motivations, aspirations, and fears by attending 
closely to the culturally inflected narratives. 
Some of my interlocutors pointed to this sort of empathy as a powerful tool, 
potentially capable of transcending stereotypes and suspicions generated by the political 
situation.  Meir, a social worker in the open ward, told me that, in his view, the 
therapeutic process, by its very nature, works to establish a personal relationship that 
transcends group stereotypes. He shared a story about supervising a social work student, 
                                                      
54 This story comes from the Babylonian Talmud, tractate Baba Metsia 84a. In fact, Ilan modestly glosses 
over the more explicit and delightfully grotesque details of the story. When a woman confronts the two 
rabbis, they retort that the body size is a direct indication of the “organ” size and that love “presses the 
flesh.” This passage concludes with commentaries of two other rabbis, who actually provide rough 
estimates of the above-mentioned organs, comparing them to water-skins. A famous Talmudic scholar, 
Daniel Boyarin, who is known for his attention to the topics of sexuality and transgression, references the 
story directly in the title of one of his books, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis (2009). 
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a religious Jewish woman, who in the beginning of her internship said she was unwilling 
to treat Arab patients. Meir’s initial reaction was outrage: “Now, I wanted to tell her 
{imitates an outraged tone}: ‘What’s that supposed to mean? We are social workers, and 
we treat all people, regardless of religion, race, and sex, and all.’” Instead, he contained 
himself and asked her to tell him why she was so hesitant: 
And she told me: ‘Listen, we see every day on the TV…” – although she was 
not… she was religious, Haredi even, but – ‘Everything that we hear in the news 
is terrorist attacks. And I know that if an Arab comes to me, I must be careful. So 
what, am I going to stay alone in the room with an Arab man who either has 
stabbed someone or is going to stab someone! Or is going to do a terrorist attack. 
Do I know <that he is not going to do that>? I don’t know!’ 
 
Meir pointed out that this was a natural fear. From his perspective, humans are 
just like other animals: They tend to be fearful and cautious against those who do not 
belong to their group. While natural, this is also a trait that can and should be overcome, 
in his view. A psychotherapeutic encounter between a Jewish clinician and an Arab 
patient may begin in the atmosphere of distrust and fear, but over time the clinician starts 
seeing a human being rather than simply “an Arab” in the patient, and vice versa: 
He is not the entire Arab population, he becomes… Muhammad, or Nabil, or 
Ahmad, or… He is someone who has a name, who has… And also, when there is 
a meeting, the chance that he will attack you because you are a Jew, he also 
knows you. So he is not going to attack you because you are Tami, or Yosi, or 
Galit. He… If someone wants to attack, he wants to attack Jews. If he knows 
someone, it will be a little harder for him to attack them. 
 
Meir told me that his words had a profound effect on the student. Eventually, she 
started treating an Arab patient and, according to him, “helped him a lot.” In his approach 
to this issue, Meir avoided two obvious responses: He neither gave in to the student’s 
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request nor berated her for the lack of sensitivity and professionalism. Instead, he 
acknowledged the real basis for her fears, but also charted a way to overcome them. 
 
The Limits of Clinical Empathy? 
Whereas Meir’s story present a rather optimistic view of the therapeutic 
worldview’s power, my other interlocutors also pointed to the potential limits to the 
power of empathy in the clinical space. Specifically, such concerns often tended to focus 
on Ethiopian Jews, who were portrayed as inherently opaque to the Westernized 
psychological gaze. Even though there were very few Ethiopian patients at Kfar Shaul 
and there were also no Ethiopian clinical staff members – in my entire time there, I met 
fewer than five – the “problem” of Ethiopian patients was an extremely common 
discourse. 
 Dr. Savchenko, a Soviet-born psychiatrist, opined that globalization is eliminating 
most significant differences in the manifestation of psychopathology. A major exception, 
in his view, were Ethiopian patients, especially those with psychoses. The explanation, in 
his view, had to do with their more “primitive”, parochial culture: 
Because Ethiopian culture is more shifted <back> there {gestures behind 
himself}, when you get the fruit from a tree with a stick {chuckles}. And they 
have that dibbuk, their beliefs are very eh reminiscent of primitive beliefs of the 
past. Those who are Christians – yes, but they still have a big influence from their 
root culture. 
 
Dr. Mandel also spoke at length about “the Ethiopian problem” with me, and I 
could not help but notice the change in the quality of his speech. An extremely 
thoughtful, well-educated, and soft-spoken person – everything that the Russian word 
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that is notoriously hard to translate, “intelligentnyi”, encapsulates – he did tend to speak 
with a lot of pauses, repetitions, and filler words. When the conversations turned to 
Ethiopian patients, however, this feature has become even more pronounced. For him, the 
biggest issue had to do with the utter incomprehensibility of Ethiopian experiences to a 
Western-minded clinician: 
Ethiopians they are so differently, different… <…> The problem is that to 
understand… They differ so much from all our codes of understa… notions 
[predstavleniy], understandings [ponimaniy], eh… So, the meaning of words with 
them and what we mean by them <words> are completely different. And they, it’s 
very difficult to understand what they are talking about, very difficult. Not in the 
sense, not in the sense that, when they talk about their experiences 
[perezhivaniya]55, practically, it’s practically impossible for a Western person to 
understand these feelings. 
 
The experience of confronting the incomprehensible Other renders the normally 
articulate clinician incoherent. Taking care to insist that the literal understanding of 
words was not the issue, Dr. Mandel emphasized that the context of the words, their 
meaning and salience, evaded him. He portrayed this as a frustrating experience, an 
encounter with the irrational that he likened to “falling into something.” He echoed Dr. 
Savchenko’s characterization of Ethiopian culture as primitive by briefly referencing his 
experiences with Australian Aborigines, noting that things may be “even more difficult” 
for those work with that population. Dr. Mandel also outlined in a compelling fashion the 
very real stakes of this interpretive failure: 
                                                      
55 The Russian word “perezhivaniya” is hard to translate unambiguously here. Depending on the context, it 
can mean anything from intense emotions, to a troubled/concerned state of mind, to experiences, usually 
with a negative connotation.  It is related to the verb “perezhivat’”, used either by itself (in the meaning to 
worry) or with a referent (to worry about someone or something). My suspicion is that Russian speakers in 
Israel use it by analogy with the Hebrew word khavayot (both come from the root “to live”), which is why I 
stuck with this translation.  
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Ethiopian patients are the scariest thing for a psychiatrist, because he can never 
understand what the problem is and if there is danger. And they are serious 
people. They can often eh kill themselves or others or something else. They are 
serious people. But rapport [kontakt]… I don’t know how you can do rapport with 
them. Because you need not an interpreter of words, but an interpreter of culture. 
That is, a person who knows this culture. 
 
The breakdown in – or absence of – communication with Ethiopian patients, 
therefore, can have life or death consequences, and the only solution is to have a mediator 
well-versed in the culture of the clinician and the patient. Dr. Mandel was quite 
unequivocal that this was the only solution, because “these are people from another 
planet whom we cannot understand.”  
I want to emphasize here that Dr. Mandel’s and Dr. Savchenko’s utterances were 
not just isolated, idiosyncratic sentiments of two Soviet-born clinicians expressed to their 
younger compatriot. On the contrary, they are representative of a much more common 
discourse – or, more precisely, a set of discourses – circulating in Israeli society. At 
worst, Ethiopian Jews are construed as ultimate ‘Others’ – illegible, opaque, entrenched 
in their traditional ways. (Recall here the reactions of a cultural workshop participant at 
Neve Geula, who was annoyed with the Ethiopian woman in the instructional video and 
opined that Ethiopians are particularly rigid and unreceptive.). This narrative, pitting 
irrational, primitive, and stubborn Ethiopians against the more evolved, Westernized 
Israeli society, has been documented by numerous scholars (Salamon 2003). However, I 
would argue that something more complicated than mere racism or prejudice is going on 
with these clinical discourses about Ethiopians. Seen in a different light, they reflect the 
very real difficulties that are rooted not in the supposedly rigid and problematic 
characteristics of Ethiopian “culture” or Ethiopian “mind” per se, but in the emergent 
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properties of the interaction between Ethiopian olim and Israeli society that have to do 
with a mismatch between the mainstream Israeli and Ethiopian norms of communication 
(BenEzer 1999; Weil 1995), further complicated by the effects of trauma and 
bereavement that many Ethiopian Jews experienced on their journey to Israel (Finkelstein 
and Solomon 2009; Schreiber 1995). 
If most of my clinician interlocutors discussed the Ethiopian “problem” quite 
willingly and often unprompted, the Mizrahi question was a whole different matter. This 
is not surprising, given the complicated emotional and political valence of the Mizrahi-
Ashkenazi divide in contemporary Israeli society (Lavie 2014). In some Israeli circles, 
even referring to the lingering disparities between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim is 
tantamount to summoning “the ethnic demon” [ha-shed ha-edati], i.e. recycling old and 
(allegedly) no longer relevant ethnic grievances and thus threatening the unity of Israeli 
society or distracting attention from the really important issues of the day (Frantzman 
2014; Klein 2013)56. Indeed, the only person at Kfar Shaul who brought up the Mizrahi-
Ashkenazi divide eagerly and without my prior questioning was Moshe, a Mizrahi man in 
his sixties, colloquially referred to by patients and some clinicians as the hospital’s rabbi. 
He was not, in fact, a rabbi, but he combined his official appointment as the kashrut 
                                                      
56 The most memorable encounter I had that demonstrates this dynamic happened when, during my 
preliminary fieldwork, I was interviewing an Ashkenazi Jewish psychotherapist and human rights activist 
in the Tel Aviv area. He was especially involved in campaigns for Palestinians’ and prisoners’ rights and 
spoke very passionately about these issues. As our conversation was coming to an end, I began scrambling 
to “cover all the bases” and asked him what he thought regarding the inequalities between Ashkenazim and 
Mizrahim in Israel. My interlocutor stopped for a moment, looking puzzled, and then dismissed my 
question with a slight air of irritation: “Why are you asking about this? It’s no longer relevant! Everyone is 
intermarried these days. Now, what was I talking about…” 
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supervisor with some religious duties, such as organizing celebrations of Jewish holidays 
for those patients who did not go home to join their families.  
Moshe spoke with bitterness about the current state of affairs, when so many 
secular clinicians working at the hospital, and especially those from the former Soviet 
Union, “look down upon” [mezalzelim] religious patients, and his grievances had a clear 
ethnic dimension to it. Moshe compared this to the situation in the early decades after the 
hospital was established, when most of the staff were Mizrahim, many of them religious. 
He alleged that in the early days after the hospital was founded most Ashkenazi clinicians 
were not willing to work in a psychiatric setting because of the stigma associated with 
mental illness, and as a result it was Mizrahim – many of them religious – who took up 
these duties: 
Because it was disgusting [mag’il], to be with the sick, they were severe, and 
there were no good medicines that would make them… And the state didn’t treat 
them with respect. Just like they didn’t treat {laughs} the Mizrahim with respect! 
Also… Yeeees, it’s not that I am against someone… So they respected religion 
more. Respected more, thought about themselves as religious more.” 
 
 This striking narrative of grievances was in a stark contrast to the clinical 
discourses that did not focus on Mizrahi as a salient category. When I sat in on 
discussions in the open ward, Dr. Vered would exclaim, “Finally, something interesting 
for Ekaterina!”, whenever the conversation concerned Palestinian patients or ultra-
Orthodox ones, but not when the patient came from a Mizrahi background – they were 
not marked as “cultural” cases, in other words. In fact, the category itself was rarely used, 
and instead the case presentation would refer to “a native of Algeria” or “born in Israel, 
parents are from Morocco.”  
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Among the very few of my interlocutors who were willing to talk about the issues 
of treating Mizrahi patients was Ester, who herself came from a mixed Ashkenazi-
Mizrahi background. She was sometimes troubled by the assumptions that clinicians 
made about Mizrahi patients, using as an example one such patient, a Mizrahi woman, a 
mother to many children with a complicated history of trauma, drug use, and personality 
disorders, who was perceived as particularly difficult and confrontational. While hesitant 
to make such an allegation, Ester nevertheless pointed out that the staff members 
unwittingly attributed some explanatory value to the patient’s Mizrahi-ness: “We see the 
problem as more social or environmental, because it’s a more Mizrahi family. Because 
they are Mizrahi, everything falls into place, and we say, yes, of course.” She also 
wondered out loud if the staff failed to provide as much help and support as they could 
have – not due to active prejudice, but due to an unarticulated, but ingrained assumption 
that not much could be done for this woman. This trope – clinicians who feel hopeless 
about their attempts to help a patient embedded in a problematic cultural-familial 
dynamic – will reappear in the next chapter, although the patient in that case will be a 
Palestinian woman from East Jerusalem. 
 
The Culture of Clinical Practice 
 In the examples discussed above, clinicians deliberate on the importance and 
potential limits of empathy in an intercultural clinical encounter. However, what I found 
remarkable in my fieldwork at Kfar Shaul was how readily some mental health 
professionals talked not just about their patients, but about their own practices and 
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discourses as products of culture. Ironically, although there was little awareness of or 
interest in the discourse of “cultural competence” at Kfar Shaul, these clinicians 
displayed a sensibility that anthropologists have long argued should be incorporated into 
cultural competence training: Namely, attending to the cultural nature of professional 
socialization, instead of assuming that “culture” is the property of the patients, and 
clinicians and clinical spaces themselves are neutral and culture-less (Carpenter-Song, 
Schwallie, and Longhofer 2007; Taylor 2003a).  
 This is exemplified by an exchange in the closed ward. Menachem, a specialist in 
addiction treatment, was giving a presentation about the twelve-steps program for 
addiction57. Ahuvah, a psychologist, wondered aloud several times about the discourse of 
“a higher power”. Menachem clarified that the program is flexible to allow the 
participants to conceptualize God in any way they like: For instance, he, a recovered 
addict himself, used to think of God as a punishing figure, but now God is more 
compassionate and parent-like for him. Ahuvah objected, “But you grew up in a 
traditional environment! It was part of your culture, it was so easy for you. But what can 
someone who didn’t grow up with this do? What about atheists?” When Menachem 
suggested that the answer is to pretend “as if” (keilu) a higher power exists, Ahuvah 
looked unsatisfied. As the presentation drew to a close and the structured discussion gave 
way to banter, Andrei, a Russian-speaking nurse, interjected playfully: “Well, for anyone 
                                                      
57 The twelve-steps program for recovery from alcoholism was originally developed by Alcoholics 
Anonymous in the 1930s in the USA. Since then, the method has been expanded to other behavioral issues, 
such as drug addiction, sex and love addiction, gambling etc. As part of the program, participants are 
supposed to admit their powerlessness in the face of addiction and acknowledge the existence of a “higher 
power”, the force greater than themselves that can help them regain sanity.  
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who grew up in the Soviet Union religion is still the opium for the masses!” Ahuvah 
smiled and responded, “But psychology is also a sort of religion.” Catching a skeptical 
look on Andrei’s face, she recalled a course she took once, in which she learned that what 
psychologist and a shaman do is very similar. Andrei laughed with great amusement and 
shot back, tapping an invisible drum: “Finally, we’ve found a word for what you do. A 
shaman [shamanit]!”  
Not only did some of the clinicians display awareness of the cultural context of 
their practice, but they were also concerned about the culturally specific – and hence 
potentially constraining – nature of clinical assumptions about the boundaries of norm 
and pathology. Some of my interlocutors went so far as to suggest that the psychiatric, 
biomedical “norm” may itself be a cultural construct. Dr. Chana Vered, an Ashkenazi, 
Israel-born psychiatrist in her late 30s, zeroed in several times on the pervasive idea that 
independence, employment, and being “a functional member of society” are necessary 
precursors of mental health: 
…there’s always a question: Who said that everyone must work? I told you, like, 
who said {chuckles}? There are entire cultures in which not all the people eh go 
to work. Eh, or our expectation that young people won’t live with the parents. Eh. 
If we say a patient, in his 30s or 40s, who is living with his parents, and is very 
dependent on them, then we often encourage the patient and the parents to help 
him to become more independent. But who said that this is the right thing to do? 
There are cultures in which children live with their parents… Maybe until… <…> 
All their life. So I don’t know! 
 
This emphasis on “functioning” [tifkud] and productivity was indeed extremely 
pronounced in the clinical discussions, especially in the open ward, where, in contrast to 
the closed ward where the primary task was to stabilize patients and bring them back to 
reality, clinicians were concerned with maintaining the patients in this stabilized state and 
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releasing them back into the community as soon as possible. Going back to work – 
whether full time or on a flexible schedule, perhaps in a rehabilitative framework – was 
seen as essential to recovery.  
Dr. Vered not only pointed out how culturally specific this value put on 
“productivity” was, but she also explicitly wondered whether such focus may 
occasionally do more harm than good, especially when it clashes with the authentic needs 
of the patient. She recounted a story of a young man, hospitalized for the first time in his 
life after he went into a psychotic state following a Vipassana meditation session. Prior to 
this, he had a stable job for a few years, but then he left for South America to “find 
himself” and used a lot of drugs. He was treated first in the closed ward and then in the 
open ward, where he entered a depressed state. The staff referred him to the day 
treatment unit, as a way to assist with his recovery and transition back to normal. But this 
transition never happened: He was in the day treatment unit for months, when he also 
applied for a disability status and a social security pension. To this day, this case doesn’t 
sit right with Dr. Vered, and she wonders whether this young man simply had a complex, 
intense spiritual experience that he would have been better off recovering from on his 
own. Perhaps the staff hastened to label him as sick because his unconventional life style 
did not fit their ideas of the norm? As she put it: 
The question is, do we say he is sick because he does not meet our criteria? Like, 
he never got married, he had no children. <…> He did not hold down a regular 
job. He travels to South America to seek himself and to use drugs. And now, after 
the Vipassana session, he is, like, maybe psychotic, maybe depressed. <…> And I 
don’t know, to this day, if I can say that he is eh really bipolar or something like 
tha… or he needs to be defined as having mental health problems, or maybe he 
is… a guy who wanted to live an unconventional [yi-shigratiyim] life, to find 
himself. And maybe we did harm by putting him into a psychiatric hospital! And 
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if he hadn’t come here, maybe he would have gone through a crisis and continued 
on, with his life. 
 
There was an additional layer of complexity to clinical understandings of the 
boundaries of norm and pathology, encapsulated by an idea that a certain behavior or 
disposition may, strictly speaking, be unhealthy by all clinical standards, but also so 
widespread as to become a de facto norm. It was best formulated by Dr. Mandel, a 
Soviet-born psychiatrist, who was telling me about a recently admitted patient, a Russian 
woman, nurse by profession, who had two children and was still living with her parents: 
And no matter how many times she is told that this is a rather, so to speak, 
unhealthy approach to life, to live with the parents, she understands cerebrally 
[umom], but she can’t do anything, because she’s always lived like that. Eh, but 
this is not something… You understand, on one hand, that according to Western 
criteria all this is a pathology, but from a Russian person’s point of view it is not, 
it is, it is… You can imagine all this mutual, the extent of all these symbiotic 
relationships, love and hate, and involvement of one <person> in the liver of the 
other, so to speak. But this, this is a fact, actually, for a Soviet person it is a 
certain… maybe, pathological norm. 
 
 Dr. Vered’s and Dr. Mandel’s critiques take the psychiatric worldview to task for 
its unacknowledged and hardly universal cultural assumptions and entertain rather 
nuanced and sophisticated notions of culture in the clinical process. Some of my clinician 
interlocutors, however, went even further and raised questions about the very validity of 
the “culture” category itself. 
 
Culture as a “Fiction” 
 In all my interviews with clinicians, one of the first questions I asked was 
purposefully broad: “What do you think about the importance/significance of the issue of 
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culture in your work?” I was careful not to provide any further details, because I wanted 
to see what the first impressions and reactions to a broad inquiry like this would be. 
Whereas quite a few of my interlocutors immediately steered the conversation toward 
cultural differences in psychopathology, Ester, a psychology intern with a strong interest 
in psychoanalysis, took the conversation into a different direction. Although some of the 
other clinicians would point to the usefulness of cultural knowledge for understanding a 
patient, for Ester therapy requires a bracketing of such knowledge. She is convinced that 
the therapist must enter the clinical encounter free, as much as possible, of 
preconceptions about the patient’s cultural identity: 
Eh, so let’s suppose <…> that I won’t think about someone something specific 
because he comes from a certain culture, but I will try to really come, as much as 
possible, without, without eh preconceptions in order to hear what is going on 
with this specific person58. In this sense, I think culture is not very different from 
many other things, from education, from appearance, from age. 
 
For Ester, even the meaning of the word “culture” is debatable. Referencing 
Lacan, she explained to me that culture is nothing but a fiction: 
It is like parentheses, and you can put inside them anything you want! So you can 
put inside, let’s say, I don’t know, a Haredi man with a shtreymel59 and… You 
can put inside… a Spanish… woman… in, I don’ t know, flamenco clothes! Like, 
it’s a sort of cloak [me’atefet] that a person wraps himself into, and so the goal is 
to try to understand who he is, what he has inside, like, that he is dressing in all 
these… <…> The goal is not to get rid of this fiction, but to help him say 
something about himself with the help of the fiction, to express himself. 
 
                                                      
58 This idea of bracketing out any and all preconceptions also echoes the famous dictum of psychoanalyst 
Wilfred Bion, who advised analyst to enter each session “without memory, desire, or understanding.”  
59 A fur hat, originating in Eastern Europe, that men in some Hasidic sects wear on festive occasions. 
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 Culture thus becomes a cloak – an outside layer hiding and obscuring something 
beneath – the real self or, perhaps, yet another fiction60. What is remarkable here is the 
blending of familial, universalist claims that are common among psy practitioners with a 
more tentative sensibility, revealing the influence of social-constructionist and 
postmodernist ideas on psychology in the last several decades (Crossley 2003; Gergen 
1985; Kvale 1992). On the one hand, the language of culture as a “cloak” still presumes 
the existence of the hidden authentic self underneath – to use a term popularized by the 
psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott (1960), the “true self” that has been suppressed by the 
“false self”, which in turn formed as a response to restrictive societal norms.  
Nevertheless, note that Esther does not claim that this “cloak” should be stripped away 
entirely, just like she does not claim that it should be taken at face value. The alternative 
that she proposes is to create an environment in which the patients can express their deep, 
authentic selves by drawing on cultural meanings and symbols. This stance both echoes 
the pervasive contemporary preoccupations with “authenticity” or “authentic 
expressivity” (Lindholm 2008; Lindholm 2013) and takes a step back by refusing to strip 
away the cultural trappings to get to the “really real” self. 
 Ester refuses to take for granted not only the meaning of “culture”, but also the 
idea that cultural differences constitute a potential barrier for the therapeutic process. In 
an interesting reversal of many statements that I have heard at Kfar Shaul and elsewhere, 
                                                      
60 We did not explicitly discuss whether Ester believes in such a thing as a “real self.” Some strands of 
psychotherapeutic and psychodynamic theory certainly postulate that a real/authentic self exists (with the 
assumption that therapeutic interventions work to reveal this self). However, Lacan, whose ideas Ester was 
strongly interested in at the time of our conversation, regards “self” as an illusory construct.  
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Ester cautions against taking cultural similarity for granted. Indeed, since she encourages 
patients to reveal themselves through their narratives, a significant difference in 
backgrounds might end up being more beneficial, because it allows Ester to ask for 
explanations. According to her, if the therapist assumes that the patient comes from the 
“same” background, he or she might assume that what the patient is talking about is clear, 
self-evident, and does not require additional probing, which would be a mistake. An even 
graver mistake, for Ester, is excessive over-identification with a patient, when the 
therapist begins to ascribe his or her own tendencies and inclinations to the person in 
treatment. Although it arises out of a very natural human tendency to look for shared 
experiences, it is antithetical to the purposes of therapy: 
The truth is that it happens all the time, because an automatic tendency in all of 
us, not just therapists, is to identify similarities. All the time to identify what’s 
similar between me and you. To say, ‘Ah, yes, it’s exact same thing with me! I 
remember, when I was small, I felt exactly what you are talking about!’ It’s very 
bad [garua] for therapy, to work from this place. Because the things that we feel 
are similar – on which are based friendship or good interaction between people – 
but this hides the differences between them. And em if I listen to a patient like 
that, then it essentially, essentially… hides him from me. I essentially see myself 
in him. I am reflected in it, I see the things that are being said about me. And this 
happens – it’s not good for treatment, but it happens all the time! 
 
When a patient brings up “cultural” material, Ester takes care not to take it at face 
value, but rather tries to understand what it reveals about this person’s inner life. For 
instance, she once treated a Yemeni woman who was particularly preoccupied with her 
ethnic identity and constantly complained that other people looked down upon her 
because of her origins. Ester, herself half-Mizrahi, was very aware of discriminatory 
attitudes toward Jews hailing from the Middle East and North Africa. But in this case her 
patient’s fixation on the perceived discrimination was so striking that it pointed to 
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something deeper than an expression of political discontent. There is a long-standing 
tradition of critiquing psychoanalytic thinking for its neglect of the political – or for 
treating the political as a mere stand-in for the “real” underlying issues, invariably 
understood as psychosexual in nature. Ester, however, neither takes the political anxieties 
of her patient at face value nor dismisses them as a rationalization. Instead, she 
acknowledges that the objective reality of enduring discrimination against the Mizrahim, 
but also probes deeper, conjecturing that her Yemeni patient was unusually preoccupied 
with the perceived discrimination because she had an unstable, wounded self-image. 
Similarly, when a Russian patient, Grigory, incessantly grumbled against 
“judgmental” Israeli women who, unlike Russian women, always pester men about 
earning more money, Ester did not take it as a reflection of reality. In this case, even the 
objective reality of the grievance is beside the point: Russian women might or might not 
be more “understanding,” but that in itself is not relevant. Instead, the fact that Grigory 
was so invested in complaining about Israeli women and extolling the virtues of his 
compatriots indicated that he was caught between two feelings: While yearning to 
become more independent and successful, he was also afraid of failure, and, in order to 
deal with the resulting anxiety, he projected the fear outward, attributing it to an object 
outside of himself (the judgmental, materialistic “Israeli women”). 
 While for Ester culture is a “fiction”, it is a fiction that has a very real meaning 
and power, and her role as a clinician is to assist patients in talking about their struggles 
with and responses to their cultural environment. Another clinician at Kfar Shaul, Dr. 
Ratner, would wholeheartedly agree that culture is a fiction, but he took this critical 
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approach in a very different direction. Genteel and charismatic – as well as eerily 
reminiscent of Michel Foucault in his looks – he presided over a curious subdivision of 
the hospital, a small outpatient clinic treating patients from East Jerusalem. Tucked away 
near the hospital’s fence, right next to the entrance, the clinic was easy to miss, housed in 
a diminutive, one-story building of the type that Israelis refer to by a nickname 
“caravans.” With only a few rooms, it had just enough space for a secretary, a social 
worker, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Ratner. I was at first puzzled to learn the official title of 
the clinic, because it had the same name as a neighborhood in East Jerusalem. As it 
turned out, the hospital indeed used to run a small outpatient facility there, but during the 
Second Intifada of the early 2000s traveling to East Jerusalem became too dangerous for 
the Jewish employees of the hospital, and the clinic was transferred to the hospital 
grounds, albeit under the old name.  
 I found Dr. Ratner a fascinating and contradictory figure: Well-versed in 
colloquial Palestinian Arabic, he chatted with his patients effortlessly and warmly, but a 
moment later he could turn to me and share a scathing remark about Arabs. At one point, 
he remarked, with a bewildering mixture of concern and disdain: 
You can’t even imagine under which conditions they live there, in villages around 
East Jerusalem! Can neither read nor write; men don’t want to study or work, just 
to make babies. And that’s how they live – twelve kids, eighteen… Just like in 
those Brazilian favelas. It’s just that those <people> play football, and these 
<people> play jihad… 
 
Even more puzzlingly from my standpoint, he had a chip on his shoulder about 
“culture.” When I introduced my topic, my other interlocutors had a range of reactions, 
some feigning polite, but somewhat skeptical interest, others enthusiastically offering 
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their views on the subject. Dr. Ratner was the only clinician I interacted with who openly 
scoffed at the notion of cultural competence, while also demonstrating significant 
familiarity with the topic. Without my prompting, he invoked the names of several 
prominent psychiatrists, Israeli and international, who have been advocating for more 
awareness of cultural issues. From Dr. Ratner’s standpoint, the whole undertaking was 
nothing but a group of unsavory individuals seeking to gain money and fame by recycling 
superficial cultural stereotypes. Some of his accusations were so bizarre – he insinuated 
that a prominent transcultural psychiatrist must be so active at attending international 
conferences because he enjoys sleeping with underage girls in Third World countries – 
that I could not help but wonder whether there were some personal conflicts at play.  
Most intriguingly, the substantive critiques that Dr. Ratner had about the cultural 
competence movement sounded, in fact, very much like the reservations that 
anthropologists had about the early attempts to make medicine more culturally sensitive 
(summarized in chapter 1). For instance, Ratner argued that “exotic” symptoms, such as 
jinn possession, should not be taken at face value. Instead, psychiatrist should inquire into 
what is behind these symptoms – how, in other words, they express some underlying 
suffering (an idea reminiscent of the anthropological concept of “the idioms of distress”).  
Ratner also recounted an experience, from his early career, that solidified his 
resentment toward the advocates of “culture.” One of his first patients was a Holocaust 
survivor, and Ratner, then a young energetic clinician, scanned the literature for 
information on the psychological experiences of this population. When she described a 
dream she had, he exclaimed, with excitement: “Ah, yes, this is just like what I read 
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about the dreams of Holocaust survivors!” The woman snapped back: “So I am just a 
Holocaust survivor for you?” – and never returned to therapy. This story struck me as 
rather rehearsed and formulaic – not in the sense that it was made up, but as if he has told 
this story multiple times, to himself or others, to explain an important shift in his clinical 
worldview. An anthropologist, Ratner told me, is interested in the “boxes” (cultures) 
themselves, but he, as a psychiatrist, is concerned with how individuals inhabit their 
boxes. Even – or especially – when a patient comes from a group that he knows a fair 
amount about, Ratner does not use general knowledge to make assumptions, but instead 
tries to understand where the patient stands in relation to the group. Over the years, he 
had a significant number of Arab patients from East Jerusalem who were gay and 
struggled to keep their sexuality in secret. In these cases, Ratner reiterated, what matters 
is not the “box” (presumably, the Arab society of East Jerusalem), but how the patient 
feels about the box (conflicted and oppressed).  
 
Making Sense of the Clinicians’ Perspectives: Moral and Ethical Dimensions 
Both the official approach to cultural competence described in chapter 1 and the 
discourses of the cultural competence training I analyzed in chapter 2 have only a 
tangential relation to the rich and nuanced clinical perspectives I presented in this 
chapter. These perspectives are not only diverse and polyvocal – they are also, at times, 
both intellectually engaging and steeped in powerful moral sentiments and moods 
(empathy, doubt, distaste, anxiety). For the most part, they raise questions rather than 
supply definitive answers. In other words, clinicians at Kfar Shaul are engaged in 
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complex ethical deliberation centered on such issues as the value and limits of empathy 
or the validity of the “culture” category.  
These understandings need not be verbalized or actually deliberated about in a 
strict sense, either. Jarett Zigon (2008) argues that morality should not be identified with 
explicit rules, norms, or principles – instead, it can be understood as “a kind of habitus or 
an unreflective and unreflexive disposition of everyday social life” (Zigon 2008, 17). 
Morality is, in other words, embodied and enacted. In Zigon’s view, explicit, self-aware 
ethical reflection is a “stepping-away from the embodied moral habitus or moral 
discourse” that is precipitated by a moral breakdown, a situation that forces people to 
consciously reflect on their ethical choices (Zigon 2008, 18). Like many critics of Zigon, 
I find this distinction between embodied, unreflexive morality and conscious ethical 
reflection arising in the moments of crisis to be too sharp and inadequate to capture the 
complex and emotionally charged nature of moral experience. However, this distinction 
is apt to some extent, as at times my interlocutors displayed moral sensibilities that they 
arrived at intuitively and on the basis of context-specific clinical practice rather than 
through ethical reasoning, while at others they engaged in more self-conscious, rigorous, 
and occasionally rather abstract ethical deliberation. This latter was not necessarily 
precipitated by a moral breakdown, and the boundaries between deliberation and 
embodied morality could not be drawn as sharply as Zigon’s distinction would suggest. 
In other words, the distinction between moral habitus and ethical reflection is 
useful, but it should not be reified or overstated. Webb Keane’s concept of ethical 
affordances provides one possible way to understand the connection between the two. 
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The concept of affordances comes from the psychology of perception, where it refers to 
the objective properties of objects that, in some circumstances and for some 
observers/actors, lend themselves to – but do not necessitate or determine – particular 
kinds of perception or action. In concrete terms, a cup has objective properties that make 
it possible to drink from it, but they do not require everyone who comes into contact with 
it to do so: Indeed, a person may choose not to use the cup at all or, conversely, use it for 
other purposes entirely (for instance, as a container to store jewelry or, perhaps, a cookie-
cutter). Affordances are, in other words, real, objective properties that create 
potentialities for human action. Keane (2014; 2015), in turn, introduces the notion of 
ethical affordances, by which he means the properties of human (inter-)subjectivity and 
social environments that enable (but do not force) people to engage in ethical reasoning 
and decision-making. For example, the technical features of ordinary conversation – the 
intricacies of turn-taking, word choice, intonation etc. – provide affordances for the 
interlocutors’ ethical evaluation of each other.  
For the purposes of my material in this chapter, the concept of ethical affordances 
is extremely useful. For a long time, medical anthropologists and sociologists tended to 
write about clinical training as a sort of indoctrination, a totalizing experience of 
socialization that drastically reshaped the novice clinicians’ subjectivities in line with the 
culturally and historically specific worldviews of the clinical communities they were 
entering (Conrad 1988; Davenport 2000; Foucault 1973; Good 1994; Good and 
DelVecchio Good 1993). While providing a valuable corrective to the naïve, skin-deep 
understandings of clinical training as merely teaching students to view things (bodies, for 
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instance) as they “really are”, this perspective, when pushed to the extreme, has a 
potential to be excessively deterministic and does not fully account for the intricacies and 
contingencies of moral reasoning involved in clinical practice. Instead, we can view 
clinical training as providing affordances – the potentialities that psy practitioners may or 
may not draw on when making everyday decisions and judgments.  
 Seen in this light, for instance, clinical training creates affordances for certain 
moral experiences of empathy, as well as for ethical reflections on the nature and limits 
of empathy in a clinical space. In the last decade or so, empathy has become a subject of 
both ethnographic accounts and theoretical treatments by anthropologists (Hollan and 
Throop 2008; Hollan and Throop 2011; Kirmayer 2008; Strauss 2004; Throop 2010). 
Taken as a whole, this literature problematizes the concept of empathy, calling for a 
sustained attention to how empathy is manifested across different cultural contexts, what 
resources and conditions foster or, on the contrary, suppress empathetic engagements, 
and in what ways empathy may be distinguished from similar phenomena (such as 
compassion, pity, sympathy, projection, etc.).  
Building on this literature, I would argue that clinical training creates affordances 
for a particular kind of empathy, one that is steeped in both what Mattingly (2008) calls 
“narrative mind reading” (a mode of understanding that seeks to link actors, their 
motivations and actions, and the actions’ consequences into a story-like sequence) and 
what Ricoeur (1971) refers to as “a hermeneutic of suspicion” (focusing on the motives 
that are either hidden from or actively concealed by the actor). What is important to 
understand is the clinical training does not cause psy practitioners to be empathetic, but 
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rather creates opportunities for empathetic engagements that are sometimes carried 
through (as in Meir’s interaction with a religious supervisee hesitant to treat Arab 
patients), and sometimes fall short (as in Ilan’s initial “zoning out” during Nathan’s 
Talmudic exegesis); sometimes stimulate ethical reflection (as in Ester’s account of the 
staff’s problematic handling of a Mizrahi patient), and sometimes elide it (as in the 
vignette with Dr. Volodin). 
Similarly, clinical training in psy disciplines creates affordances for – rather than 
strictly determines – a particular stance toward the nature of the relationship between the 
self and the social world. Here, as well, medical anthropologists have tended to draw 
linkages between the clinical (more precisely, biomedical) training and a worldview that 
sees people as largely autonomous entities, ontologically prior to and analytically 
separable from their social environment (Gordon 1988). It is true – and not entirely 
surprising – that my interlocutors at Kfar Shaul tended to assume the existence of 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral human universals and to take interest in the 
individuals rather than their cultural environments. But the actual manifestations of this 
universalism were wide-ranging, and the universalism itself was by no means 
unqualified. For instance, Dr. Ratner’s radical critique of  “cultural competence” was 
distinct from Dr. Mandel’s focus on the psychological significance of cultural symbols, 
and both were different from – and challenged by – Dr. Vered’s critique of culturally 
contingent assumptions inherent in psy disciplines themselves.  
To return to the starting point of this analysis, in contrast to Zigon, who sharply 
distinguishes between embodied morality and conscious ethical reflections following the 
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moments of moral breakdown, Keane portrays both conscious and unconscious ethical 
evaluations and decisions as enabled by affordances. Correspondingly, my Kfar Shaul 
interlocutors’ clinical training created affordances for – but did not necessitate or 
determine – a wide range of ethico-moral experiences, ranging from situationally 
contingent, intuitive decisions to rigorous and self-conscious ethical reflection, and 
including everything in between. In the next chapter, I continue my exploration of 
clinical reasoning and decision-making at Kfar Shaul by raising the following question: 
How do clinicians draw on their embodied moral sensibilities and engage in ethical 
deliberation when politically fraught clinical encounters with the patients who are viewed 
as cultural “Others” create demands for recognition? In order to bring to life some of 
these tensions and dilemmas of engaging with difference at Kfar Shaul, I will structure 
the following chapter around an extended case analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RECOGNITION OF WHAT? CONSTRUCTING CULTURAL 
“OTHERS” IN A JERUSALEM PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL 
In Chapter 3, I explored the complexities of moral reasoning – about clinical 
empathy and its limits, the culturally contingent nature of psy discourses, the relationship 
between individuals and their sociocultural environment, and the very validity of the 
“culture” category – that clinicians at Kfar Shaul engaged in on the day-to-day basis, 
connecting it to the ethical deliberations and debates in the larger Israeli society. In this 
chapter, I will zero in on an extended analysis of two case studies from my fieldwork at 
Kfar Shaul – of Yirmiyahu, a Jewish Orthodox man, and Rifaat, a Palestinian Muslim 
woman. Using the notion of “recognition” as a theoretical lens, I ask, What does 
recognition look like in a politically fraught clinical setting wherein a patient is seen as a 
cultural Other? Furthermore, when this “Otherness” has multiple dimensions, which ones 
are recognized and foregrounded and which ones are elided, and why? Finally, how do 
mental health care practitioners integrate the political context into their clinical 
reasoning? The larger theoretical contribution of this chapter is to show that medical and 
psychological anthropologists are uniquely positioned to interrogate and trouble the 
assumptions that underlie interdisciplinary conversations about pluralism and difference. 
 
Why Recognition? 
The concept of recognition has been widely used, although with different 
meanings, by moral philosophers, political theorists, social scientists, psychoanalysts, and 
others. While not without earlier historical antecedents, contemporary theories of 
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recognition can be generally traced back to German idealist philosophy, especially Hegel, 
who argued that independent self-consciousness is a product of intersubjectivity – i.e., 
one’s sense of self and sense of freedom can only be achieved through recognition from 
other individuals. Since then, the concept of recognition has been taken up and 
reinterpreted by such disparate communities of thought as Marxism, American 
pragmatism, French phenomenology, developmental psychology, object-relations and 
relational psychoanalysis, feminism, and multiculturalism (Zurn 2010).  
Although these two strands are interrelated, “recognition” is usually employed in 
two different sorts of conversations: Some revolve around interpersonal encounters 
between parents and children, therapists and patients, or lovers (Benjamin 1998; Orange 
2010; Winnicott 1969), while others discuss the challenges of recognition on the societal 
scale in the context of debates around pluralism – whether and how differences should be 
acknowledged, tolerated, and accommodated (Fraser 1997; Honneth 1996; Modood 
1998; Taylor 1992). Both of these conversations are rooted in the same assumption – that 
receiving respect and acknowledgment is not only an essential human need, but 
fundamental for the formation of human subjectivity. If this need is not accommodated in 
both personal encounters and political life, grave consequences for both individual and 
collective well-being can ensue. When applied to the societal level in particular, the 
concept of recognition is also not without its critics who argue that the language of 
recognition reifies the boundaries of cultural groups that are in reality always in flux 
(Benhabib 2002), too easily lends itself to political control and manipulation of minorities 
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(Hale 2005; Povinelli 2002), or even ultimately incompatible with individual freedom at 
all (Appiah 2005). 
 I contend that medical and psychological anthropologists are uniquely positioned 
to bring these two strands of the conversation around recognition, the interpersonal and 
the societal one, together. Indeed, this would be a logical development building on the 
recent trends in the field. In their formative decades, these subdisciplines extensively 
documented how the causes, course, manifestations, and treatment of mental illness are 
deeply embedded in various sociocultural and political-economic contexts (Biehl 2005; 
Brodwin 2013; Estroff 1981; Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Gaines 1992; Good 1992; Good 
et al. 2008; Jenkins 2015; Kleinman et al. 1978; Kleinman and Good 1985; Luhrmann 
2000; Rhodes 1995). The more recent work, however, has turned the analytical gaze to 
the mental health care settings themselves as a space where cultural, ethnic, and religious 
differences are constructed and the limits of empathy and tolerance are tested (Davis 
2012; Giordano 2014; Kirmayer 2008; Kirmayer 2011; Santiago-Irizarry 2001). To bring 
in the notion of recognition more fully – not as an afterthought, but as a working concept 
to be critically examined in light of ethnographic material – would be both a logical and 
productive next step.  Specifically, the very taken-for-granted terms of the debate need to 
be disrupted by asking a different sort of question altogether. In his famously sharp 
critique of social constructionism, Ian Hacking suggested that the term has become so 
overused as to almost lose meaning. Taking inspiration from Hacking’s question, “The 
Social Construction of What?” (1999), I ask: When we talk about recognition, it is 
recognition of what, precisely?  
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To support this theoretical claim, I analyze two contrasting stories in which the 
patients, although for very different reasons, were viewed by clinicians as cultural Others. 
Although in both cases there were multiple dimensions of the patients’ identities that 
could all potentially have become the focus of clinical attention and reasoning (gender, 
religion, political persuasions and positionality, ethnicity), clinicians honed in on only 
some of these dimensions to the exclusion of others that were not seen as relevant to the 
therapeutic process. The consequences of this divergence were profound: Because the 
difference was constructed differently in the two cases, the two patients were also treated 
differently. How they were recognized (if at all) was contingent on what was being 
recognized in the first place. Furthermore, how the political context was acknowledged 
was drastically different between these two cases. 
As detailed in the previous chapter, the very location and appearance of Kfar 
Shaul is permeated with meaning, signaling unresolved conflicts and tensions that are 
ever-present in clinical and everyday encounters in Israel. Just like Israelis struggle with 
recognizing and coming to terms with their country’s past, patients and clinicians in the 
hospital have their own challenges of recognition to work through. The two cases below 
detail some of the contradictions and unexpected turns that this work entails, while also 
raising questions about the different meanings of recognition and the validity of the term 
as an analytical device. 
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Case 1: Yirmiyahu 
I first saw Yirmiyahu during the Monday morning rounds in the closed ward. The 
rounds last up to three hours and provide an opportunity for the staff to meet recently 
hospitalized patients and check on the progress of the ones who have been in the ward for 
a while. Rounds take place in the “doctors’ room” (heder rof’im) – a rather cramped 
space with nonmatching chairs lining the walls and stacked around a long table. Often it 
is Dr. Levin, the head of the ward and a USSR-born psychiatrist with an athlete’s 
shoulder span and an intense, piercing look, who leads the rounds. He has an imposing, 
authoritative manner about him: I once joked that out of all the people in the ward I 
feared him most, and he deadpanned without missing a beat: “And rightly so!” His 
manner with patients is also serious, almost solemn, as if to convey the gravitas of the 
situation, but his wry humor and compassion are also ever-present. Either Dr. Levin or 
another psychiatrist leading the rounds on the same day would conduct the whole 
interview and ask other staff members present in the room – psychiatrists, psychologists, 
social workers, students – whether they have questions. The “turnover” of patients is 
quick, and discussion in between the interviews is brief and informal; patients are 
discussed in a lot more depth during a staff meeting later in the day. 
Yirmiyahu was one of the last patients to be seen on that day. A thin man with 
short dark hair and curly side locks framing his face, he was wearing a wrinkled grey 
sweatshirt and sweatpants and had a knit yarmulke on his head. Later, I found out that he 
was in his mid-thirties, but his unkempt, silver-laced beard made him look much older. 
He was clasping his hands in his lap and sometimes lifting them up to his chest, rubbing 
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them around his heart. He mostly kept his eyes shut and, when Dr. Levin asked him why 
he was doing that, he said that “the light” was hurting him, but he offered no further 
details and reported no other aches or pains in the body. 
Although the conversation concerned the circumstances of Yirmiyahu’s arrival, I 
did not know the background story at the time, only gathering that he was from a West 
Bank settlement and that there was some sort of terrorist attack there. In my notebook, I 
took detailed notes of the conversation between Yirmiyahu (Y) and Dr. Levin (L)61: 
L: There have been some tragic events in your settlement62. How are you coping 
with it?  
Y: The woman wasn’t killed, and the attacker left. In this encounter, the bad and 
the good met, and a lot of light came out of it. 
L: What do you mean by that? 
Y: That man came with a knife and wanted to stab her. [Yirmiyahu was getting 
visibly upset when talking about this.] But she looked at him with her good eyes 
and asked, “How can I help you?” And that same moment things changed, he no 
longer was there to kill, but to be killed [lo laharog ela lehihareg]! He realized that 
all he’s been told his whole life was nonsense [shtuyot], that this was a mistake, 
and that he needs to respect his family. And he left, and in the street the people 
saw him with a knife and started shouting: “Terrorist, terrorist!” And the security 
                                                      
61 Based on the written notes I took in a mixture of Hebrew and English during the conversation. 
62 Although the English word is the same, in Hebrew he used the neutral word, yishuv, instead of 
hitnachalut. The former is more general and can refer to any kind of town, while the latter has an aura of 
illegality and is often applied to Jewish settlements in the West Bank. 
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forces shot him in the leg. But she wasn’t killed, and he wasn’t killed. This was a 
miracle, an opening for an encounter, for peace! 
L: And you tried to explain that to your friends? That this was a miracle, an 
opening? 
Y: Yes… [Smiling thinly] That it is an opening for peace, for dialogue, for 
coexistence. To accept the other [lekabel et hazulat]. We have Arab workers who 
come to our settlement… Because they <his friends> thought this is crazy talk, I 
am here now. 
I was left intrigued and wrote in my fieldnotes, “the most interesting case today”.   
Soon I started seeing Yirmiyahu in the morning group therapy sessions in the 
closed ward. Perhaps referring to these gatherings as group therapy sessions implies the 
structure and organization that in reality was lacking. Every time, two staff members 
(usually a psychiatrist, nurse, or occupational therapist) would call on the patients in the 
communal room – some of them drawing, others browsing on a computer or lounging on 
an armchair with a book – to gather around in a circle. A staff member would almost 
invariably start the session by announcing that everyone was welcome to share his63 
feelings, thoughts, and challenges and that others were invited to listen and respond 
respectfully. In reality, there was a lot of flux, with people joining the circle and leaving, 
speaking out of turn, or expressing frustration by exclaiming things like: “I really miss 
                                                      
63 Only men are hospitalized at the closed ward of this hospital. If women are deemed to be in a severe 
enough condition after spending a few days in the emergency room, they are transferred to another hospital, 
also part of the Jerusalem Community Mental Health Center network of hospitals and outpatient facilities. 
The open ward at the hospital I studied does have women patients.  The absence of women at the closed 
ward was described to me as a matter of safety: There was a concern that the staff simply would not be able 
to prevent sexual harassment or even violence from breaking out. 
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my girlfriend!” or “Why am I here, with these crazies [ha-meshugaim ha-ele]? It was 
occasionally difficult to discern any common theme in the conversation, other than 
suffering.  
Amidst this atmosphere of distress and confusion, Yirmiyahu turned out to be a 
compassionate and attentive participant. He did not speak much in the sessions that I 
attended, but he would always lean forward and listen intently. In one group therapy 
session, a young Arab patient was speaking in halting Hebrew64 about alienation from his 
father. He was tearing up and becoming increasingly upset, when Yirmiyahu, who was 
sitting next to the speaker, wrapped one arm around his shoulder and then squeezed the 
man’s hand with his and shut his eyes tight, concentrating. Later, I heard from several 
staff members that Yirmiyahu often launched into a spontaneous prayer, grasping the 
shoulders of the men he was talking to, many of them Arabs.  
In a little over a week since he was hospitalized and put through a course of 
antipsychotic medication, Yirmiyahu was deemed sufficiently stabilized and transferred 
to the open ward. I would often see him in conversations with other patients or sometimes 
simply sitting on the bench in front of the open ward, not uncommonly next to an Arab 
patient. The sight of a Jewish settler talking so freely and willingly to Arabs from East 
Jerusalem struck me as unusual, especially in light of what I knew about the 
                                                      
64 Although Arab citizens of Israel generally speak excellent Hebrew, Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem are a 
special case. They do not have Israeli citizenship, but hold a special resident permit and are entitled to a 
limited range of services, including health care. They are less integrated in the Israeli society than their 
counterparts in other regions of the country, and as a result rarely speak Hebrew fluently. 
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circumstances of Yirmiyahu’s arrival that I had already started piecing together, based on 
conversations with the staff members and media reports. 
Crisis and Arrival 
Yirmiyahu arrived at Kfar Shaul during the so-called “lone wolf Intifada,” a wave 
of car-ramming, stabbing, and shooting attacks in the winter of 2015 and spring of 2016 
that received its name because in the public perception the attacks were performed by 
individual Palestinians acting on their own behalf and not affiliated with any political 
organization65. Yirmiyahu was living in a Jewish settlement in the West Bank where one 
of the attempted attacks took place. Although the alarm would normally sound when an 
outsider entered the settlement, on that day the security system was accidentally turned 
off, and a Palestinian teen holding a knife entered the settlement undetected. The boy 
knocked on the door of one of the houses. A pregnant woman opened the door and, when 
she saw the knife, started pleading with him to spare her life and let go of his weapon. 
Whether because he was convinced or for another reason, the youth did not attack her, 
but instead started running, the knife still in hand, and it is then that he was spotted by a 
guard, who fired his gun, injuring the boy in the leg.  
When Yirmiyahu, who was teaching at the local preschool at the time of the 
foiled attack, learned about what happened, he became extremely agitated and active. It 
was one of his responsibilities in the settlement to make sure that the security system was 
functioning well, and he became preoccupied with ensuring that it was in good order, 
                                                      
65 While the media at first speculated about the link between the attacks and the Islamic State, it soon 
became apparent that the violence was largely not religiously motivated (Issacharoff 2016).  
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while also raising money for the Jewish family affected by the attack attempt. Over the 
next several days, Yirmiyahu barely slept or ate, and his friends and wife became 
concerned about his erratic activity and increasingly bizarre statements. According to his 
wife, Yirmiyahu started saying that it was God who had prevented the attack from 
happening, and that he personally had caused this intercession. He insisted that he was 
reading a verse from the Jacob’s ladder story in the Book of Genesis exactly at the time 
when the teenager with the knife showed up on the doorstep, and it was that verse that 
averted the tragedy from happening. Finally, Yirmiyahu’s wife became so concerned – 
about his statements and frantic appearance – that she brought him to the hospital. 
 
Yirmiyahu before Hospitalization 
Staff members at the closed and the open ward did not have a unified 
understanding of what happened to Yirmiyahu and what the best way of helping him was. 
But, invariably, his “history” was brought up as relevant to understanding his condition. 
At a staff meeting after morning rounds in the closed ward, a psychologist recounted that 
Yirmiyahu was born in Israel, but grew up in the United States. He had some history of 
mental illness in his family: His grand-aunt had schizoaffective disorder and did not 
function well in everyday life, and his brother had had a manic-depressive episode. His 
father, an American, came to Israel as a volunteer in the 1980s and married an Ethiopian 
woman. Both worked, but did not have stable employment. When Yirmiyahu was seven, 
the family left for the United States, because his father had asthma, and the air was 
deemed better in the US. They found life in the States hard, and his parents’ marriage 
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eventually fell apart, but they eventually integrated in the local community. Yirmiyahu 
went to college and studied engineering, but dropped out of the program and enrolled in a 
comparative religion degree, which he also did not finish.  
Around that time, he became religious66 and went to Israel, where he met his wife. 
He started studying at a yeshiva to become a rabbi, but failed the exam. Although the 
exam was so hard that almost all students failed the first time, Yirmiyahu’s failure left 
him in a distraught state, and his wife suggested that they move to a settlement in order to 
gain some distance from distressing memories. When the second Intifada started in the 
early 2000s, they moved to the US, where they spent four years. Their first son, now 
fourteen, was born in the United States, and since then they have had three other children, 
twelve, ten, and five years of age, respectively, at the time of Yirmiyahu’s 
hospitalization. This was the most stable period in the life of Yirmiyahu, who was able to 
secure a job at the stock exchange. After the most intense days of the Second Intifada 
were over, the family returned to Israel and moved into a house in a West Bank 
settlement. Yirmiyahu found a job as a teacher at the settlement’s preschool, while also 
volunteering at the local council.  
When the attack happened, he blamed himself a lot. His wife did not even notice 
at first that something was wrong, because she assumed he was busy helping other people 
cope with what happened, but then she realized he was not sleeping and barely eating. He 
                                                      
66 “Became religious” is an imprecise rendering of the Hebrew phrase, hazar be-tshuva, which, as 
explained in a footnote in the previous chapter, can be figuratively translated as “turned back to God.” 
Tshuva (or teshuvah) is often conveyed as “repentance,” but the three-letter root (sh-u-v) of the word has 
the meanings of turning, returning, repeating. Depending on the context and the speaker, the phrase can 
have a positive, neutral, or negative connotation, which reflects how deeply Israeli society is split over the 
issues of religiosity.    
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was out the entire time on Shabbat and, when he came back, he started talking about 
receiving a blessing (bracha) from a tzaddik67 he met on the way and about “the lights,” 
which is when his wife, herself working in a clinical field and familiar with Yirmiyahu’s 
mental health history, decided that she had to have him hospitalized. 
 
Diagnosing Yirmiyahu 
When Yirmiyahu’s case was discussed in the closed ward, staff members 
struggled with diagnosing him in light of his cultural and religious background, and they 
incorporated the family’s and community’s opinions into their evaluation. Hila, a 
psychologist in the final stages of her residency, pointed out that other people in the 
settlement described the incident in very similar terms – focusing on the “miraculous” 
nature of the incident and emphasizing its potential to bring about peace. She said, “They 
are all about peace there, although one wouldn’t expect that.”68 Ahuvah, the psychologist 
who presented Yirmiyahu’s history, concurred, saying that, according to his wife, 
Yirmiyahu had always been concerned with peace and coexistence, but recently this 
“went to a whole another level.” Dr. Levin pointed out that by itself it was not bizarre 
that he perceived what happened as a miracle; the problem was that he failed to convince 
                                                      
67 Tzaddik can literally be translated as “the righteous one” (the same root as tsedek, justice, and tsedaka, 
charity).  It roughly describes individuals viewed as holy and considered to be capable of mediating 
between God and humans.  
68 The taken-for-granted assumption underlying this comment is that settlers are driven by an ideology that 
leaves little space for peace, since the founding of Israel and the expansion of Jewish settlements 
throughout the Eretz Isra’el territory are believed to bring with them the messianic era. In this worldview, 
the creation of a Palestinian state would impede the redemption of the land and therefore the coming of the 
Messiah.  
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his friends and ended up feeling that they perceived him as crazy. This line of thinking 
reflects an important nuance in the psychiatric approach to irrational beliefs: Although a 
particular conviction may appear irrational on its face, it needs to also be rejected by the 
members of the individual’s culture or sub-culture to be classified as a bizarre delusion. 
While everyone agreed that what transpired to Yirmiyahu was a psychotic break, 
the clinicians did not agree over a more precise diagnosis or the most desirable approach 
to therapy. Dr. Levin was adamant that it was too early to talk about post-traumatic stress 
disorder, because less than a month had passed since the traumatic incident. However, he 
acknowledged that the trauma had contributed to the psychotic break. Ahuvah said that 
Yirmiyahu’s wife told people in the settlement that it was PTSD, and that it was a 
familiar category for them. Someone suggested that Yirmiyahu would be a good fit for 
therapy with social worker Ayelet, because of her similar worldview (tfisat olam), 
namely religious Zionism (dati-leumi)69. Dr. Levin had his doubts: “I am not sure he 
needs worldview. He needs someone who can help him.”  
Although the clinicians ultimately aligned with the community’s views of 
Yirmiyahu’s politico-religious interpretation of the events as “crazy,” Dr. Levin’s 
comments display a certain ambivalence about the national-religious worldview (a theme 
that became more pronounced with the open ward clinicians). The exchange about 
trauma and PTSD not only reflects uncertainty about Yirmiyahu’s diagnosis, but it also 
                                                      
69 “National-religious” (dati-leumi) is a label commonly used in Israel to refer to those Jews who share the 
ideology of religious Zionism. Unlike secular Zionists, the dati-leumi are religiously observant (usually 
keeping the Sabbath, observing the dietary laws of kashrut, praying regularly etc.), but, unlike ultra-
Orthodox Jews, they also serve in the army and view the founding of Israel as the opening of the messianic 
age. Many Jewish settlers come from the national-religious background. 
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points to, in a subtler way, the prominent and politicized place that the discourses of 
trauma, invoked to explain individual and collective vulnerability, have assumed in the 
public awareness in Israel, (Friedman-Peleg 2017; Plotkin-Amrami and Brunner 2015) 
and how the PTSD diagnosis has come to be implicated in the calculus of blame and 
stigma (Fassin and Rechtman 2009). It is possible that Yirmiyahu’s wife told their 
community members that he had PTSD before a diagnosis was given not only because it 
was a “familiar” category for them, but also because this explanation would attract less 
stigma than one emphasizing Yirmiyahu’s previous mental health problems.   
When Yirmiyahu was transferred to the open ward, there was a similar struggle to 
draw the line between religious belief and psychosis, and staff members, in the ward 
discussions and private exchanges, struggled with how to make sense of Yirmiyahu’s 
condition. Yirmiyahu was assigned Hodaya, a Modern Orthodox psychiatrist with a sharp 
sense of humor and impeccable color-coordinated outfits, as his main therapist. Just as 
Dr. Levin often had the final say in the closed ward discussions, the head of the open 
ward, Dinah, usually weighed in in a decisive and often uncompromising manner. 
Hodaya: He wants to go back to being a teacher, four times a week, like before. I 
explained to him that what happened was not an acute psychotic episode, because 
it developed over time and against a background [of mental health issues]. He 
accepted it. There is a lot of space for guilt in his condition. You remember, he 
was doing a presentation about Jacob’s ladder, and the terrorist attack happened in 
the middle of the presentation, so he thinks it was a miracle.  
Dinah: But religious people could think this way... 
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Chana: Could be [yachol lehiyot]. 
Hodaya: He thinks that angels came down and saved everyone because of his 
prayer. 
Mazal (student): But people do think this way and behave this way, it is not 
psychotic at all. 
Hodaya: Yes, this is an example of a cultural matter. In fact, you could even say 
that religion itself is psychosis… 
Dinah: His wife is a psychologist herself and is very angry that, of all people, it 
was her husband who went crazy. 
Hodaya: It is interesting that he worked long days at some points, and during 
other periods he was barely averaging two hours a week. 
Dinah: It is a cumulative problem. 
Unlike the closed ward members who concentrated on the psychotic episode 
itself, open ward staff members, and especially Hodaya, framed Yirmiyahu’s experience 
as continuous with his previous life course. Hodaya told me that she would not exclude 
the possibility of an affective disorder that simply had not been diagnosed, given that 
Yirmiyahu’s mood constantly fluctuated, his life lacked stability, and he had been in the 
process of spiritual search ever since becoming drawn to religion in his late teens. When I 
asked her whether it was possible to tease out the psychopathological and the cultural in 
Yirmiyahu’s experience, she was not sure, but noted that she did not consider his 
interpretation of the failed attack as a miracle to be a sign of psychosis per se. Perhaps, 
Hodaya said, he became psychotic later, but the closed ward staff put too much weight on 
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his religious interpretations. (Although she did not mention it explicitly, this reminded me 
of the several instances when the open ward clinicians wondered about the ability of the 
closed ward staff – many of them Soviet-born, non-religious Jews and Arab Muslims – to 
properly understand religious Jewish patients, without unwittingly pathologizing 
religious beliefs or practices.) 
At a different meeting, the conversation turned to Yirmiyahu’s wife again and circled to 
the pathological nature of the settlement environment: 
Hodaya: He has a very problematic relationship with his wife… 
Dinah: It is not just his wife. He has problems with his children, too. He went 
crazy in that crazy settlement, and his children went crazy from the fact that he 
went crazy! But he has good insight now.  
Hodaya: He is calmer than his wife these days… 
Dinah: It is important that he doesn’t get stuck here. He needs treatment, but not 
in a hospital. It is important that we release him, and release him fast. He needs 
medication and therapy, and family rehabilitation, too. Also, it is hard to do all 
that in the settlement, there’s a stigma attached to it… 
This discussion adds another layer to the clinical discourses around Yirmiyahu’s 
social environment. Conversations in the closed ward were primarily concerned with 
evaluating Yirmiyahu’s behavior and statements against the backdrop of his cultural 
context. The people in his environment, in this situation, are invoked as “cultural 
insiders” whose judgment made it possible to classify Yirmiyahu’s claims as bizarre 
delusions rather than expressions of religious or political conviction. By contrast, open 
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ward clinicians, who were more preoccupied with situating what happened to Yirmiyahu 
in the context of his life history, implicated life in “that crazy settlement” itself in 
Yirmiyahu’s breakdown, raising questions about the feasibility of proper treatment and 
rehabilitation upon his return. Dinah’s concerns in particular bring to mind the discussion 
about PTSD in the closed ward, although she makes more explicit what was merely 
hinted at before: Coming back as a person with a “cumulative” mental health problem in 
need of systematic treatment and rehabilitation, rather than as a terrorist attack survivor 
with PTSD (an interpretation that his wife already started disseminating in the 
community), Yirmiyahu would have to deal with stigma and, possibly, struggle to get all 
the resources he needed to ensure recovery.  
 
Coming to Terms with the Fall 
How did Yirmiyahu himself understand what happened to him? I got a chance to 
interview him when I saw him alone on the bench outside the outpatient unit on a sunny 
spring day. He was almost unrecognizable from the despondent, unkempt man I first saw 
at the closed ward a month before. The wrinkled sweatshirt and sweatpants gave way to a 
much more orderly appearance, and Yirmiyahu’s face was exuding calm. He greeted me 
and started a conversation, but I was so anxious to interview him that I rushed into 
explaining the purpose of my research to him. In fact, I was so flustered that I made an 
off-hand remark about the unique history of the hospital we were at, and he tensed up and 
said that perhaps we should just talk and not do the interview, because he was less 
comfortable with the idea now. We continued our conversation, him telling me about a 
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rabbi in the settlement he greatly admired who had been involved in peace initiatives, 
until he circled back to the opening of our discussion. Apparently, when I referred to the 
Palestinian village that used to be where the hospital now stands, Yirmiyahu took my 
words as indicative of a hidden agenda. “I thought, perhaps you think that this place 
should be returned to the Palestinians,” he said candidly. “I am a man of peace, but that 
would be going too far.” Afterwards, however, he added that our conversation had been 
going so well that he was now willing to sign the consent form and answer my questions. 
When I finally asked how he understood what happened to him, Yirmiyahu 
launched into a monologue that was fascinating, moving, and confusing with its puns and 
Kabbalistic references. Unfortunately, he did not grant me permission to record the 
conversation, so I only have a few notes to reconstruct my memories. Yirmiyahu said that 
he understood what happened to him as “falling” (nefila). Something divine entered him, 
as if to test him, but he was not strong enough to be able to cope with it. It was as if he 
jumped too high and fell, he said, but at least, after the crisis and the treatment, he landed 
on a higher rung than he was at previously.  
When I asked about Yirmiyahu’s experiences with treatment at the hospital, he 
said that the staff in the closed ward made too much of his words, taking him to be more 
unstable than he really was. He immediately added that he really appreciated all forms of 
care he was getting, but differentiated their function: He thought that the medicine and 
the individual therapy were stabilizing him, while group therapy was “rebuilding the 
tools.” I thought he was using the word in a psychological jargon sense, but then he made 
a motion with his hand and pointed out that the Hebrew word he just used (kli) begins 
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with the letter “kaf,” which in turn sounds the same as the Hebrew words for “palm” and 
“tablespoon”. This launched him into a Kabbalistic account, making me realize that he 
was referring to vessels rather than tools, or perhaps even playing with the multiple 
meaning of the word. In the Lurianic Kabbalah, a mystical teaching developed in the 16th 
century city of Safed in the Galilee, God created special vessels to contain the light he 
was emanating, but these vessels were unable to contain the light and shattered. The 
universe we live in now is made of these shards, and each time a good deed is performed 
a spark of divine light returns to its source, repairing the world (tikkun olam).70 The 
personal “repair” that Yirmiyahu was going through was thus connected to the restoration 
of the world. 
Although I am sure that I failed to grasp many nuances of Yirmiyahu’s 
interpretation, the central organizing theme of his narrative was very clear. He saw his 
“breakdown” as imbued with meaning – a momentous event in which the personal, the 
social, and the cosmic were intertwined. The incident in the settlement was an episode in 
the unfolding drama of Yirmiyahu’s relationship with God. Although Yirmiyahu was not 
able to handle the test that God had in store for him, the ordeal nevertheless helped him 
move up the ladder of spiritual development. Not only that, but by reciting the Jacob’s 
ladder verse he also contributed to the miracle that happened in the settlement: Nobody 
was seriously harmed, and a space for restoring peace was opened, all of this connected 
                                                      
70 Scholarly accounts of and debates on the Lurianic Kabbalah – and the Kabbalah and Jewish mystical 
tradition more broadly – comprise a vast, vibrant literature. For a few prominent examples, see Scholem 
(1954, 1965, 1974), Idel (1988), Wolfson (1994), and Fine (2003). 
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to the rebuilding of the cosmic vessels or tools that were necessary for a regeneration of 
the world. 
Taken as a whole, Yirmiyahu’s experiences in Kfar Shaul demonstrate the 
complex, contradictory workings of recognition in a clinical environment. While 
clinicians disagreed over the meaning of Yirmiyahu’s religious experience during the 
attack – whether it constituted a psychotic break in itself or not – they did not 
automatically dismiss his religious statements as pathological. They also directly took the 
family and community members’ perspective into account when evaluating what 
happened. Furthermore, clinicians paid close attention to the political context of 
Yirmiyahu’s experience, whether to ponder the pathological effects of life in a settlement 
or to anticipate stigma upon his return.  
In the case of the other Kfar Shaul patient that I now turn to, Rifaat, clinicians 
similarly took guidance from the family’s perspective, despite considerable ambivalence 
about the trustworthiness of the family members. What was drastically different was how 
the staff members accounted for the strong political undercurrents shaping Rifaat’s 
experience. 
 
Case 2: Rifaat 
I met Rifaat in the emergency room (kheder miyun) of the hospital the day after 
her family brought her in. When I arrived, I saw a short plump woman in her late 
twenties or early thirties, dressed in a long-sleeved brown jacket and a headscarf, using a 
mixture of English, Hebrew, and gestures to communicate with the Russian nurse on 
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duty, Svetlana. An older Mizrahi man from the geriatric ward was also there, waiting for 
his blood pressure to be taken and silently surveying the scene. I jumped in, offering my 
knowledge of colloquial Palestinian Arabic to assist their interaction. Looking relieved, 
Rifaat explained that she did not have any clothes, not even underwear, with her and that 
she was wondering if the nurse could give her some. Svetlana enthusiastically dug into a 
deep drawer next to the blood pressure machine and extracted a heap of well-worn 
sweatshirts, sweatpants, and T-shirts, a few scarves, and an unexpected collection of 
racier items, among them a spaghetti-strap dress and a satin nightgown. She jokingly set 
the nightgown to her body, making appreciative sounds, and then thrust it in Rifaat’s 
hands. When Rifaat smiled shyly and declined, Svetlana feigned surprise and then burst 
out laughing and told Rifaat, with my help, that she could layer these clothes under more 
modest ones, for warmth. Rifaat started speaking again, but I could not understand the 
colloquial word she kept repeating, and suddenly the older male patient, who apparently 
spoke some Arabic, addressed her, asking what she wanted, and then explained to us that 
she wanted flip-flops rather than shoes. He kept talking to her, but Rifaat stopped 
replying, and looked relieved when he got up and went to the bathroom. When Svetlana 
dug into another bag of clothing and pulled out very modest-looking pajamas, Rifaat got 
visibly excited, hugged Svetlana, and said, in English, “I love you.” 
 
Rifaat’s Story 
Rifaat, age 28, was brought to the hospital by her father and brother, because her 
family could no longer tolerate her increasingly chaotic and disruptive behavior. 
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According to her, she agreed to be admitted not because she believed she had any issues, 
but because her family doctor threatened her with involuntary hospitalization. Born in 
Jerusalem, inside the Green Line, she moved with her family to one of the nearby villages 
when she was seventeen. She had four sisters and a brother and was the second oldest 
child in the family. When talking to me, she shared that she had to endure physical 
violence from her mother, but her father, who worked as a tailor, was good to her. She 
added that this changed when she grew up, but left it at that. I later learned from a staff 
member that there was an allegation of sexual assault against her father.  
In her teenage years, Rifaat started having conflicts with her sisters, in her view 
due to their envy and jealousy for her. Not wanting to keep fighting, she became quiet, 
withdrawn, and increasingly religious. Rifaat did not see herself as sick, but she received 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia at the age of fifteen and was hospitalized and treated with 
psychiatric medication intermittently throughout her teenage and young adult years. She 
told me that she did not believe in the efficacy of medication and thought that the only 
thing that helped her was reading the Qur’an. In fact, she believed that she herself had the 
power of using the Qur’an to help people, and she told me that one day she would want to 
use it. 
Rifaat finished school and started her undergraduate studies at a university, but 
did not finish them. When she was in her late teens, a marriage proposal came in, and her 
father insisted that she leave the university. Rifaat did not want to withdraw from the 
university, but she was anxious to get away from her family, so she accepted the 
proposal. After only being married to her for five months, Rifaat’s husband left her. From 
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Rifaat’s standpoint, this happened because he turned out incapable of respecting and 
protecting her. (According to staff members, the husband left after realizing that Rifaat 
had a mental condition that the family had kept from him.) A few years later, she was 
married again, and again the husband was told nothing about her diagnosis. At the time of 
hospitalization, Rifaat was living with her parents again, she and her second husband 
were in the process of separation, and he was also suing the family for not disclosing 
Rifaat’s condition to him. Based on Rifaat’s and her family’s accounts, the staff at the 
hospital suspected that the second husband was previously pocketing Rifaat’s disability 
money. 
 
Rifaat in the Hospital 
Rifaat was first admitted to the emergency room, and two days later Dr. Mandel, 
head of the emergency ward, followed up with her, drawing on my help as an interpreter. 
Alluding to the family’s reports that Rifaat did not always take her medicine, Dr. Mandel 
asked me to repeat several times that she needed to stick with the regime whether she 
really believed it would help or not. Rifaat responded that she never thought the medicine 
was the problem in the first place; all the problems were created by her family. Rather 
than dismissing this concern, Dr. Mandel replied that what her family does to her was a 
separate issue that would be addressed by a social worker shortly, and that the primary 
problem at the time was Rifaat’s refusal to take medication.  
After Rifaat left, Dr. Mandel characterized Rifaat’s case as a manifestation of a 
much larger problem – a “real catastrophe” – related to the treatment of divorced women 
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in the Arab community. A lot of these women, he said, do have psychological problems, 
but they are not severe enough to warrant psychiatric hospital admission. In some cases, 
the women are merely “exhausted” by their families and happy to get a respite from them 
at a hospital. He thought that this was true with Rifaat, as well: She agreed to the 
hospitalization not because she believed that she was ill, but because she wanted to get 
some rest away from her family. What he found strange “for the Arab sector,” however, 
was that the family members failed to bring any clothes or hygiene products that Rifaat 
needed, even after the hospital placed a call with her uncle and he agreed to come over. 
Speaking in our shared Russian language, he told me:  
There, families fight, but they usually don’t abandon their own. It’s possible that 
we’ll have to involve a social worker in this case. With Arab patients, we try not 
to involve outsiders, but if it turns out that the family is exploiting her, there will 
be no other choice but to call the welfare office. 
  
 Ending our conversation, Dr. Mandel asked me to tell Rifaat that a social worker 
would arrange a call to her family later that day. The social worker, Rut, was a religious 
(although not Haredi) woman in her mid-thirties, dressed in a long skirt and a beret that 
covered most of her hair, except for a few short wayward curls. Not an Arabic speaker 
herself, Rut asked me to assist in her communication with Rifaat and Rifaat’s mother 
whom she was about to call on the phone. Sitting in Rut’s office, I called Rifaat’s mother 
who, after some meandering statements, said that she would come the next day and bring 
some clothes and personal items for her daughter. Rifaat refused to talk to her mother 
directly and, after I hung up the phone, shifted the conversation to her prospects of living 
independently after release from the hospital. Rifaat complained that she did not have 
many friends or a lot of money, and most of her disability pension was going to her 
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mother, anyway. With an alarmed look on her face, Rut promised to investigate the 
disability pension matter. She also noted that it was “no good to be in a state war” with 
the family at all times. To me, Rut observed that “there is this woman’s version and then 
there is her family’s version.”  
 Upon her admission, then, Rifaat was perceived as a woman with two separate 
problems, medical and cultural: She had a psychiatric condition that she did not accept or 
systematically treat and she was surrounded by family members who were unsupportive, 
restrictive, and possibly exploitative. Rifaat’s situation was framed as “typical” in two 
senses: Like many other divorced Arab women in East Jerusalem, she suffered frustrating 
restrictions on her freedom, and, like many individuals with mental illness in “the Arab 
sector”, she was possibly a victim of exploitation, her family and ex-husband using her 
condition in order to get access to her disability pension (a common trope that I heard 
many times in relation to Arab families from East Jerusalem). 
Four days later, Rifaat was transferred to the open ward and, because there were 
few Arabic speakers among the staff or the patients there, I ended up talking to her a lot, 
although, after the first emotionally charged interview in which she recounted her life 
story, our interactions were mostly about mundane things. At one point, for example, she 
told me that she wanted to go to the gym, but was not sure where it was or how to 
communicate her need to the staff, so I conveyed her request to the head nurse of the 
open ward. On a different occasion, she said that she did not like it in the ward – not 
because someone was bothering her, but because she was not sick and should not be 
there. She told me that she did not see a need to take her pills and asked me what I 
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thought. Another time, she was in a good mood and shared that she wanted to marry 
someone of similar views and religious beliefs and have a child with him, although she 
did not want to have more than one. She was constantly struggling with the idea of telling 
her friends where she was, afraid that they would not want to associate with her anymore. 
Most of all, she was lonely and either sat glued to her phone or chatted with cleaning 
workers at the hospital, most of whom were Arabs. 
As described above, clinicians in the emergency room honed in on Rifaat’s 
refusal to stick with her medication as the main problem, separate from the issues with 
the family, and viewed the family members as rather problematic and not trustworthy in 
themselves. While the open ward clinicians had a lot of criticisms in store for the family, 
they also shifted the focus from Rifaat’s medication adherence to her comportment. 
Almost everything about her behavior was now viewed with concern.  
On one occasion, a psychiatrist assigned to her, Dr. Chana Vered, a tiny, cheerful 
woman with freckles covering her face, was talking to Rifaat with the help of Leila, an 
Arab psychologist at the ward71: 
Chana (C): How do you sleep? 
R (Rifaat): Okay [be-seder, one of the few Hebrew words Rifaat knew]. 
C: When do you go to bed? 
R: Nine o’clock. 
C: But other girls say you wake up at five, and they can’t sleep. 
                                                      
71 Leila was translating back and forth, but for the purposes of brevity I am not making the interpretation 
itself the focus of analysis and only indicate it when Leila added things to what Chana was saying or told 
something to Chana that was not translated back to Rifaat. 
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R: No, I don’t, I swear. But I get up early and pray and then talk on Facebook on 
my phone. 
C: With whom do you talk? 
R: Friends. Or I download music or read books on my phone. 
C: Do you talk to somebody you know or somebody you want to meet? That’s 
okay, we just want to know. 
Leila: We are not like your family, Rifaat! 
R: Some I know, some I don’t. 
C: Do you want to go out with someone, start a relationship with them? 
R: A legal relationship, yes. Of course! I want it to be accepted by religion and 
customs.  
C: How do you feel about your family? 
R: They bother me a lot. They bother me! They say I am ill. My father and mother 
even read my posts and respond to them.  
C: Who can read what you write on Facebook? 
R: Everyone. Only the people I blocked can’t. They can see all responses and 
pictures.  
[Leila to Chana, in Hebrew: She told me before that she accepts requests from all 
guys on Facebook. They are like brothers to her. But, you know, it’s not 
acceptable.] 
C: We see that you are feeling well, happy, right? 
R: Yes. 
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C: How did you feel this weekend? 
R: A bit lonely72. 
C: If we gave you an option to go home next weekend, would you like to? 
R: I don’t know… I don’t know at all if I am going back. 
[Leila to Chana, in Hebrew: This is new.] 
C: Are you still angry? 
R: Yes, and I am afraid they will pressure me and not allow me to be free, they 
will make me do things! 
C: Last week you said you felt they wanted to hurt you because they are envious. 
How do you feel now? 
R: The same. They have already hurt me. 
C: Why would they do this? 
R: It’s simply envy. I don’t know why! They don’t want to see me with friends, 
they don’t want to see me successful. They just want to see me sick. They don’t 
have confidence, they are not satisfied with what they have. They are bothered 
that I do have faith in myself [thiqqa bi-nafsi]. 
C: Sometimes when you are alone in the room, do you hear voices? 
R: Tsk73. I only hear voices when people are in the room. 
                                                      
72 Many patients both from the closed and the open ward are allowed to go home and stay with their 
families on the weekend. They usually leave Friday afternoon and return Saturday night after the end of the 
Shabbat or Sunday morning. 
73 A “tsk” sound is often used by Arabic speakers to convey a negative answer to the question. 
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C: I want to ask you, Rifaat, that when you can’t sleep, please go to the nurses. 
And also, don’t talk on the phone at night. Maybe give your phone to the nurses, 
for the night? 
R: No! [lo, in Hebrew – she reacted before Leila translated Chana’s words for 
her]. I only pray at night, I don’t talk on the phone. 
Leila: Even to pray is not good. You are here to be in therapy. 
C: I can also write to the nurses to give you a pill, to help you sleep. [To Leila:] It 
seems to me, she doesn’t sleep well. 
R [before Leila translates]: I do sleep. 
C: Let’s wait another night and see.  
In this exchange, clinicians probe into Rifaat’s sleep difficulties, angry and 
suspicious thoughts, and, especially, her “not acceptable” habit of communicating with 
men on Facebook. Leila, bilingual in Arabic and Hebrew, positions herself and her 
colleagues to Rifaat as “not like her family” and therefore deserving of trust, but she also 
acts as a mediator for Chana and other non-Arab clinicians by alerting them to the 
instances when Rifaat’s behavior deviates from the cultural expectations. 
Leila’s ambiguous positioning eventually caused a conflict between her and 
Rifaat. A few days after this conversation, Rifaat told me she was frustrated with Leila. 
She used to think Leila was a good person interested in helping her, but, Rifaat now 
thought, she was only there to help her family. Rifaat showed Leila her Facebook page 
and now thought that Leila was jealous of her and did not want her to succeed. She was 
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telling Rifaat there was no place in the hostel74 for her, but Rifaat did not believe her. 
Rifaat was very annoyed and refused to talk to Leila anymore. When I got a chance to 
check in with Leila, she said that she talked to Rifaat three times that week. She noticed 
that Rifaat disliked being asked what she wanted to do after release from the hospital. She 
said she wanted to study, get married, and have children, but when Leila asked for 
concrete details, Rifaat became cranky and taciturn.  
Rifaat’s use of her phone was increasingly irritating the staff and was usually the 
central topic of discussion when Rifaat’s case came up: 
Leila: Rifaat’s mother called, she said she talked to Rifaat. She is talking to guys 
on the phone all night. Her mother asked her to stop, but Rifaat told her: “You are 
bothering me!”. Mother says Rifaat was rude [khutzpanit], yelled at her. It was 
similar to the state she was in before hospitalization. Mother thinks it is because 
of the pills. She told her parents that she is not going home, that she will go to the 
hostel. 
Dinah: And who is paying for her phone? 
Leila: Her parents. 
Dinah: They should stop. They don’t need to pay.  
Leila: They need a lot of guidance [hadracha]. We must send them to family 
therapy.  
                                                      
74 Hostel in the mental health care context refers to a rehabilitative facility where patients live in the 
community of others and under the supervision of mental health professionals. The creation of hostels is 
part of the general trend toward the “outsourcing” of mental health care from hospitals to outpatient 
settings. In Jerusalem, there was only one hostel that accepted Arab women. 
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Dinah: We must restrict the phone use to two hours, three maximum.  
Leila: Yes. I think she is a bit manipulative… Her mother doesn’t want her father 
or brother to see what is going on, because that would be a catastrophe.  
On another occasion, Rifaat’s use of her phone was discussed as a direct threat to her 
safety. 
Dinah: So how do we stop Rifaat from talking on the phone? 
Leila: It is so frustrating! On one hand, there is simply no other way, we have to 
take it from her. On the other hand, she doesn’t understand the language [meaning 
Hebrew], she doesn’t participate in groups [group therapy]. 
Dinah: Are you sure she doesn’t understand Hebrew? I am sure she gets quite a 
bit more than she shows. 
Leila: Not enough. Maybe she will <understand more> when she returns here. 
Eli, a social worker: Today she didn’t have her phone and came to the group. She 
started talking! First in English, I was translating. I asked, what do you want to 
say to the group? She said she was not sure why we took her phone away.  
Mazal: I was there with Eli, and many people made a big effort to communicate 
with her. And then Yigal, that right-wing guy from Hebron, started talking to her 
in Arabic! [Everybody laughs] 
Dinah: That was probably the most effective therapeutic measure of all. We must 
put the facts in front of her and explain to her. She is intelligent enough, I think. 
The question is whether we should consult a child protection officer [pkidat saad]. 
She is being exploited. 
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Maayan, a nurse: But wouldn’t it hurt her, from a cultural standpoint [me-bekhina 
tarbutit], if this becomes known? 
Mazal: There is a bigger danger of her hurting herself. 
Dinah: In the end, someone could kill her because of this nonsense. 
Leila: Her parents don’t seem extreme, but they are angry.  
Eli: But do they understand it comes from her illness? 
Leila: They understand, but because of it precisely her parents can’t set 
boundaries [gvulot] for her. They need guidance. The question is who will support 
these boundaries.  
Two intertwined concerns are prominent in these discussions. First, Rifaat is 
perceived as potentially manipulative, although perhaps (according to Dinah) intelligent 
enough to understand “the facts” and eventually stop her pattern of phone use. The other 
concern has to do with Rifaat’s social environment that is implicitly seen as both too 
restrictive and not restrictive enough: Rifaat’s community sets very firm boundaries on 
female behavior, meaning that her culturally unacceptable chats with men could put her 
in grave physical danger, and yet her family, lacking guidance and proper understanding 
of mental illness, is not capable of setting proper personal boundaries (such as ensuring 
consistent use of medication) for her.  
Several days later, Leila told me that nurses took away Rifaat’s phone because she 
was having “sexual conversations” with men, and her roommates complained that they 
could hear her. Rifaat was very offended, because she thought it was natural for her to 
want sex, given that she had been married twice in the past. I asked Leila if she thought 
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Rifaat would have been treated differently if she were Jewish. Leila said no, it was not 
the conversations themselves that were problematic, but rather that Rifaat carried them 
out so that people could hear her. If they were private, nobody would have issue with 
that. (Which was surprising to me, since previously Rifaat’s use of the phone was 
discussed precisely as a danger to her safety first and foremost, and not a nuisance to 
other patients.) A few days later, Leila called one of the young men that Rifaat was 
talking to. It turned out that he lived in Ramalla and was married. Rifaat was claiming 
that he was serious about her, leading Leila and other staff members to conclude that she 
lacked insight and had to remain on medicine in order to be stabilized.  
To summarize, Rifaat’s interactions with men at the hospital and online were 
taken as both an indication of her poor judgment and a direct threat to her safety. This 
was in a stark contrast to how displays of romantic or sexual interests among Jewish 
patients were handled. Patients are technically not supposed to touch one another, let 
alone have sex. However, when Jewish patients engaged in such behaviors, the staff 
members commented on them as humorous, mildly annoying incidents – assuming that 
the intimate relationship appeared consensual and non-exploitative – rather than a matter 
of life and death. With Rifaat, however, her attempts to interact with men on the hospital 
premises and on Facebook, were taken extremely seriously, as the clinicians recognized 
the much more serious potential consequences that sexual misbehavior would carry for a 
Palestinian woman from a conservative Muslim society, in comparison with a non-
Orthodox Jewish woman. 
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I did not get a chance to talk to Rifaat before her release, but I learned that she 
ended up returning home, despite her strong reluctance to do so. She was deemed 
stabilized, but felt deeply unhappy about her situation. There was no space in the only 
hostel in Jerusalem that accepted Arab women and there was very little hope of a spot 
opening in the foreseeable future. A different hostel up in the North was suggested to her, 
but Rifaat, who always lived in and around Jerusalem, could not imagine moving so far 
away. The idea of moving out and renting a room, perhaps with some friends, that Rifaat 
was excited about for some time did not turn out to be financially feasible. The solution 
that the staff came up with involved appointing a social worker who would come in every 
week or so and see that Rifaat was being treated well and receiving her disability money 
directly. The general atmosphere after her release was fairly gloomy, and several people 
told me that they expected Rifaat to be back at some point and had little hope that the 
social worker arrangement would work out in the long run.  
 
The Limits of Recognition? 
One central argument of this chapter is that medical and psychological 
anthropologists who study clinical encounters are perfectly positioned to speak to the two 
strands of conversation about recognition, the one that revolves around interpersonal 
encounters and the one that tackles recognition in the public sphere. Specifically, they 
can contribute to discussions of recognition by drawing critical and systematic attention 
to three interrelated questions: What is it that is being recognized in the first place? 
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Whose perspective is being recognized? And, finally, are there limits to recognition in the 
clinical space?  
First, to reiterate the question in the title of this chapter, we can inquire: 
“Recognition of what?” That is, which dimensions of difference are prioritized as 
deserving of recognition, which are underplayed, ignored, or dismissed, and why? With 
both Rifaat and Yirmiyahu clinicians attended to or foregrounded some dimensions of 
their identity and deprioritized or ignored others. For instances, gender is a focal point in 
the treatment of Rifaat, who is implicitly constructed as an unstable, paranoid, 
manipulative woman with a problematic, even dangerous, sexuality. With Yirmiyahu, 
however, his gender is almost an afterthought, even though it is plausible that his intense 
feelings of guilt at least partially result from his failure to live up to his ideal of a 
responsible Jewish man. Similarly, while both of them are religious, even intensely so, 
Yirmiyahu’s religious experiences are brought into the discussion repeatedly when 
clinicians try to tease apart legitimate religious beliefs shared by a community and 
psychotic ideation. Rifaat’s Islam is not part of the picture at all – it is not even seen as 
relevant when interventions are formulated, even though she clearly indicates her 
ambivalence about psychiatric medication and states that the only kind of treatment she 
felt relief from was a healing session with a sheikh. Yirmiyahu’s ethnic background – his 
mother being an Ethiopian Jew – is also never part of the picture. 
Whose perspective(s) is being recognized is another issue to consider. Despite all 
the differences between how Yirmiyahu’s and Rifaat’s cases were handled, it is 
noteworthy that in both cases the clinicians took the families’ lead. Neither Yirmiyahu 
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nor Rifaat were initially interested in hospitalization or considered that there was 
anything wrong with them. Instead, it was their family members – parents in Rifaat’s 
case, spouse in Yirmiyahu’s – who made the decision to bring them in. Furthermore, the 
clinical assessment and diagnosis relied not on some universal standards of norm and 
pathology, but on specific, situationally and contextually contingent, judgments derived 
from consultations with the two patients’ family members. 
Finally, these two case studies, analyzed together, raise the most provocative 
question of all: Why does recognition work unevenly across these two cases? Are there 
limits to recognition in the clinical framework? Based on my analysis, I would argue that 
clinicians construed Yirmiyahu’s case in a way that was more sophisticated and multi-
dimensional than that of Rifaat. How do we make sense of it? A more straightforward 
explanation has to do with the divergent underlying logics that structure Yirmiyahu’s and 
Rifaat’s narratives. Yirmiyahu’s perspective, phrased in a religious idiom, is not fully in 
line with the biomedical psychiatric understanding of his condition and he might not even 
accept his specific diagnostic label or find it especially salient. However, what Yirmiyahu 
does do is locate the source of his problem internally: He was not capable of standing up 
to the divine challenge and now he needs time to recover and repair himself and his 
relationships, with the help of therapy and medication. Rifaat, on the other hand, 
emphatically denies the existence of any illness whatsoever and instead invokes the toxic 
family dynamic, reinforced by problematic aspects of the community she belongs to, as 
the source of her suffering. In other words, the calculus of blame and responsibility 
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underlying Yirmiyahu’s narrative is simply more compatible with the biomedical clinical 
model than Rifaat’s. 
 The explanation cannot be complete if we stop here, however. It is important to 
consider the different ways in which the clinicians made sense of the sociopolitical 
context of these two patients’ predicaments. With Yirmiyahu, mental health care 
professionals took into consideration his family history and life up to hospitalization, 
attending to the factors that contributed to his psychological instability and vulnerability 
to mental illness. They also showed appreciation for the complicated role of religious 
experience in his life – which is not to say that there was consensus on this topic, but at 
least some of the explanatory models considered his religious experience at the time of 
the “breakdown” as not synonymous to psychopathology. Furthermore, clinical 
discussions took a complicated stance toward Yirmiyahu’s community: On one hand, 
clinicians – at least some of them – took his family’s and friends’ side in characterizing 
Yirmiyahu’s politico-religious narrative of the “miracle” as delusional. At the same time, 
they also took a more critical stance toward the “crazy-making” life in the settlement as a 
source of stress in itself (and as a possible deterrent from seeking out proper help upon 
release).  
As in the case of Yirmiyahu, the staff’s assessment of Rifaat’s condition did take 
into consideration the larger context of her life. Specifically, the clinicians recognized the 
family’s complaints that Rifaat was not behaving the way a Palestinian woman from East 
Jerusalem – especially one with so few marital perspectives due to her twice-divorced 
status and a record of mental illness – was supposed to behave. In this sense, I would 
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argue that the clinicians displayed a great degree of sensitivity and context-based 
judgment in handling Rifaat’s case. Their recurrent concerns with Rifaat’s deviant 
behavior, while occasionally expressed in a suspicious or even paternalistic vein, sprung 
from a highly justified fear that Rifaat’s behavior would eventually put her in grave 
physical danger. Furthermore, although they aligned with the family’s concerns, they did 
not always take these concerns at face value, either. To be more precise, while the staff 
members acknowledged the reasonable nature of the family’s grievances in light of the 
strict behavioral norms for women in Rifaat’s society, they hardly saw the family 
environment itself as healthy or reasonable. Not only did the clinicians recognize a 
potential double bind for Rifaat created by her parents’ inconsistent enforcement of 
boundaries, but they also strongly suspected that her family might be exploiting her 
(hence the decision to appoint a social worker to visit the household upon Rifaat’s 
release).  
All this is to say that it would hardly be fair to argue that clinicians provided 
“proper” recognition to Yirmiyahu and withheld it from Rifaat. And yet, despite all this, 
Yirmiyahu leaves the hospital in an upbeat mood, and Rifaat is, until the very end, 
distressed by the staff members’ interventions, seeing them as unjustified, paternalistic, 
and intrusive. Here, I would argue, the transformative potential of recognition bumps up 
against the larger, intractable realities of Israeli society. While some of the clinicians at 
Kfar Shaul may be ambivalent about or even hostile to the settler movement and the 
national-religious ideology underlying it and while Yirmiyahu is certainly in a vulnerable 
position vis-à-vis his community, his structural position, as a Jewish settler in the West 
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Bank, is a lot more secure than that of Rifaat, a Palestinian Muslim woman in the 
occupied East Jerusalem. The type of resources and social support available to him are 
vastly above and beyond anything that exists for mentally ill individuals, and especially 
women in a precarious position like that of Rifaat, in East Jerusalem. Broadly speaking, 
hospitalization created a space for him to work out his own rich narrative that put what 
transpired to him in a religiously meaningful context, and upon release he was going back 
to a wife, herself a mental health care professional, and a community of similarly-minded 
people where he could relatively easily get access to outpatient mental health care. By 
contrast, Rifaat was going back to a family that at best could not handle her and at worst 
exploited her, and to a community where her freedom was doubly restricted – first, by the 
Israeli occupation and second, by the local societal regulations of women’s behavior.  
To summarize my stance as generally and clearly as possible, the differences in 
the dynamics of recognition in the cases of Yirmiyahu and Rifaat are significant not 
because they point to the biases in or limitations of clinical judgment and empathy – after 
all, in both cases the Kfar Shaul clinicians displayed sensitivity, compassion, and 
contextually contingent understanding of the patients’ situations. Instead, they point to 
the deep, irreconcilable contradictions at the very heart of Israeli society that no measure 
of clinical empathy or therapeutic intervention can transform or transcend. 
Why does this matter? In her ethnography of clinical, religious, and state 
discourses around migration in Italy, Giordano (2014) calls for a shift from the politics of 
recognition to the politics of acknowledgement that leaves space for uncertainty, 
ambivalence, and ultimate unknowability of the Other. While I find her critique of 
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recognition useful and insightful, I want to argue that medical and psychological 
anthropology can and should do more. Whereas the bulk of the interdisciplinary literature 
has centered either on how recognition can be better implemented or why it is 
problematic, the anthropological approach can raise different kinds of questions: What 
does it actually mean, in practice, to recognize the Other? What aspects of difference 
become selected and prioritized for recognition, and why? And, finally, what happens 
when competing narratives – for instance, the patient’s and his/her family’s – vie for 
recognition? By raising these questions, anthropology can make a valuable contribution 
to interrogating, unpacking, and problematizing the notion of recognition. 
In the last two chapters, I continue to explore the question of what it means to 
grapple with culture and politics in a clinical space, but I take it to a very different 
clinical setting, a community mental health care center in an Israeli Arab town. There, 
clinical practice is shaped, in complex and sometimes contradictory ways, by the political 
mission of the clinic’s founders, the bureaucratic and economic constraints imposed by 
the mental health care system, and various discourses that draw connections between 
Arab cultural and familial dynamics, on one hand, and psychological distress, on the 
other. 
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PART III: BALAD IL-GHABAR 
The third-largest Arab city in Israel after the majority-Bedouin Rahat in the south 
and the heavily Christian Nazareth in the north, Balad il-Ghabar (the ‘city of dust’ in 
Arabic) has been a major center for charcoal production for centuries.  It is hardly an 
attractive locale. The walls of the houses – beige, pink, yellow – merge into uniform dull 
brown and grey hues under layers of grime. There is nary a green patch in sight. The 
narrow, poorly paved streets wind up and down the hills, but cannot handle the heavy car 
traffic, which is a result of the near absence of public transport. A few small yellow 
moniyot sherut (shared taxis) do doggedly traverse between a handful of neighborhoods 
and several nearby villages, but they are rare, almost like an afterthought. Most residents, 
many of whom work outside of the city in construction jobs in Jewish localities, have to 
rely on cars, and driving often feels like taking your life in your hands. Although the city 
is small enough to seem walkable, for the most part it is not; its sidewalks are crumbling, 
and often come to an abrupt end in the most unexpected places.  The walkways are also 
marred by corpses of stray dogs and cats that lie there for days, decaying under the 
sweltering July sun.  
The only remotely attractive view of Balad il-Ghabar is at sunset, from the top of 
one of the hills overlooking the glimmering domes of the city’s many mosques. In the 
setting sun the dust-covered houses assume a warm glow. The multiple unfinished 
construction sites, normally an eyesore, somehow fade into the background, and the 
sounds of the evening call to prayer begin to resonate through the air.  
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My host mother, Fakhriyyeh, once took me up to a hilly vantage point at sunset 
and we stood for a long time until I remarked that the city almost had a certain beauty to 
it, seen like this. She nodded and pointed toward the West Bank border, merely twenty 
kilometers to the east of us. I could see a small town, white walls and red roofs, nestled 
cozily among trees. A settlement. She said, “There it is much more beautiful. But the 
Jews knew it and they took it from us.” The dusk fell, and the city was suddenly studded 
with the countless tiny green lights weaving around the tall necks of the minarets, like 
ivy. The fleeting sense of calm gone, we returned to the car and started making our way 
back through the precariously steep and crowded streets. 
 
Pic. 5.1. Balad il-Ghabar panorama 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PARADOXES OF (UN)CONVENTIONALITY IN AN ISRAELI 
ARAB CLINIC 
“Karim” is a community mental health care center perched on one of the steep 
hills of Balad il-Ghabar. I had been planning to do fieldwork at “Karim” since my first 
pilot visit to Israel in the winter of 2013-2014, when I met the clinic’s staff and its 
founder and then-director, Gloria, and accompanied her on a weekly trip to the West 
Bank for a meeting with the Physicians for Human rights organization. Gloria is a left-
wing Jewish child psychiatrist who made an aliyah to Israel from a Latin American 
country several decades earlier, fleeing political persecution.  She founded “Karim” in 
2007, together with a local social worker, Dalia. “Karim” employs a diverse staff of 
psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, social workers, and art therapists, the majority of 
them Israeli Arabs hailing from all over the country, but especially the Galilee and the 
Triangle75 area in central Israel, and coming from Muslim, Christian, and Druze 
backgrounds, although there are also Jewish employees. As is typical for Israel, all 
therapists have had some exposure to psychodynamic methods (some were trained in 
psychoanalysis while others had only taken a few courses in college).  They were equally 
varied in their degree of commitment to it: some exclusively worked within the 
psychodynamic framework, others were more comfortable with various cognitive-
behavioral approaches76. 
                                                      
75 The area spanning parts of Central and Northern Israel, close to the Green Line, with a high 
concentration of Arab towns and villages.  
76 Cognitive-behavioral approaches have emerged out of the combination of behavior modification 
therapies of the early 20th century and the therapeutic innovations accompanying the “cognitive revolution” 
of the 1950s. They generally emphasize short-term, problem-oriented interventions and help the patient 
identify and modify dysfunctional cognitive patterns that, in turn, result in dysfunctional behaviors. The 
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 In addition to the main, original branch in Balad il-Ghabar, “Karim” also has a 
smaller branch in the northern town of Hilweh, a mixed Muslim-Christian Arab town 
near Haifa. Every week, the staff employed at this location travel to Balad il-Ghabar for a 
day of staff meetings and workshops, followed by seeing patients. Although my 
fieldwork was mostly at the main branch in Balad il-Ghabar, I travelled to the Hilweh 
branch several times a week to interview the staff members and observe clinical 
encounters there. In addition, I spent some time at a rehabilitative center for the mentally 
ill (a branch of a nation-wide organization) in Balad il-Ghabar and visited several schools 
in the area, where I spoke with directors and mental health counsellors.  
“Karim” overwhelmingly treats underage patients, both children and adolescents, 
and provides guidance and counselling to their family members, but in the last several 
months of my time there the clinic began accepting adult patients. The mental health 
services are provided both on an individual and group basis, exclusively in the outpatient 
format (there is no hospitalization, and patients in a crisis state are referred to the closest 
hospital to their place of residence). Because there are so few mental health care facilities 
in Arab locales that cater to underage patients, families come to “Karim” not only from 
Balad il-Ghabar itself and the neighboring region, but also from other parts of the 
                                                      
therapy would often involve some sort of structured “homework” (reflecting on one’s faulty cognitive 
patterns and gradually engaging in behaviors that counteract these patterns). Insurance companies generally 
prefer this form of psychotherapy, because it is perceived as more efficient and evidence-based, although 
both of these claims have been surrounded with controversy. Psychodynamic therapy, including 
psychoanalysis, tends to take longer and probe into the patient’s motivations, relationship patterns, 
fantasies, etc. More attention is typically paid to therapeutic relationship itself, as well. While a patient can 
enter this form of therapy with the desire to target a concrete symptom (e.g. anxiety in social situations) and 
some of the sessions may take a more problem-oriented approach, the scope of the therapy is much wider 
than in the CBT. 
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country, sometimes as far away as the Negev desert. The disorders and issues treated at 
“Karim” are vastly diverse in terms of symptoms and severity: Children and adolescents 
brought for treatment may be struggling at school, throwing tantrums, showing delays in 
speech and in other developmental milestones, or suffering from the aftermath of 
traumatic experiences, to name just a few examples.  How they arrive at “Karim” also 
varies.  Some, especially those with learning and behavioral difficulties, are sent by 
school counselors; others get a referral from a family physician, neurologist, or other 
health care professional who thinks that the problem is of a psychological nature; still 
others are referred by a mental health care professional at the previous place of treatment.  
This chapter and the following one present the data I have collected at “Karim.” 
In this chapter, I will provide context for a focused exploration of clinical discourses 
about Arab families and culture that will be at the center of the following chapter. After a 
brief discussion of Balad il-Ghabar as the key location for my study, I will outline a 
general picture of the state of mental health care services in the so-called Arab sector and 
then describe the everyday atmosphere and routines at “Karim”, with a special focus on 
patient records, in order to illustrate the paradoxical positioning of this institution. 
Consciously and intentionally created to address a perceived lack of services to the 
structurally vulnerable and disempowered minority population, “Karim” appears to be a 
very unconventional place. Yet in other ways it is thoroughly conventional since it faces 
the same issues as many other mental health care institutions in Israel, entangled in the 
vagaries of bureaucracy and the locally inflected, but universally recognizable language 
of psy disciplines.  
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This chapter continues the exploration of this dissertation’s main concerns – 
namely, the complexities of ethical deliberation in the clinic and the ways in which psy 
practitioners incorporate political considerations into clinical thinking and practice. Like 
at Kfar Shaul, clinicians at “Karim” display a great degree of sensitivity, ingenuity, and 
reflexivity – and, again like at Kfar Shaul, they operate against the backdrop of multiple 
structural constraints. Everyday clinical practice is filled with ethical decision-making 
about what is good for the patient, as well as ethical deliberations over what it means to 
be a good therapist in the age of the mental health care reform. These deliberations are 
steeped in powerful moral emotions, and especially moral anxiety. 
 
Balad il-Ghabar 
The choice of Balad il-Ghabar as the location for “Karim” has an unmistakable 
political resonance in the Israeli context. The city is a major regional center of the so-
called Little Triangle or simply the Triangle (ha-meshulash / il-muthallath77), a 
constellation of Israeli Arab towns and cities lying close to the Green Line. Balad il-
Ghabar itself, sitting on a highway that connects Central Israel with the Galilee, is but a 
dozen miles away from Jenin in the West Bank. It was founded in the Middle Ages, but 
an observer would hardly be able to tell how ancient the city is: Nothing from that period 
has survived to this day, since Balad il-Ghabar is a sort of an architectural palimpsest, 
with newer buildings erected on top of the older ones. The only structure with any sort of 
                                                      
77 In this and the following chapter, I use italics for all Arabic words and phrases and underlining for all 
Hebrew words and phrases. 
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claim to antiquity is a grave of an unnamed sheikh (see pic. 5.2), situated in one of the 
very rare green areas of the city, next to an abandoned unfinished building that was meant 
to be a community theater.  
 
Pic. 5.2. Balad il-Ghabar, the grave of a sheikh. “Allahu Akbar” is written on the locked door. 
The city is divided into neighborhoods, many of them named after the long-dried 
water springs, ‘ein (pl. ‘uyun) in Arabic, that used to run in the area, others sharing the 
names of the largest clans that historically have inhabited these neighborhoods. But it is 
no longer possible to straightforwardly trace a person back to a neighborhood in Balad il-
Ghabar just on the basis of the last name. During the 1948-1949 war, refugees from the 
nearby villages flooded the city and ended up settling with local families, in many cases 
changing their last name to that of the family who took them in. The family of my host 
father, Eyad, was one of these. He told me that when some other families changed their 
names back to their original forms after the war, his family decided to stick with their 
new surname, as a sign of gratitude. Once, he showed me what remained of his original 
village while he gave me a ride back from the northern branch of “Karim.” I squinted 
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trying to see anything resembling a village in the overgrown field, but only noticed some 
broken stone structures scattered here and there. The area where the village used to be, 
just a twenty-minute drive to the north of Balad il-Ghabar, is called the Jezreel Valley, 
primarily significant for the site called Megiddo – the presumed location of the 
Armageddon.  
Today, Balad il-Ghabar has a certain unsavory reputation in Israel. Since the 
1980s, political Islam has been on the rise in there, and it became the stronghold of the 
northern branch of The Islamic Movement in Israel, a political organization that, in 
contrast to the southern branch of the movement, prefers confrontation over alliances 
with more moderate Arab political groups in Israel. This branch of the Islamic movement 
is sometimes accused of secret ties with Hamas and was, in fact, outlawed by the Israeli 
government in November 2015. The stigma against Balad il-Ghabar is so strong that I 
was advised by my host family and other friends not to mention to the airport security 
officials that I was staying nearby, because I would be perceived as a suspicious and even 
dangerous individual. Once, during the airport security check, I was obliged to mention 
Balad il-Ghabar in response to a direct question about whether I lived in any place other 
than Jerusalem during my stay in Israel. As a result, I was bumped up to the next security 
level, as manifested by an updated code on my passport sticker, and had to check in my 
electronics and undergo a thorough search. My host mother, hearing this, joked that she 
herself sometimes does not feel like mentioning where she lives and says instead, with a 
playfully evasive hand wave, “between Hadera and Afula” (two small, predominantly 
Jewish towns to the south and north of Balad il-Ghabar, respectively). 
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Another, more light-hearted example of how Balad il-Ghabar is perceived in 
Israel, comes from Eyad, my host father. Once, while traveling, he was caught 
jaywalking. The policeman stopped him and asked him where he was from. Upon hearing 
the answer, the policeman laughed, pointed to the crosswalk, and said knowingly: 
“Aaaah, Balad il-Ghabar… These don’t exist in Balad il-Ghabar [eyn davar ka-ze be 
Balad il-Ghabar]!” This anecdote reflects a dual stereotype of Balad il-Ghabar in Israeli 
imagination: A space of danger, but also a place of absurd, almost comical, lawlessness, 
primitiveness, and disorganization. 
Currently, there are some attempts underway to “rebrand” the city. Most 
prominently, the city gallery that opened in 1996 hosts the works of Israeli Arab artists, 
as well as some international ones, including, as I was told, Yoko Ono. A couple of 
restaurants, known for their hummus and meat dishes and located near the entrance to the 
city are also fairly common destinations for Israeli Jewish and foreign visitors. 
Nevertheless, the stereotype of the city in the popular Israeli imagination is that it is 
dangerous, harsh, ugly, and unsophisticated. 
Balad il-Ghabar is a major regional center for the Israeli Arab community with a 
strong history of political engagement and even unrest, but it nevertheless lacks an 
effective institutional infrastructure for addressing mental health issues of adults and 
children alike: Before the founding of “Karim”, the only other institutions providing 
mental health care in the city were a branch of a country-wide psychological 
rehabilitation service and a psychological counselling center. All these factors motivated 
the founders of “Karim” to locate the clinic there, and it is this politically resonant 
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positionality that I described earlier as unconventional. However, if the significance of 
“Karim” cannot be understood outside of its immediate setting in Balad il-Ghabar, 
neither can it be appreciated without addressing the state of mental health care services 
for Arab citizens of Israel, in general – not only because “Karim” draws patients from all 
parts of Israel, but also because its staff explicitly see themselves as affected by these 
overarching, country-wide trends. In the next section, I provide this discussion.  
 
Mental Health Care and Israeli Arabs 
 Literature on mental health among Israeli Arabs usually portrays this community 
as a population at a heightened risk of psychological distress and disorders, but at the 
same time ambivalent about or even hostile to mental health care interventions. Alean Al-
Krenawi (2005), an Arab social worker who is considered a major authority on mental 
health among Israeli Arabs and especially the Bedouin, claims that this population is at a 
higher risk for psychiatric disorders and psychological distress in general due to the 
higher rates of close-relatives marriage, the practices of polygamy that cause stress to 
both women and their offspring, economic instability leading to tensions in the family, 
and structural discrimination that gives rise to the feelings of worthlessness and distress. 
Despite this heightened vulnerability to mental health issues, Al-Krenawi writes, Israeli 
Arabs are often wary about seeking professional help. Many fear the strong local stigma 
against mental illness and are thus unwilling to risk disclosing their condition.78  A 
                                                      
78 The stigma associated with having a mentally ill family member is, of course, not unique to the Israeli 
Arab society and has been documented in a wide range of cultural contexts, including among Irish and 
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preference for traditional healing over biomedical mental health care, perceived as both 
coercive and unavailable, also plays a role. 
 Although much of the literature on Israeli Arabs in the context of mental health 
focuses on the attitudes in this community that prevent its members from seeking help, 
another important point to consider is the very limited availability of mental health care 
services in predominantly Arab locales, especially for children and adolescents, who 
constitute a significant proportion of the Israeli Arab population (~40%). A governmental 
report, published in 2014, lists only 24 clinics in 15 Arab locales in Israel, including East 
Jerusalem (The Knesset Research and Information Center 2014). Out of these, only seven 
specialize in treating underage patients, and seven more accept both underage and adult 
patients. The scarcity of clinics in Arab locales is a major factor explaining vast 
disparities between Jews and Arabs accessing mental health care services. In 2011 50.6% 
of Jewish children who sought mental health care services at public clinics did not 
receive treatment, whereas for Arab children the number was much higher, 80.2% 
(Physicians for Human Rights – Israel 2013). The disparity looks even more pronounced 
when broken down by region: In the same time period, the percentage of children whose 
mental health care needs were not met was as high as 83% for the Northern District, 
where 80% of Israeli Arabs under the age of 18 live, and 96% for the Southern District of 
Israel. 
                                                      
Italian Americans (Scheper-Hughes 1987), in mainland China (Lam et al. 2010), and Japan (Ando et al. 
2013). 
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 Seen in this larger context, “Karim” is more than a local institution serving the 
needs of Israeli Arab families in Balad il-Ghabar and the Little Triangle area. The staff 
members at “Karim” see themselves as pioneers, fighting the uphill struggle in which 
there is always more to be done and always more patients to help – as manifested by the 
long waiting list – which adds to the stress of everyday work and the pathos of providing 
service against all odds. It also instills an air of bitterness among the staff. In the national 
context in which Israeli Arabs are perpetually underserved whether it comes to health 
care, infrastructure, or other public services, “Karim” occupies an inherently politicized 
position, making it an unconventional clinical space. Nevertheless, the everyday clinical 
reality is shaped by the same forces and routines that characterize any mental health care 
clinic in Israel, and I turn to these routines in the following sections. 
 
“Karim”: Clinical Space and Practices 
 
Pic. 5.3. Entrance to “Karim”, Balad il-Ghabar 
 “Karim” is located on top of a steep hill, next to a secondary school, and 
overlooks a green area with a few patches of agricultural land. There is a parking lot with 
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a small garden where my host mother, Fakhriyyeh, who is also a secretary at “Karim,” 
has planted herbs for tea. The clinic occupies the first floor of a multi-floor building, and 
is rather small. Entering the clinic, visitors are immediately faced with the reception area, 
two secretary desks in the center, arranged similarly to a reception desk at a hotel. Two 
columns that frame the secretary “island” bear the plaques with the names of the 
secretaries, in both Hebrew and Arabic. My host mother’s plaque spells out her first name 
in Hebrew, but the Arabic says “Umm Ali” (“the mother of Ali”, referring to her son79), 
and that is indeed how most people refer to her, both staff members and visitors. Right 
next to the entrance there is also a bulletin board with a dozen pages attached to it that list 
patient rights (such as privacy), contact information, and admission hours of the clinic (it 
is open every day except on Muslim holidays and Yom Kippur), conditions treated, types 
of services provided, referral information, and a short account of the clinic’s history. 
Some of these come in two versions, Arabic and Hebrew, while others have the two 
languages side by side.  
On the left from the entrance, there are restrooms, a meeting room where staff 
meetings and workshops occur, and a couple of offices. There are a few offices behind 
the reception area and a waiting area right across from it, lined up with a dozen of chairs, 
but most of the clinic is located to the right: more offices, including an art therapy room, 
a spacious beautiful office with large windows that belongs to Gloria, and a kitchen. The 
walls of the clinic are painted a soothing pastel shade of blue with a hint of lilac, and 
                                                      
79 A common respectful form of address in Arab cultures is Umm/Abu (“mother/father”), followed by the 
name of a son (usually a first-born). 
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there are large framed pictures on the walls: Flowers, a beret-wearing boy with a bouquet 
of red roses, and a dreamy looking girl. There are no overtly “cultural” or religious 
symbols anywhere. The décor, in other words, is very low-key and would not be out of 
place in any other setting of similar function in Israel. 
 
Clinical Routines 
My fieldwork at “Karim” coincided with a very tumultuous period in its 
existence, which, no doubt, affected the quality and nature of my data, raising the 
question of how “routine” the routines I observed were. Neither a governmental clinic nor 
a private one, “Karim” had operated under the auspices of an NGO that, in turn, secured 
the Ministry of Health funding. As the mental health care reform progressed, the 
sponsoring organization was supposed to renegotiate the terms of its contract with the 
HMOs, but they were not able to reach an agreement. The deadline passed by, and in 
May 2015, not long before I arrived there, all employees of “Karim” received severance 
letters in the mail. Distraught and angry, Gloria and several senior employees took their 
grievances to higher officials in the Ministry of Health and attended the meetings of the 
Knesset committee on the reform, trying to make their case. In the end, after months of 
frantic activity and uncertainty weighing heavily on employees and patients alike, a new 
organization stepped in to take over the contract. But the damage was already done: In 
the first three month of my time there, almost half of the staff members were gone.  Some 
left after finishing their internships and deciding against staying at “Karim,” but many 
left because of ideological disagreements over the changes at the clinic. 
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Despite these dramatic circumstances, “Karim” never fully ceased to function. A 
typical day at the clinic still included processing new arrivals (“intakes”), and providing 
group therapy for the existing patients, as well as consultations for parents. Visitors 
usually came up to the reception to notify the secretary of their arrival and then took a 
seat on one of the chairs that line up the waiting area. If it was their first visit, the parents 
(sometimes only one parent) would provide the secretary with a referral document and 
their ID to be scanned. The secretary opened a file in the computer database and asked 
the parents general demographic and contact information, but most of the file would be 
filled out by a therapist during the intake. The interactions between the secretary and 
parents were fairly formal and restrained, with little, if any joking or banter, unless they 
happened to be personal acquaintances.  
After a wait that could last between a few minutes to, more typically, 15-20 
minutes, a therapist would come to the waiting area, greet the parents and the child, 
engage them in a short chat, and invite them to an office. The intakes were typically 
conducted by a social worker or a psychologist. The therapist opened the newly created 
file on the computer and filled it out gradually over the course of the interview, often 
while also taking notes by hand. The intake was structured according to the categories of 
the file, but therapists sometimes deviated from it to inquire in more depth about 
something mentioned by the parents. During a typical intake, the therapist would start by 
explaining that the first one or even two visits to the clinic would be devoted exclusively 
to gathering information about the child rather than to treatment. He/she would then 
proceed to ask questions about the child’s early development with an emphasis on 
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developmental milestones (e.g. weaning, walking, first words), the atmosphere and 
relationships in the family, the child’s performance at school, etc.  
After gathering this information, the therapist typically asked the parents to bring 
the child into the office and then leave while the therapist talked with the child one on 
one. The kinds of questions that the therapist might ask were contingent on the child’s 
age and developmental level, but some common ones included: What troubles you? How 
are you doing at school? Do you have friends? Do you have hobbies? Are you happy? 
After this conversation was over, the parents were invited back in, a few more questions 
were asked, and then the therapist explained his or her recommendation for further 
treatment (for example, that the child has to come in for an appointment with a 
psychiatrist every month and/or individual therapy every week, and the parents are 
required to show up for a consultation, as well).  
Every week, Gloria, Wajib, and Dalia, the head social worker, held a so-called 
intake committee meeting (vaadat inteyk), where all new patients were discussed and a 
course of treatment is determined. I originally expected these meetings to contain 
extended diagnostic discussions, but they turned out very different. Typically, Gloria 
would sit at the computer and skim the patient file, reading aloud relevant information, 
including the treatment indicated by the clinician who conducted the intake. There would 
be very little discussion, as someone would state the kind of treatment required in their 
opinion – “It’s music therapy, nu!” – and others would concur or suggest alternatives. If 
the intake clinician did not mention the need for a psychiatric evaluation, the intake 
committee would usually add that recommendation. Finally, if no spots for individual 
  
208 
therapy were available, the child would be temporarily put in a group until space frees up 
in a clinician’s schedule to see the child on an individual basis. 
Children already in treatment at the clinic had several kinds of appointments 
available for them. First, there was a regular consultation with the psychiatrist (at the time 
of my fieldwork, there were two of them, Gloria the director and Wajib). Consultation 
was typically very brief, with the psychiatrist inquiring about how the child was doing on 
the current medication and either adjusting it, prescribing something new, or imploring 
with the family to stick with the existing regimen. The latter was actually quite common, 
because many parents were anxious about giving psychiatric medication to children and 
often ended up adjusting it without prior consultation in response to side effects or a 
perceived improvement or deterioration in the child’s condition.  
The style of the psychiatric consultation varied quite a bit depending on who was 
receiving patients that day, Gloria or Wajib. Wajib was an Israeli Arab psychiatrist who 
had received his education in one of the Soviet bloc countries. Gloria, who did not speak 
Arabic beyond a few words and phrases she had picked up over the years, either used 
Hebrew with the parents who knew it or relied on one of the employees, usually Dalia 
(the head social worker), for help. She was rather terse and on-point, wasting little time 
on social niceties. If it became apparent that the parents had not been sufficiently diligent 
about the medication regime, Gloria could get agitated and angry. She would ask the 
interpreter something like: “Tell her, word by word, that the child must take this medicine 
as I prescribed it, no exceptions!” When Wajib was the psychiatrist on call, on the other 
hand, he was usually more relaxed and, depending on the situation, joked with the family 
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or adopted an air of concern. He rarely openly berated the parents if they failed to follow 
the prescribed routine, but instead resorted to placating or imploring with the family if he 
detected any non-compliance. I often heard him launching into long explanatory 
speeches, trying to convey how a particular medicine influenced the brain or reassuring 
the worried parents that what seemed to them as excessively high dosage was a necessity. 
Both individual and group therapy were a major part of the clinic’s life, as well. 
For privacy reasons, I was not able to attend individual therapy sessions, but I sat in on 
some art therapy and group therapy sessions with child patients (after securing their oral 
assent and their parents’ oral consent). Groups were made up of four to eight children 
similar in age, mixed by sex. Although, in theory, groups are supposed to have a stable 
composition over time (and the clinic tried to enforce it by dropping a child from the 
group if he or she failed to attend several meetings in a row), in practice most of the 
groups were a lot more dynamic, children joining and dropping all the time. Depending 
on the children’s age and the clinician’s orientation, participants could work on art, 
individually or together, and then share what the drawings or other creations mean to 
them or spend the session playing and talking. Clinician(s) leading the group moderated 
and steered the direction of the conversation, inculcating certain ways of self-expression 
(sharing of emotions and experiences, supportive comments to other children) and 
engagement and discouraging others (hitting, making fun of others, or sexual innuendos 
in the pre-teen/teen groups). If a child began to get anxious and boisterous, this was 
tolerated to a degree, but the group leaders also tried to introduce children to coping 
techniques (such as breathing deeply).  
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In addition, “Karim” provided individual consultations and discussion groups for 
parents, which in practice almost always meant mothers80. I was able to regularly observe 
one such group, attended by six-seven mothers weekly. For approximately forty minutes, 
the mothers would take turns talking about issues with their children. These ranged from 
academic difficulties at school to conflicts with siblings and, with the mothers of 
teenagers, concerns about the bad influence of peers. Marital problems, including in one 
case concerns about physical abuse by a spouse, also came up regularly. The moderator, a 
social worker, intervened occasionally to rephrase a participant’s utterance, identify a 
common thread in the conversation, or elicit reactions and advice.  
On Thursdays, the so-called “staff day” heralded a break in the clinical routine. 
All the employees from the Hilweh branch would arrive for a day of meetings, 
workshops, and appointments with patients81. Those employees who worked under the 
supervision of more senior staff members would often have their meetings with the 
supervisors early in the morning and then proceed to join the rest of the staff for a group 
therapy seminar. Run by Yoram, a Jewish psychologist in his 60s with a somewhat 
sleepy, but congenial manner, this was a curious, multi-purpose gathering, at once a 
workshop on conducting group therapy and an opportunity for the staff members to air 
their grievances and talk about feelings and experiences related to work. In essence, it 
was a seminar on group therapy that itself functioned as a therapeutic outlet of sorts. For 
                                                      
80 I heard that the clinic tried to put together groups for fathers on several occasions, but it never worked 
out. The clinicians attributed this to the problematic attitudes of many fathers (who viewed child-rearing as 
the female responsibility and were averse to the idea of sharing their feelings with a group of strangers).  
81 In the late summer, as numerous employees of the Balad il-Ghabar branch left for various reasons, the 
Hilweh staff stepped in, taking on some of the caseload in the main branch. 
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the majority of my time at “Karim,” the second goal of the seminar predominated, and it 
was always a very emotional gathering. Employees discussed the ongoing reform and its 
effects on the clinic, their anger at Gloria who was known for her blunt and, for some, 
rude interpersonal style, and their sadness about her leaving, when it became clear that 
she would not get along with the new management. Only in the last month or so of my 
time at the clinic did the conversations touch upon the theory and techniques of group 
therapy. 
After a few more hours filled with separate meetings of the clinic’s psychologists 
and social workers, patient appointments, and supervisions, a general staff meeting would 
take place in the conference room. It usually lasted approximately two hours. Every 
week, someone was responsible for bringing food, because the meeting fell at lunch time. 
My host mother told me that in the past everyone brought home-cooked meals, but that 
was rarely done anymore, except when it was her – and a few other women employees’ – 
turn. The subject of food and cooking stirred a lot of conversations and banter, and the 
mealtime was one of the few contexts in which the staff members from the Balad il-
Ghabar area and those from the North openly commented on and discussed their 
differences, although it always remained a light-spirited exchange (for instance, 
Northerners would gently tease the natives of Balad il-Ghabar for their pronunciation of 
the “k” sound as “ch” or for the carbohydrate-loaded constitution of the local meals, both 
of which are, incidentally, popularly explained as Bedouin influences). 
The topics and nature of the staff meetings were wide-ranging, but during my 
time at “Karim” the majority of time was spent on discussing organizational changes. 
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Therapists were concerned with the effects of the managed care reform on their work and 
livelihood, often debating the changing realities of clinical practice. A source of 
particular concern was the changing relationship of the clinic with the kupot cholim 
(HMOs): Since they were now obliged to submit reports to the kupot cholim in order to 
justify the need for treatment for each patient, clinicians were unsure how much and what 
kind of information to include. Some of this concern had to do with the clinicians’ desire 
to render their patients’ issues, often multifaceted and less than straightforward, 
understandable to the insurance providers, but it was also a matter of privacy. The issue 
of privacy extended beyond HMOs to non-mental health care providers: As the medical 
record system in Israel was changing at the time, clinicians at “Karim” were particularly 
wary of the prospect of that their patients’ psychiatric diagnoses and treatment details 
could potentially become available to all other health care providers that this patient 
would consult in the future. For some clinicians at “Karim”, this was a disconcerting 
prospect – among other things, because they believed that the label of mental illness 
might negatively affect how health care professionals not trained in mental health care 
issues treat these patients.  
Increasingly affected by the pull of the mental health care reform and drawn into 
the ever-widening network of bureaucracy, clinicians also used the staff meeting to 
discuss the implications of the reform for what it meant to be a therapist. While a 
minority saw the reform as a force for good, bringing rigor and order to the practice often 
mired in messiness, most of the staff members at “Karim” feared that the reform was 
eroding their capacity to provide meaningful care. During one staff meeting, a 
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psychologist quipped: “You know how they say ‘sex workers’ rather than prostitutes 
now? I feel like this reform is turning us into ‘psychological workers’!”. Other staff 
members present laughed and nodded. One change that the clinicians were particularly 
disturbed by was the mounting imperative to maximize patient hours by reducing, if not 
eliminating completely, any breaks between appointments, as well as intentionally 
overscheduling multiple patients per appointment slot. Indeed, they were now only to be 
compensated if a patient showed up for an appointment. The management’s suggestions 
that each clinician should call those patients who have missed their appointments in order 
to find out the reasons and reschedule for a later time also caused some uneasiness. More 
psychodynamically oriented clinicians in particular felt that this change would irreparably 
disrupt the intricate and fragile therapeutic alliance82.  
Although “Karim” is a unique space with a complex and fraught political 
position, it is also, as this brief overview demonstrates, a clinical facility that deals – and 
occasionally struggles with – the same quotidian issues as many other mental health care 
clinics in Israel. Every day, the staff members endeavor to provide treatment for its many 
current and even more numerous new patients, improve their professional skills, and 
navigate the complex, increasingly changing bureaucratic terrain of the mental health 
care system. The anxiety that the reform has stirred up in the “Karim” staff clinicians – 
whether they can continue to provide confidential, empathetic, person-centered care to 
                                                      
82 The reasoning was that missing - or being late to - an appointment is often clinically significant in itself, 
reflecting the dynamic of transference. The therapist, the logic goes, must carefully unpack the underlying 
reasons during the upcoming sessions, rather than probe into them directly. Furthermore, the therapist who 
calls after each missed appointment could come across as “needy” and dependent on the patient for income, 
violating what Kirschner and Lachicotte (2001) call “the ethic of ambiguity.” 
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their patients – would be familiar to any mental health care professional in Israel, 
especially those working in outpatient environments (which have been affected a lot more 
than hospitals by the ongoing reform).  
 
Patient Records: Divergent Theoretical Perspectives at Play 
 Like many other mental health care clinics in Israel, “Karim” is struggling with 
the implications of the ongoing reform. What sets it apart from many other institutions of 
the similar kind, however, is the additional struggle of attending to the very specific 
social and political positionality of its patients, which is reflected in the language and 
structure of patient records – a topic I turn to in this section. Each day at “Karim” 
clinicians expand the database with new information about their patients, and these 
records contain valuable insights into the nature of local clinical reasoning (which will 
become the subject of closer examination in the following chapter).  
Patient records start with demographic information, such as the patient’s ID 
number, birth date, address, and parents’ names and ID numbers. Most of this 
information is taken down by the secretary when the patient and family members arrive. 
During the intake, the clinician takes notes by hand or in a word file, to be later entered 
into the database record, or sometimes enters everything directly into the database. The 
resulting document is known as “the intake summary” (sikum inteyk) and is structured 
uniformly in each case around the following categories (as reflected in the intake 
interview discussed above): reason for referral, family background, parents and siblings, 
extended family, traumas and crises in the family, pregnancy and birth, psychomotor 
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development, educational framework, heredity, sensitivity to medicines, physical 
illnesses, and social situation. The intake summary ends with a diagnosis (there is space 
both for an ICD83 code and a psychodynamic formulation) and treatment 
recommendations. The rest of the file consists of entries about each subsequent therapy 
session, consultation with parents, phone calls to the parents and, in some cases, the 
child’s teachers, case workers, etc. 
Just the list of the intake summary categories shows that clinical reasoning at 
“Karim” focuses on seeing each case in the longitudinal, social context. The issue is not 
(or not only) a neurobiological pathology located in the individual, but rather a complex 
agglomeration of symptoms that are rooted in the child’s development and family 
environment. To provide a better understanding of how patient records construct 
individual cases, I include an extended example below. Dalia recommended this case as a 
good example of how socioeconomic pressures have a deleterious influence on mental 
health in Arab families. She also noted that this case had a “political” angle, because the 
father of the patient was from the West Bank84. I will mostly paraphrase the contents of 
this record, with multiple changes to protect the family’s privacy, but also provide direct 
quotes where the language is significant or noteworthy.   
Ahmed, age 15, was referred to “Karim” by his family physician. The reason for 
the referral is noted as the behavioral changes in Ahmed: His parents are in the process of 
a divorce, and this has been putting a lot of stress on him. According to Ahmed’s mother, 
                                                      
83 The International Classification of Diseases, a counterpart of the American DSM.  
84 It was noteworthy to me that when I asked the clinicians at “Karim” to talk about the influence of 
politics, they almost always brought up the cases in which one of the parents was from the West Bank. 
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he has many anger outbursts (hitpartzuyot za’am), and he “breaks things” when he gets 
irritated (mit’atzben). It is hard to discipline him at home, although at school he does 
accept the authority of the teachers. 
 Ahmed’s father, in his mid-forties, is a construction worker, and his mother, in 
her early forties, is a housewife. When they got married, they lived in a nearby city in the 
West Bank, where Ahmed and his siblings were born. However, they were denied child 
allowance on the basis of their residence in the West Bank. To counteract that, they 
moved to Israel, to live near the wife’s parents, but this only exacerbated the tensions 
already present in their marriage. According to the file, “Mother describes tense 
relationships with her husband throughout all years of the marriage, she describes that the 
father exploded and broke things in front of the children.” Three years before they 
brought Ahmed to therapy at “Karim,” his parents separated. At that time he was living 
with his mother and several siblings, from preschool to high school age, in his maternal 
grandparents’ house.  
 The file classifies the divorce and the forced move to Israel among the “traumas 
and crises in the family,” also adding to that category the conflict over the youngest 
child’s health care. When she was very young, she started suffering from a physical 
disease that could not be properly treated in the West Bank. After the father refused to 
take her to a hospital to Israel, the mother took matters into her own hands. She stayed 
with her daughter in an Israeli hospital for several weeks, and her other children at that 
time were with their grandparents. The daughter was released from the hospital 
eventually, and the mother took her and the rest of the children to stay with the 
  
217 
grandparents in Israel. The relationship between Ahmed’s troubles and his younger 
sister’s health issues is not explicitly elaborated in the file, but it is taken for granted that 
the resulting instability and conflict in the household created a stressful environment for 
him.  
 The tense situation at home was only one source of stress for Ahmed, however. 
His “social situation”, outlined in the file, seemed precarious. He did not have any 
friends, except for a few who were also his neighbors. The record portrays Ahmed’s 
isolation using a mixture of detached psychological terms and more experience-near 
words that must have been taken from Ahmed’s speech or his parents’ account. “At 
school he doesn’t succeed in building positive social relationships. He has many 
problems with the children in class. Several times he beat up other children. According to 
him, the children do not accept him and think that he is a ‘moron’ [ahbal], and after he 
beats them up they realize who they are dealing with. The children ostracize him, because 
his father is from the territories and his parents are separated, sometimes laugh at him and 
say bad things [melachlechim] about his father and especially the children who are the 
mother’s relatives. A short time ago he began to raise birds, which helps him build a 
social network with children who have the same hobby.” This softer touch at the end is 
typical of a file put together by a social worker, as social work training emphasizes 
looking for the clients’ strengths rather than merely identifying their problems.  
 Ahmed’s file concludes with a diagnosis and recommendations, but diagnosis 
itself comes in two very different forms. The first, that could be called “biomedical,” 
contains the ICD codes and labels. In Ahmed’s case, he is assigned the labels of 
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“adjustment disorder” and “other unspecified behavioral and emotional disorders with 
onset usually occurring in childhood and adolescence,” as well as a Z-code85, “atypical 
parenting situation”. These labels and codes come across as an afterthought and seem 
almost tautological in their phrasing, but they are, in fact, fundamental. Unlike most of 
Ahmed’s file, this section would be accessible by the kupat cholim (HMO) that he is 
registered with. The assigned ICD label – in this case and many others – is not helpful to 
the clinicians, but it is instrumental in ensuring the patient’s continuous access to care. 
The “dynamic diagnosis” section paints a much more complex picture, and one 
that is deeply rooted in a psychodynamic perspective that many clinicians at “Karim” 
shared. Instead of assigning labels, it tries to convey a sense of Ahmed’s inner life: “He 
experiences parents as separate figures. He experiences the father as a positive and 
beloved figure, he meets with him once a week and identifies with him because it is hard 
to live in a strange [zara] society. He internalized the coping patterns of his father that 
when one gets angry one expresses it through outbursts and the breaking of objects. He 
experiences himself as a victim, and the rest of the people provoke him and don’t contain 
[machilim] him.” This narrative is unmistakably steeped in the assumptions and language 
of object-relations approaches in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, associated primarily 
with such theorists as Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, Ronald Fairbairn86. Object-
relations perspectives that see people enmeshed in relationships not only with real 
                                                      
85 Z-codes in the ICD are used to describe the social or environmental factors that impact the patient, but 
are not themselves symptoms of the pathology. They are similar to what used to be the Axis-IV in the 
DSM, before the latest overhaul. 
86 The first two names often came up in clinical discussions or in private conversations, when I asked 
clinicians about the biggest theoretical influences on their work.  
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individuals around them, but also with the unconscious, internalized representations of 
important figures in their early life (usually parents), as well as parts of these figures (for 
example, the angry/destructrive part of the father or the despondent/depressive part of the 
mother). The relationships in the real world, in this view, are shaped by internal object 
relations. This perspective also emphasizes the importance of a “holding” environment 
early in life – one in which a young child can feel at ease to explore, but also safely 
contained. If such environment is not established, the task of therapy is to recreate it for 
the patient.  
 The final section, recommendations, once again abandons the psychodynamic 
language in favor of more concrete, behavior-focused language in its condensed summary 
of the major difficulties faced by Ahmed: “It is hard for [Ahmed] to adapt to the move to 
a new village, the separation between parents. He is coping with the adolescence crisis 
and it is hard for him to accept the authority of an adult figure. He can’t control himself 
or contain his anger. When he gets angry, he gets to the level that it is very hard for him 
to cope with his internal world, and he becomes violent and breaks things. Ostracized at 
school and feels that he is inferior to the rest of the children.” This part of the file ends 
with a recommendation to start individual therapy with Ahmed, as well as counseling 
with parents in order to verse them in setting boundaries and understanding the crises of 
adolescence. 
 Ahmed’s file perfectly captures the tensions at the heart of clinical work at 
“Karim”. The file tacks back and forth between different scales, different lenses of 
analysis, letting them exist side by side rather than attempting to square them. First, the 
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file attends to the structural-political context of the boy’s upbringing, explicitly 
portraying it as a source of stress and instability. While the file does not provide a lot of 
detail on this topic, I believe that this has nothing to do with the lack of clinical 
understanding or interest. On the contrary, the notes in this case are sparse precisely 
because they function as a shorthand, hinting at a slew of sociopolitical issues that 
clinicians at “Karim” are only too familiar with: the difficulties that the West Bank 
residents face in obtaining medical care in Palestine or maintaining stable employment in 
Israel, the stigma and ridicule that a child with a West Bank parent faces at school, the 
strained marriage amplified by intergenerational conflict.   
By contrast, the psychodynamic section of the file leaves this larger context 
behind, engaging psychoanalytic theories in an interpretation of Ahmed’s object-relations 
patterns. If the social situation portrays Ahmed as a victim of his sociopolitical 
environment, affected by his parents’ marital discord and the indignities associated with 
having a parent from the West Bank, the dynamic diagnosis paints a more universal 
picture devoid of cultural specificity. It also introduces the mediating element of 
subjectivity and fantasy: Ahmed is not just directly harmed by his dysfunctional 
environment; through an identification with his father, he has picked up a warped pattern 
of relating to the outside world, whereby any provocation is unwarranted and justifies 
retaliation.  
Finally, the diagnostic label frames Ahmed’s problem as the issue of individual 
adjustment in need of clinical attention, both erasing the sociopolitical context of 
Ahmed’s predicament and glossing over the psychodynamic complexities of his inner 
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life. These different perspectives are not fully reconciled and the potential contradictions 
between the divergent ways of seeing are not acknowledged. The file, taken as a whole, 
provides a snapshot of “Karim” at a transitional point in its existence: Still committed to 
a psychodynamic and sociopolitically conscious clinical worldview, but also under the 
increasing pressure from above to adapt to the language of discrete diagnostic categories 
and evidence-based interventions. The polyvocal structure of the patient files allows them 
to have practical utility on several levels, both capturing the clinically useful aspects of 
the case and providing a concrete diagnostic label that would be legible to the insurance 
companies. 
 
Political Positionality, Ethical Deliberation, and Moral Anxieties at “Karim” 
 As I show in this chapter, “Karim” is a unique clinical space with a contradictory 
status and complex positionality. Conceived as a political project, it was meant to address 
the lingering disparities in access to mental health care services among Israeli Arab 
families living in the Little Triangle region, and beyond. The location of the main branch 
of the clinic in Balad il-Ghabar, with its long and frequently explosive history of civic 
unrest, underscores the overt political underpinnings of “Karim’s” existence. 
Nevertheless, in the everyday reality of the clinic this political, idiosyncratic nature of 
“Karim” often takes the backstage to the immediate concerns shared by any other mental 
health care institution in Israel – the bureaucratic demands of HMOs and other 
implications of the ongoing reform.  
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Similarly to my interlocutors at Kfar Shaul, clinicians at “Karim” are complex 
moral agents who are constantly engaged in implicit and explicit ethical deliberation and 
decision-making. Guided by the notions of the good that are informed both by the 
political positionality of the clinic and by the clinical paradigms they were trained in, the 
staff members strive to capture both the structural and psychodynamic dimensions of 
their patients’ predicaments, while also providing a diagnostic shorthand that, far from 
capturing the same level of complexity, would ensure that the patients receives care. 
These multiple, competing imperatives are reflected in the language and structure of 
patient records, as exemplified in my extended analysis of Ahmed’s case file.  
The challenge of providing meaningful care while complying with the mounting 
institutional constraints in the age of “managed care” has become a vibrant subject of 
critical analysis in anthropology and beyond in the last twenty years or so (Brodwin 
2011; Brodwin 2013; Kirschner and Lachicotte 2001; Rylko-Bauer and Farmer 2002; 
Ware et al. 2000). Psy practitioners themselves have been engaged in a sustained 
conversation about the potentially deleterious effects of bureaucratization on the human 
dimension of the therapeutic engagement for much longer (Chodoff 1972; Cushman and 
Gilford 2000; Karon 1995; Lewis and Blotky 1993; Miller 1996). 
To make sense of these moral anxieties, I find useful the term that Lisa Stevenson 
(2012; 2014) coined in her critical exposition of the Canadian government’s efforts to 
address the tuberculosis epidemic of the 1950s and the ongoing “suicide epidemic” (the 
1980s to the present day) among the Inuit – “anonymous care”. By this she means the 
ethic of care that is primarily oriented at keeping a sufficient number of its Inuit targets 
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alive, without a consideration for whether the community itself considered their rapidly 
changing lives worth living and how negatively these health interventions affected 
familial ties.  
When clinicians at “Karim” express anxieties about the momentum of the mental 
health care reform, I believe that they are fearful of the specter of “anonymous care”. The 
efficiency promised by the reform – more patients seen per day, more standardized 
records, a greater focus on brief, problem-oriented interventions – may seem like an 
attractive prospect. Nevertheless, all this may result in losing sight of the individuals in 
need of help. If Israeli Arabs get a better access to mental health care services, but are 
treated as a faceless population to be managed and kept just functional enough to get by, 
this means that something crucial is lost. Psychotherapy should not be romanticized as a 
purely humanistic enterprise, as it has been shaped by its involvement in societal and 
state projects of social control from its very beginning. However, this humanistic 
sensibility is important, and the entrenchment of managed care – at “Karim” and beyond 
– would mean for it to be compromised or even extinguished as the imperatives of social 
standardization and accountability are gaining ground, evoking a Weberian ghost of 
rationalization. 
If my account of clinical reasoning and decision-making at Kfar Shaul works to 
demonstrate the interrelated nature of embodied morality and ethical reflection, both of 
them rooted in ethical affordances (Keane 2014), my material from “Karim” speaks more 
forcefully to the importance of the affective side of moral experience. Moral emotions – 
such as, most prominently in my material in this chapter, moral anxiety – are an 
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irreducible and even central part of moral experience, and I align with the calls for the 
anthropology of ethics and morality to account for the importance of powerful moral 
emotions (Fassin 2012; Throop 2014) or, in Kleinman’s terms, to pay attention to how 
emotions and values are intricately intertwined as individuals navigate what is at stake in 
their private and social lives (Kleinman 2007). Clinicians at “Karim” do not coldly 
“deliberate” over what is good for the patient or what is good for their clinic – instead, 
they worry, they obsess, they hope, they express frustration, disgust, and sadness. Indeed, 
this affective side of ethico-moral experience of clinicians at “Karim” will become even 
more apparent in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CLINICAL DELIBERATION, CULTURE TALK, AND 
BOUNDARY WORK IN AN ISRAELI ARAB CLINIC 
One evening in the fall of 2015, I stayed behind at “Karim”, as it was winding 
down after a full day of staff seminars and meetings interspersed with patient 
appointments. Everyone had left, except for me, Wasim (a clinical psychologist hailing 
from the north of the country), and a Mu’min (a social worker living in a town close to 
Balad il-Ghabar). Both were in their early thirties. Mu’min was blind and usually got 
rides from colleagues or waited for his wife to pick him up. Since Wasim did not drive 
that day and Mu’min’s wife was unable to come over, we called a taxi. Forty minutes 
later, the taxi was still not there and the dispatcher was not picking up the phone. We set 
out on foot toward the busy highway where the bus station was, Mu’min leaning on 
Wasim’s and my shoulders for support. The walk was just over two kilometers (1 mile) 
long, but it took us close to forty minutes to make it to the highway, as we had to walk 
down a steep and poorly paved hill and then navigate the main street, significant stretches 
of it missing any functional sidewalk. As we stumbled down a pothole-filled road with 
trash scattered alongside it, Wasim kept fuming about the taxi and the streets, finally 
exclaiming: “Always the same thing, Arab labor [avoda aravit]!” I flinched. “Arab labor” 
is a derogatory, blatantly racist phrase used by some Israelis to refer to badly and 
carelessly done work87. In a self-righteous burst-out, I challenged Wasim on this issue, 
                                                      
87 The phrase might also be familiar to the non-Israeli reader as the title of a popular sitcom, created by an 
Israeli Arab writer and journalist Sayed Kashua. The show focuses on the ups and downs of Amjad, an 
Israeli Arab journalist, as he struggles (and often fails) to integrate in the Israeli society. A major focus in 
the sitcom is on Amjad’s ambivalence toward his Israeli Arab identity – a theme that reverberates through 
this chapter. 
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but he dismissed me, saying that there was nothing racist about his words. They were 
simply the truth. 
This exchange neatly encapsulates the paradox at the heart of my fieldwork at 
“Karim”: While the Israeli Arab mental health care professionals I studied were certainly 
aware of the connection between the dismaying material conditions in Balad il-Ghabar 
and the long-standing unequal treatment of Arab citizens in the Israeli state, they were 
also not immune to adopting discourses that paint Arab culture, Arab families, and even 
Arab minds in a negative light. 
In this chapter, I analyze two main interpretative frameworks — “structural” and 
“familial-psychologizing”— that clinicians at “Karim” used in their diagnostic 
deliberation while trying to make sense of and address their patients’ predicaments. The 
structural framework explicitly connected the mental health conditions and social 
problems of their patients to the vulnerable situation of the Arab minority in Israel. From 
this standpoint, clinical work attempted to redress some of the imbalances in mental 
health care provision to this underserved population that has been suffering 
discrimination and neglect in the Israeli state for decades. The clinicians were, in a sense, 
going against the grain by fighting, albeit on a very limited and case-by-case basis, a 
social problem created by a constellation of unjust political, social, and economic 
conditions faced by the community since Israel’s founding.  
At the same time – and, in my initial view, paradoxically – the familial-
psychologizing framework echoed and sometimes openly incorporated demeaning 
narratives and stereotypes about Arabs that circulate in Israeli society. Complaints about 
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the everyday frustrations of clinical practice, for example about parents bringing their 
children late for appointments, being unwilling to give them medication, beating them, 
stumbling when discussing even the most basic feelings, or engaging in “superstitious” 
practices, to me evoked familiar discourses about Israeli Arabs as a problematic 
population. In this framework, the suffering and discomfort experienced by an individual 
child became a matter of familial, not social or political, pathology. The role of the 
clinicians differed accordingly, with an emphasis on providing patients and their families 
with “psychoeducation,” or knowledge about and skills for verbally expressing feelings, 
maintaining relationships, and managing emotionally difficult situations.  
I argue in this chapter that these two frameworks, though at first glance very 
different, are both rooted in the complex positionality of Israeli Arabs as a community. I 
further contend that the self-deprecating discourses about Arab families and Arab culture 
that circulate among Israeli Arab clinicians at “Karim” cannot be simplistically explained 
away as internalized oppression. Instead, these discourses – what I term negative culture-
talk – can only be understood in the context of my interlocutors’ positionality as middle-
class Israeli Arabs trained in psy discourses and trying to negotiate their own personal 
and professional identities as members of a mixed Jewish-Arab clinical team.  
 
“Racism and Things Like That”: Structural Thinking 
 Regardless of which model they were drawing on at any given moment, clinicians 
at “Karim” were pragmatic actors who strove to relieve the suffering of their patients and 
improve their quality of life as much as possible. However, when they applied the 
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structural framework, they framed the problems presenting at the clinic as the result of 
unjust socioeconomic and political conditions that put undue stress on families. These in 
turn were understood to affect children by either creating their pathology wholesale or 
amplifying what they considered to be already present genetic risks.  
From the beginning of my fieldwork, I was interested in understanding the link 
between the systematic discrimination the Israeli Arab community suffers, and the mental 
health issues it faces. As a result, I was especially interested in hearing from my 
interlocutors what they thought about the matter. What I did not expect was that my 
interlocutors took for granted the structural explanatory model that lay blame for the 
condition of the Israeli Arab community on systemic discrimination to such an extent that 
many of them had trouble actually articulating it to me. It was supposed to be so obvious 
as to not require any deliberation beyond a passing reference. This extended beyond the 
clinical realm, to most basic issues. For example, early in my fieldwork, which coincided 
with Ramadan, my host mother Fakhriyyeh took me to see her friends, and we spent a 
good deal of time navigating the cramped, often unnamed and poorly lit streets of the city 
on the way to our destination. Subjected to a barrage of frustrated comments about the 
road quality, I sought to elicit her explanatory model for these conditions by asking her, 
“But why are they so bad?” She glanced at me, clearly amused, and said: “Only you 
would ask such a thing, Katreena. To us it is very obvious.” 
 In other everyday conversations, I often heard abbreviated references to “the 
situation” [ha-matzav] or “racism and things like that” [giz’anut u hek]. When I kept 
insisting on my need for explanations, my interlocutors did start speaking at length and 
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very emotionally about structural barriers preventing Israeli Arabs from accessing mental 
health care services. One problem that came up very often was public transport, the state 
of which is quite lamentable in Arab locales in Israel in general, but in Balad il-Ghabar it 
was practically non-existent. There are several intercity buses that pass by the road 
junction behind which the city lies, but the clinic itself sits on a steep hill in the middle of 
the city, and it takes at least half an hour of brisk walking – and, no doubt, a lot longer 
with several children in tow – to get there, and significant stretches of this journey are 
missing a sidewalk altogether. Another issue that was often highlighted concerned 
language accessibility, or lack thereof, where it came to materials on mental health and 
mental health care or even signs in hospitals and clinics. As Aref, a young Muslim social 
worker, observed to me indignantly, “the translations simply make you laugh!” 
When I probed my interlocutors about the reasons behind these barriers, they 
often responded in a way that implicated the political order. Nadia, a Christian social 
worker in her early 30s who specialized in issues of gender, told me, reacting to my 
question about the near-lack of mental health services even in large Arab or Arab-
majority towns: “I don’t know, maybe it’s not profitable.” She went on to explain that 
Israeli Arabs were second-class citizens whose health was not prioritized: “Or maybe not, 
we are not… <it is> not important in the heart of the state that we are well, like. <…> 
Second-class citizens. {laughs}.” Aref also picked up on the theme of neglect, connecting 
individual psychological problems to the socioeconomic issues that beset Israeli Arab 
communities:  
I also think that in the Arab society, also in the Triangle, and in the south 
in the Negev, the level of personal self-confidence is very low. Because 
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today the level of violence is very high. There are criminal families, 
criminal organizations. And the state is not doing enough. I don’t want to 
say ‘encourages,’ but it is not doing enough on this matter. 
 
Amir, a clinical psychologist in his early 40s, likewise provided a multifaceted 
interpretation of how the structural conditions of unemployment, poverty, and second-
class citizenship undermine mental health and promote psychological disorders: 
When someone is out of work and can’t build a house or provide for the family, it 
creates the sense of frustration [ihbaat]. It may result in irritability [asabiyyeh], 
emotional conditions, sense of insecurity. If I feel that the state is working in my 
interest, I feel secure. But if it is destroying homes... 
 
Several of my interlocutors explicitly framed their work as a way to redress these 
structural inequalities by at least reducing, if not obliterating, their insidious effect on the 
psychological well-being of Israeli Arab patients. Kamilla, a young Druze psychologist 
from the north, told me about her previous experiences of working at schools and clinics 
where most of her clients and colleagues were Jewish, to make the point that her work 
was more meaningful/needed at Karim:  
I learned a lot there, the work <was> very organized, but I felt that in Jewish 
localities [‘and il-yahud] there is a lot of professional work; we, in the sector [ha-
migzar], don’t have any. <…> I felt that, like, if someone has already studied 
psychology and feels he has something to give and … <still works> in the Jewish 
sector… and we… {laughs} so I chose in the end to leave.  
 
She later added, as if to make sure that I understood her correctly, that it was not 
that she did not want to treat Jewish patients anymore, she would be happy to, but “our 
situation is seriously hard [‘enjad sa’eb].” 
These statements, although they do not necessarily amount to a coherent theory, 
articulate a clear-eyed approach to the impact of the powerful structural conditions of 
discrimination, unemployment, and poverty on the psychological well-being of 
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individuals and the flourishing of families and communities. Sherine Hamdy (2008), in 
her study of Egyptians with kidney failure and their families, found that they understand 
their suffering as more than a private tragedy, but rather as a predicament intimately tied 
to the insidious political corruption, staggering economic inequalities, and environmental 
degradation in Egypt. Subverting the trope in which the prescient anthropologist is the 
one getting at the deep underlying causes of various societal issues that the interlocutors 
can only partially comprehend and articulate, Hamdy shows that the anthropologist’s 
interlocutors can, in fact, be the most insightful critics of their own condition, and this 
point was fully confirmed by my study. 
 
“It Starts at Home”: Pathologizing Arab Families 
Although clinicians at “Karim” were hardly unaware of the political-economic 
conditions that undermined the well-being of their Israeli Arab patients, the structural, 
systemic way of explaining the prevalence and severity of mental health problems 
coexisted uneasily with a very different approach, which instead attributed patients’ 
difficulties to their “problematic families.” I collected a wealth of material from 
interviews and observations of formal and informal interactions among the staff that 
strongly points to the centrality of “problematic families” (or mishpachot be’ayatiyot, as 
they were sometimes referred to in Hebrew) in the local clinical setting. Families were 
seen as problematic in two senses: My interlocutors saw many issues and disorders as 
directly rooted in faulty family configurations and relationships, and also assigned blame 
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to parents in particular for failing to comply with and facilitate the treatment of their 
children. 
I often heard complaints about parents – and especially fathers – who refused to 
understand that several intake meetings were necessary before any treatment could start, 
failed to bring children to their appointments, or behaved as if just showing up at the 
clinic is doing the therapist a favor.  They routinely “misunderstood” the root of the 
problem, the clinicians implied. For example, several of my interlocutors complained 
about patients’ parents’ excessively conservative attitudes about dating and romance. 
They described how frustrated they got when parents brought in a teenage son or 
daughter and asked to “do something” about them having a romantic relationship, when, 
in the clinicians’ view, the “real” problem lied in the lack of honest communication in the 
family.  
When it came to tracing the etiology of mental disorders themselves, family 
issues also occupied the center stage. As Amina, a Muslim social worker and one of the 
few Muslim employees always wearing a hijab and a long-sleeved dress, put it bluntly in 
response to my question about the most common causes of the mental disorders 
presenting at the clinic:  
The majority of cases, there is a problem between father and mother. And that is 
what is causing what is influencing the upbringing of children. If there is 
something in the relationship that is, like, not right [mush mazbuta], the mother is 
irritable [‘asabiyyeh], or the same thing the father. 
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In a similarly unequivocal fashion, Halim, a clinical psychologist very 
enthusiastic about the psychodynamic approach, provided the following example of how 
the family environment creates psychological difficulties88:  
It starts from the house, the way he grows up in the house, how the parents treat 
him. All the, all the important feelings, learning to speak about feelings starts at 
home. Like, for instance, if a boy grows in the house where his father say every 
time: ‘You don’t cry, you don’t cry! Men don’t cry! You don’t cry, you don’t 
cry!’ He’ll grow up and he’s a macho, he’ll not learn to express his feelings, and 
ehh maybe even won’t understand other people’s feelings and he’ll be just 
focused on how to be a man, because, because that’s his ehh ehh that would be his 
conflict from his childhood. 
 
Nadia, both demonstrating, once again, her interest in gender and displaying her 
psychodynamic orientation, honed in on the patriarchal relationship dynamic in Arab 
families, opining that this dynamic is often at the root of the child’s issues and sometimes 
actually turns the father in particular into an impediment to the therapeutic progress: 
Often children come to the therapy, and you sit down with the child and you sit 
down with the parents, and you see that it’s the parents that need to work on 
themselves, basically. And that the problem is basically in the parents, not in the 
child. And many difficulties between the parents are the result of values of our 
society, the patriarchal values [al-qiyam al-abawiyyeh], that is. That the father is 
the one in control, he is making decisions, if the father doesn’t agree on the 
therapy, the child doesn’t come to the therapy. Usually the mother wants therapy, 
like, usually the children basically come with the mother. The father doesn’t 
come, doesn’t take responsibility.  
 
My analysis so far has attempted to convey that both the structural and the 
familial-psychologizing perspectives are powerful, internally coherent explanatory 
models. However, I would argue that only the latter is truly actionable in the clinic. 
Structural explanations place the blame within the faulty political-economic structure of 
                                                      
88 This excerpt is from an interview I conducted in English, rather than Arabic or Hebrew, upon Halim’s 
insistence. 
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the Israeli state that systematically discriminates against its Arab citizens (as well as other 
minority communities), and the sort of interventions they prescribe – be it a radical 
overhaul of the regime or modest improvements of the local infrastructure – are located 
outside of the therapeutic sphere. By contrast, the familial-psychologizing framework 
situates the problem in faulty family relationships and dysfunctional inner life of 
individuals, both of which are seen as amenable to therapeutic intervention. It also 
supplies a set of guidelines for action that mental health professionals, at least in theory, 
can address with their skills and authority. 
 
“They Are Very Backward”: Blaming Arab Culture 
 Upon a closer look, then, the structural and the familial-psychologizing 
frameworks are not necessarily opposed to each other, but rather they operate at different 
levels of analysis, with different implications for what can and should be done by trained 
clinicians. However, even this “concentric” model is incomplete, because it does not 
account for a powerful explanatory tool that clinicians employed to understand 
dysfunctional family patterns: Although they used the models of familial pathology that 
are grounded in psychoanalytic and psychodynamic theories developed in Europe and the 
US, they also drew on a set of powerful, albeit often unarticulated, assumptions about 
Arab society at large.  
Even before I started encountering these assumptions in the clinical discourses, I 
was exposed to them early on my fieldwork in the form of self-deprecatory humor. 
Perhaps the first example that I remember was when Fakhriyyeh told me a joke: “When a 
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Frenchman dies, elegance is left. When a Russian dies, intelligence is left. When an Arab 
dies, a stomach is left.” While on some level this joke may offer a commentary on the 
tough circumstances of the Arab community, it also echoes an assumption, that I often 
heard stated in much more overt terms, that Arabs are too selfish, obsessed with material 
things, and unable to put these superficial concerns aside in pursuit of higher goals (such 
as obtaining an education or bettering their community). These self-critical comments 
kept coming, both in an everyday context and in the clinic, where they ranged from bitter 
criticism to seemingly light-hearted quips, such as: “Put the child in a room with a 
computer. That’s Arab occupational therapy!” From the earliest stages of my fieldwork, I 
was struck by the frequency and poignancy of these self-deprecatory comments, so much 
so that I often joked that my first publication would be a paper entitled “Hek ihna il-
‘arab!” (“that’s the way we Arabs are!”), in which I would analyze all the instances when 
I heard my (Arab) interlocutors refer to Arabs, Arab culture, etc. in a negative key.  
Over time, I learned to identify specific subthemes within this larger discourse. 
For one, clinicians did not treat “Arabs” as a unified category, and instead assumed a 
certain hierarchy of psychological sophistication among their patients, with the Bedouin 
on the very bottom and the more urbane – and urban – Arab Christians in the northern 
part of the country on top. The “backwardness” was not evenly distributed in the entire 
Arab society, in other words, but was rather clustered in certain communities. The 
Bedouin in Israel primarily live in the Negev desert in the south and the Galilee in the 
north. Because I was primarily based in the main branch of the clinic in central Israel, I 
did not come into contact with Bedouin patients a lot, except when I occasionally 
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traveled to the branch in Hilweh, a religious mixed Arab city in northern Israel with a 
sizable population of Christians and Druze. However, because most of the clinical staff at 
the time of my fieldwork held their primary appointment in Hilweh, they encountered 
Bedouin patients regularly, and often talked about them as exemplars of “backwardness.” 
Some of them also had rich stories from their previous employment. When I asked about 
“cultural” aspects of working with Arab patients, clinicians often brought up the Bedouin 
first, emphasizing how difficult it was to work with Bedouin patients due to their 
astonishing lack of psychological insight. In a particularly evocative monologue, Kamilla 
told me about a Bedouin village she worked in:  
…they are very backward [mutakhallifin] people. You understand? Very 
backward!  Like, even if they try to become, like, modern [‘asriyin] in things, to 
become modern [khadshaniyin], then it is just in the clothes… Just! In the shell, in 
the external things. Like, inside they don’t have any understanding regarding what 
happens inside the heart of a human being… This is all external, in the shell, on 
the inside they have no idea what happens in the human heart. 
 
It was not only Bedouin who were seen as problematic patients, but also the 
conservative Muslims with a relatively low socioeconomic status who constituted a large 
part of the population of Balad il-Ghabar and nearby towns and villages. One large local 
family was notorious for their poverty, low or non-existent education levels, and 
pervasive intermarriage within the family, they were seen as a breeding ground for 
dysfunctional behaviors and psychological disorders.  
An even more pronounced example – perhaps the epitome of this category of 
problematic family settings – is the town of Jisr az-Zarqa, located on the coastal plain to 
the northwest of Balad il-Ghabar. It has a dubious distinction of having some of the 
lowest indicators of the quality of life in Israel in terms of average salaries, education 
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levels, and infrastructure. I often heard Jisr mentioned as a place of ignorance and 
squalor, and it sometimes elicited an almost visceral reaction from my interlocutors. On 
one occasion, for instance, a family from Jisr – a mother in her late forties and her three 
children – visited “Karim” for the first time, on a referral from a school for one of her 
boys. The appointment lasted for more than an hour, and there was lots of discussion in 
the kitchen and reception area among clinicians, who mostly expressed in exasperated 
whispers that the mother had no understanding of what her child needed, that she could 
not grasp that it was not proper to have all her children in the room when only one needed 
an evaluation, and that it was unlikely that they would come back, anyway. After the 
family finally left, Fakhriyyeh, my host mother and secretary at “Karim,” scrunched up 
her nose and said to me, “Thank God they left… But I can still smell it! That is Jisr for 
you.” 
When I asked my interlocutors to compare Balad il-Ghabar and Hilweh in terms 
of their clinical experience, they without an exception said that cases in Balad il-Ghabar 
were more severe. The explanations were vaguer, but several hypothesized that the 
severity of pathology in Balad il-Ghabar had something to do with its “closed” society, 
rooted in conservative religion. Wasim once told me that the symptoms of mental 
disorders are “sharper” in Balad il-Ghabar, a strict, religious place. If Hilweh, “like all 
mixed places,” is more tolerant [mutasamih], Balad il-Ghabar is all “borders, borders, 
borders [huduud, huduud, huduud]”, he said, cutting through the air with his hand for 
emphasis with each word.  Aref, who was listening to our conversation, agreed that in 
Hilweh “people can breathe.”  
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 Some cultural features of the conservative Muslim society in Balad il-Ghabar 
were seen as especially intractable and pernicious in the clinical context. In particular, 
two practices were mentioned again and again, often in conjunction: levirate marriage (a 
widow marrying her deceased husband’s brother) and intrafamily adoption (a childless 
couple adopting a child or children of their close relatives, often of their siblings).  
In one staff meeting, the entire discussion was devoted to these issues, and it is 
illustrative of the local mode of clinical reasoning, especially how therapists think about 
culture and its “problematic” aspects. Echoing the existing research on the pathological 
effects of polygamous marriage on women and children (Al-Krenawi 2001; Al-Krenawi 
and Lightman 2000; Elbedour et al. 2002; Hamdan et al. 2009), clinicians expressed their 
concern about children in such arrangements. Aref, who started the discussion, said that 
in his experience it is children from the second marriage (between the woman and her 
former brother-in-law) who suffer most, because they have trouble understanding the 
situation in the family or relating to their siblings from their parents’ previous marriages. 
In one of his cases, a man, already married and with two daughters, married his deceased 
brother’s wife, with the hope of having sons with her. However, after this second wife 
gave birth to two daughters, he became conflicted about simultaneously raising his new 
children and taking care of the old ones, and eventually divorced his second wife.  
An exchange regarding similar cases ensued, but Gloria stopped the discussion 
and addressed Aref, asking him point blank what his question was. Aref said89: “We 
                                                      
89 Here and below in the description of this staff discussion I am using very close paraphrases, but not 
direct quotations. 
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always talk about this as a dilemma [sugiya], but this is very common in our society. 
How exactly are we supposed to deal with this?” He added that, from his standpoint, the 
majority of work must be done with the parents, who must be helped to understand the 
complexity of their new family arrangement, to appreciate that children are bothered by 
the changes – for example, when an uncle suddenly asks to be called “father.”  
Gloria, steering the discussion toward generalizable, practical knowledge, 
concurred and summarized her position as follows:  
The first thing is to clarify everyone’s function. Every child must know what the 
role of each adult is. Who plays whom in this telenovella. {smiles} This really is a 
telenovella! The problem is that everybody is related and everybody knew one 
another from before. When there is a new marriage and people didn’t know one 
another previously, it is easier. Here the person used to be uncle – what, he is 
going to be dad [aba] now? In many such cases uncles do force children to call 
them father, mother and father, but they are not mother and father. This kind of 
confusion is difficult, because they already knew each other in a different 
capacity. 
 
The discussion then shifted to how this lack of clear boundaries in the family 
contributes to issues seen in children, once again locating psychological issues not in the 
individual brought in for treatment, but in his or her familial and social environment. 
Several participants gave examples of their own cases – ADHD, behavioral problems, 
language difficulties – and explicitly framed them as stemming from the child’s 
“confusion” [bilbul].  
They concluded that it is not only the children who are affected by the confusion, 
but everyone else in the family. As Amina noted, “children are not the only ones who pay 
for this, everybody does.” The discussion turned to the staggering emotional burden on 
other family members. The woman who has to marry her deceased husband’s brother 
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must learn, in a very short time frame, to look at her brother-in-law differently. Amina 
observed that such women enter a very difficult psychological state, because they are 
supposed to accept someone who until a few days before was completely forbidden to 
them. Agreeing with her, Gloria said: “This is something emotional, something cultural. 
This is compulsion [kfiyah]. She has to make a big switch [“big switch” said in English]. 
She doesn’t think of him as a man even, and now she has to receive him in her bed!”  
Although this was followed by some joking about the lack of comparable 
difficulty on the part of the man – Wajib quipped, “For the man it’s just another 
woman… He has already thought about her in sexual terms at some point” – the 
conversation then turned to the emotional conflicts created in men. Aref noted, “There is 
something moral here. In our culture, brother-in-law is supposed to protect the woman 
and treat her like a sister, what is this?” Gloria, concurring, brought up a case from her 
practice, of a man who had to marry his sister-in-law, twenty years older than him, after 
his brother died. The new couple had a child together, but there were many issues in the 
relationship. Gloria concluded, “How can you receive a woman who could be your 
mother, who maybe even actually took care of you when you were younger? There is 
something incestuous here. There is a ton [hamon] of very difficult problems.” 
One of the most striking things about this staff discussion was how it ended. 
Although Gloria persistently steered it toward concrete suggestions, the conversation 
raised more questions than it answered, and solutions were few and far in between. Gloria 
immediately dismissed Wajib’s idea of creating a support group for families with the 
issues that were being discussed: “This is the opposite of what we want! We want to 
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separate90 [lehavkhin], not to give the impression that ‘we are all alike, we are all in this 
together.’ We must make a very clear separation.”  
In the end, Aref, who started the discussion, offered this summary that elicited 
several smiles among other clinicians: “Sometimes in therapy you have to look for a 
central theme. But here it’s the opposite situation. You know immediately what the theme 
is, and it’s almost too much!” Nodding, Gloria finished the meeting with a foreboding 
rhetorical question: “How do you even open it up? It is a very, very sensitive issue, 
culturally. You are a therapist sitting in front of this woman. Where do you even begin to 
enter this? Maybe they say, don’t touch it, it would result in an explosion [pitzutz].” 
This discussion, presented at length, illustrates some of the key assumptions that 
clinicians at “Karim” held about working with Arab families. Although it is never 
explicitly spelled out, the labeling of some of the local types of family structures and 
relationships as problematic is rooted in specific ideas about what a normal family is 
supposed to look like. Clinicians prefer a clear functional separation of roles, while 
viewing double roles – uncle and father in levirate marriages, or aunt and mother in the 
case of intrafamily adoption – as fraught with ambiguity and confusion. Such as issues, 
labeled as “cultural”, are singled out for a special discussion and seen as particularly 
intractable and bound up in emotion and irrationality – hence the discussion repeatedly 
returning to the idea that such topics should not be broached with patients or family 
members carelessly or excessively. 
                                                      
90 Alternatively, this could be translated as “diagnose” or “discern”. 
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Over time, I came to see these discourses not as isolated snippets, but rather as 
part of the implicit, but powerful system of assumptions that many clinicians at “Karim” 
tapped into. This system assumed the existence of various strata in Israeli Arab society, 
arranged from the most traditional to the most modern communities. The traditional 
communities, including the lower-class, less educated, and more religious inhabitants of 
Balad il-Ghabar, were seen as less open to psychological intervention, more prone to 
ignorant ideas about mental illness and mental health care, and more likely to engage in 
problematic practices, such as levirate marriage or intrafamily adoption.  
Now that I have presented both the structural and the familial-psychologizing 
frameworks used in the clinic, we are left with a paradox: Why do the clinicians who 
themselves come from an Israeli Arab background and often take an explicitly political 
stance that implicates the structures of power in the predicaments of their patients, also 
negatively portray Arab culture and Arab family? I tackle this seeming paradox in the 
following section. 
 
Making Sense of “Culture Talk” at “Karim” 
 It is a well-known fact that negative stereotypes about and prejudice against Arabs 
are pervasive in Israeli Jewish society. Stigmatizing and even dehumanizing images of 
Arabs have been documented by a cross-disciplinary body of scholarship and in such 
diverse domains as the media, public discourse, cultural production, as well as among 
children and youth (Bar-Tal and Teichman 2005; First 1998; Hammack 2011; Patai 1973; 
Ramraz-Ra’ukh 1989). An extensive and long-standing tradition, in social psychology 
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and sociology in particular, has traced the impact of negative outgroup stereotypes on 
individuals’ self-esteem and group identification (Allport 1954; Sherif 1956; Tajfel and 
Turner 1986), with a special attention paid to the effects of such stereotypes on ethnic and 
racial minorities (David 2014; Osajima 1993; Phinney 1991; Pyke and Dang 2003; 
Speight 2007). It would not be too much of a leap to hypothesize, therefore, that Israeli 
Arabs themselves, including Israeli Arab clinicians, are influenced by the negative 
stereotypes that they are constantly exposed to.91  
However, this is not the direction that I want to take here. Indeed, I would argue 
that to posit “internalization” of inferiority as the explanation would mean to miss the 
complexity of the situation entirely. Moreover, such an interpretation is not compatible 
with the more sophisticated and less deterministic approaches to subjectivity that have 
emerged in anthropology, including psychological anthropology, in the last four decades 
(Biehl, Good, and Kleinman 2007; Ewing 1990; Hefner 1985; Hollan 2000; Ortner 2005; 
Kleinman 1997; Laidlaw 2013; Lindholm 2001; Schielke 2009; Shore 1998; Sperber 
1975; Throop 2003; Zigon and Throop 2014). The picture that emerges from these 
engagements and debates is that of individuals who are irreducibly complex, ambivalent, 
                                                      
91 Some of these stereotypes can be traced to the European Jews’ prolonged and painful encounter with 
Orientalism, and the effects of this encounter on the subsequent national project of creating a fully 
westernized nation in Eretz-Israel (Khazzoom 2003). In the Arab Middle East, this genealogy could also be 
extended to the impact of Turkish government schools and Christian missionary schools in the Greater 
Syria region, some of which discouraged the use of Arabic by the students and promoted negative ideas 
about Islam and Arab culture (Mar’i 1978; Ryad 2009). The critical stance toward Islam and “traditional” 
Arab culture was also present from the beginning in some of the strands Arab nationalism in the region that 
was inspired by Western nationalist ideas and in many cases developed by Christian thinkers who could not 
identify with the aspiration of a Muslim Ummah (Haiduc-Dale 2013). Moreover, during the period of Arab 
cultural and literary revival in the 19th century, the so-called nahda, intellectuals widely debated what 
civilization and civility meant, often criticizing traditional Arab culture for its emotionality and discussing 
how Arab society can be reformed and civilized (Bashkin 2015). 
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creative, and constantly construct and negotiate – rather than simply internalize – cultural 
meanings. Therefore, I regard my interlocutors as multidimensional actors who are 
constantly engaged in negotiating their personal, professional, and civic identities while 
embedded in larger systems of meaning and power.  
These individual meaning-making projects unfold against the backdrop of 
momentous social changes within the Palestinian community in Israel. Although 
Palestinians in Israel suffer from systematic discrimination and lag behind the Jewish 
majority in wages, employment rates and security, health status, level of education, and 
other areas (Baron-Epel and Kaplan 2009; Haberfeld and Cohen 2007; Okun and 
Friedlander 2005), their socioeconomic situation is unquestionably a lot better than that 
of Palestinians in the occupied territories. These improvements over the years have been 
associated with smaller families, growing autonomy of nuclear families from the 
patrilineal clans, later age at marriage, and greater female participation in the workforce 
(Azaiza 1996; Veronese, Castiglioni, and Said 2011; Winckler 2002). As Kanaaneh 
(2002) has documented in her Galilee-based study, middle-class Palestinians in Israel 
tend to value education, aspire to elevated levels of consumption, and embrace more 
flexible and less authoritarian models of courtship, marriage, and childrearing, all the 
while using the modern/traditional (or even modern/primitive) binary to justify these 
aspirations.  
These commitments are deeply ambivalent: As scholars have extensively 
documented, Palestinians in Israel often feel caught between a Palestinian/national and 
Israeli/civic identities (Amara and Schnell 2004; Ghanem 2001; Louer 2007; Rabinowitz 
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2001; Rouhana 1997; Smooha 1990; Yiftachel 1999a). While many Palestinians are 
drawn to the promises of “modernity” (however defined), this rhetoric has been used in 
uncritical, essentializing ways to juxtapose the allegedly more “advanced” and 
Westernized Israeli-Jewish society to the more “traditional”/patriarchal “Arab sector”, 
thus implicitly justifying the history of inequality between Israel’s Jewish and Arab 
citizens. To complicate things even further, these identity struggles are also profoundly 
and inescapably gendered: Palestinian women in Israel have to creatively navigate the 
multiple and interlocking systems of family, national identification, and citizenship that 
both oppress them and create opportunities for empowerment, often at the same time 
(Abu Baker 2002; Herzog 2004; Sa’ar 2005; Sa’ar 2006; Sa’ar 2007; Shalhoub-
Kevorkian 1999), whereas Palestinian men are dealing with competing narratives of their 
own amidst what some have called a crisis of masculinity (Birenbaum-Carmeli and 
Inhorn 2009; Herzog and Yahia-Younis 2007; Kanaaneh 2005; Monterescu 2006; Sa’ar 
and Yahia-Younis 2008).  
In this context, we can view the culture talk as a manifestation of the more general 
discourses of – and struggles over – modernity that have been circulating and unfolding 
among middle-class Palestinians in Israel. The lengthy clinical discussion I presented and 
analyzed in the preceding section is particularly illuminating in this respect. In that 
exchange, both Arab and Jewish clinicians expressed discomfort with such practices as 
levirate marriages or intrafamily adoption. Family relationships and structures that do not 
fit into the modern, Westernized mold of a nuclear family unit with a clear separation of 
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roles were seen as not only problematic (“melodrama”), but also perverse and potentially 
pathological92.  
The explanatory approach I have presented so far also appears convincing to me 
because it helps account not only for the pejorative comments, but also for the more 
ambivalent and wistful sentiments that my interlocutors expressed about Arab society in 
Israel. Although “Karim” clinicians commonly construed “tradition” as an obstacle to the 
development of more psychologically sound family relationships and configurations, they 
also occasionally expressed concern about the breakdown of “traditional” social 
relationships and values and their effects on individuals and families. For example, when 
I asked Aref about changes in Arab society in Israel over the last several decades, he told 
me, “All the social unity that was in these villages crumbled. Like, today you can’t call 
an eighteen-year-old a kid anymore. Like, you don’t dare to talk to him, because maybe 
he has weapons, maybe he uses violence… Before, it wasn’t like this.” He added that 
parents in Israeli Arab families can no longer set boundaries for their children, like their 
parents’ generation could, speculating that this has something to do with the children’s 
access to electronics and media.  
Furthermore, some of my interlocutors conveyed a sense of their own distance 
from their community. Some narrated this distance as stemming from their early 
inclination to pursue a career in psychology or social work, which was not always 
understood or appreciated by their families. While not all of my interlocutors had this sort 
                                                      
92 This type of “joint” family dynamic in some non-Western societies has been described in the literature 
(see Kurtz 1992; Obeysekere 1981; Rolland 1987). 
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of story to share, almost everyone talked about the distancing effects that training at a 
Hebrew-speaking university created in them. Zeinab, an occupational therapist, shared 
with me how awed she was by meeting a colleague trained in Jordan, who was able to 
effortlessly maintain a conversation about psychotherapy in Arabic, while Zeinab 
constantly caught herself slipping back into Hebrew. These concerns were also echoed by 
Nadia, who told me during an interview: 
 In the Arabic language, it’s as if there is a lack of therapeutic words. Or maybe it 
is a lack, or maybe we don’t know them. Because the Arabic language, it has 
many words that are perhaps difficult or perhaps we don’t know because we don’t 
work with them, because we have a substitute, we studied in, in, in, in a Hebrew-
speaking university and come to work and speak Hebrew with one another. 
 
In other words, Israeli Arab clinicians at “Karim” are highly educated, middle-
class professionals who are deeply ambivalent about their community. Their remarks 
convey a strongly critical attitude, but also a sense of nostalgia, loss, and alienation – the 
loss and alienation felt not only by Palestinians in Israel in general, but also by my 
interlocutors about their own personal situations. While this backdrop provides an 
essential piece of the puzzle, it is nowhere near sufficient. My interlocutors are not 
simply middle-class Palestinian citizens of Israel, but middle-class Palestinian citizens of 
Israel who have been trained in psy disciplines and work side by side with Jewish 
colleagues. Seen from this angle, the negative culture talk is both a side-effect (of sorts) 
of professional socialization and a means of negotiating difference and belonging in a 
Jewish-Arab team. Let me tackle each of these considerations in turn. 
All clinicians at “Karim”, Jewish and Arab, have been socialized through their 
training in psychiatry, psychology or social work into particular communities of 
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knowledge and practice. I do not want to discount the undisputable – and often 
significant – differences between and within psy disciplines, but I believe it is still valid 
to talk about assumptions and ways of thinking that are shared by many, if not most, 
professionals who work in the mental health care field. As described in the previous 
chapter, the staff at “Karim” espoused a combination of cognitive-behavioral and 
psychodynamic approaches with a heavy emphasis on the object-relations perspective. 
From personal experience, I know that a psychodynamic lens can be very powerful: In 
fact, at a certain point I found it difficult to see things in any way but through this lens. In 
conversations with my clinician interlocutors I increasingly had to remind myself to 
problematize what they were saying, because I constantly had a strong sense that all I was 
learning was “common-sense” truths about the human condition. The supreme irony here 
is that, despite being a psychological anthropologist, presumably conscious of the cultural 
and historical nature of the discourses employed by mental health professionals, I had 
trouble taking a critical stance when so much of what was told to me simply “made 
sense”: Of course, it is a pity that patients can’t talk about their feelings, of course more 
open and egalitarian relationships in a family are desirable! 
But what is it about psy discourses that negatively implicates Arab families? I 
believe that these discourses both presuppose and promote a particular normative model 
of private life and intersubjectivity that encompasses specific ways of understanding and 
acting upon the self and the family. To generalize, the ideal model of the self that is 
presupposed by psy discourses is that of a reflexive, self-actualizing, and self-managing 
agent – which partially resonates with, but is not reducible or equivalent to – what has 
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been described as the neoliberal subject (Ganti 2014; Gershon 2011; Gill 2008; Rose 
1996). Psy discourses also promote specific forms of family intimacy and sociality by 
valorizing verbal emotional expressivity, care, and mutuality (Duncan 2017; Illouz 2007; 
Pritzker 2016; Wilce and Fenigsen 2016). The features of Israeli Arab family dynamic, 
child-rearing, and emotional expressivity that clinicians at “Karim” find most 
problematic are the ones that run counter to some of the core assumptions shared across 
psy disciplines. To put it differently, negative culture-talk among Israeli Arab clinicians 
is, to an extent, a product of their professional socialization into a discursive community 
of psy disciplines. 
Even this is not a complete explanation, however. I posit that one more factor 
needs to be considered – namely, that Israeli Arab clinicians at “Karim” are engaged in a 
complex and often fraught negotiation of their status as professionals in a team made up 
of both Jews and Arabs. To remind the reader, at the time of my fieldwork the director of 
the clinic was Jewish, as were the two senior supervisors and a few junior staff members. 
Seen from this standpoint, Israeli Arab clinicians employ culture-talk as a way to 
simultaneously negotiate the contradictory imperatives of detachment and belonging. As 
part of this boundary work (Lamont and Molnar 2002), they claim privileged access to 
knowledge about Arab patients by virtue of both language proficiency and insider 
familiarity with the culture. At the same time, however, they assert their detachment from 
the “Arab sector” and claim solidarity with their Jewish colleagues. To use Herzfeld’s 
(2005) term, Israeli Arab clinicians aspire to “cultural intimacy” with their Jewish 
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colleagues by bonding over what they perceive as embarrassing and frustrating features 
of Arab family life.  
I do not mean to imply that this boundary work is entirely conscious, strategic, or 
always successful. It is also not one-sided, as Jewish clinicians also negotiate – and 
struggle with – this same dynamic of difference and belonging. In fact, my point is 
precisely that it is a constantly fraught and mutually co-constructed endeavor, and below 
I present a detailed analysis of an illustrative staff seminar. The seminar, devoted to the 
theory and practice of group therapy, was run by Yoram, a Jewish Israeli psychotherapist 
and supervisor. Sitting in a circle in the staff meetings room were Yoram himself, 
psychologists Wasim and Halim, social workers Mu’min, Aref, Kamilla, and Nadia, and 
art therapist Bella. As previously mentioned, Yoram is a Jewish Israeli, whereas everyone 
else, except for me and Bella93, come from an Arab background.  
Setting the agenda for the day, Yoram said that he was eager to talk about how 
group therapy works in an Arab context. For example, he offered, he observed that the 
most common complaint that Arabs come with to therapy is atzbanut (the cognate of 
Arabic asabiyyeh, referring to the state of nervousness, jumpiness, irritability). He had a 
patient come in with this very complaint after her mother and both of her cats had died 
within a very short period of time, and she also broke her arm. “It may be something 
cultural,” Yoram offered, adding that asabiyyeh is similar to the affect of anger, but it is 
                                                      
93 Bella was born in Europe, grew up in Latin America, and came to Israel after marrying an Israeli Arab 
man. She possessed a strong mastery of colloquial Arabic and freely communicated with Arabic-speaking 
colleagues and patients. 
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anger articulated in culturally specific terms. Wasim commented that, according to what 
he read, Arabs sometimes use the label of atzbanut to refer to depression. 
Lina, a social worker from the North, then made a comment that shook up the 
entire group. In our interview earlier that week, she told me that her training (at the 
University of Haifa, which was a very common background among clinicians at 
“Karim”) never included any materials about the specific challenges of providing mental 
health care to Arab patients: 
“Until now, all the psychology that we learned is psychology… I told you, that is, 
Freud, maybe Erikson, they are all Jews. All scientists who are Arabs, who 
propose other methods of treatment, who propose a way of treatment appropriate 
for Arabs specifically, from the standpoint of language, even diagnoses 
[ivchunim] that are seen by psychologists, all of it is not… <studied>.” 
 
Addressing Yoram and other seminar participants, Lina observed, in a seeming 
non-sequitur that was echoing the comments she had made earlier in the interview: “I 
noticed how all famous psychologists are Jewish. It is very interesting!” Yoram 
immediately asked: “Who?” Lina mentioned Freud’s name right away, and then, after a 
pause and with less conviction, Erikson94. “So, what does this mean? That psychology is 
Jewish?” inquired Yoram with dry irony. Lina, looking embarrassed, immediately 
responded that she, of course, did not mean to say that – however, it might be that 
psychology is more appropriate for the Jewish population and needs to be adapted for 
                                                      
94 Erik Erikson, a psychologist and psychoanalyst famous for his theory of psychosocial development and 
coining the term “identity crisis,” was indeed born to a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father, although he 
was later adopted by his Jewish stepfather who also gave Erik his original last name, Homburger. Due to 
his Scandinavian features, he did not fit with his Jewish peers, and he was teased at school for being 
Jewish. After arriving to the US, he converted to Christianity and changed his last name to Erikson. 
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therapeutic work with Arab patients. To rephrase things crudely, Lina here had pivoted 
from “psychology is wrong for Arabs” to “Arabs are wrong for psychology.” 
Continuing her conciliatory gesture, Lina pointed out that, when it comes to 
emotions and expression of emotions, Arab patients are different: “When you ask an 
Arab how he is doing, all he says is, ‘Barukh ha-shem, barukh ha-shem’ [Heb. thank God 
or literally “blessed be God”] all the time. They don’t describe the feelings of anxiety or 
frustration that we learned about in our training.” Yoram objected, saying that Arabs are 
precisely [davka] emotional and Lina agreed, but pointed out that Arabs simply “don’t 
speak the language of emotions.” Wasim remarked that, unlike Hebrew that distinguishes 
between anxiety [kharada] and fear [pakhad], Arabic only has one word, khouf, that 
denotes both of these meanings. Halim added there is another term, qalaq, but it means 
“worry” rather than anxiety. 
 After a lull in the conversation, Yoram observed that there are, in fact, many 
things shared among people in the Middle East, psychologically. Several people inquired, 
“Like what?” He explained that both Jews and Arabs are very family-oriented 
[mishpachtiim] and tend toward informality in their interactions, unlike Europeans who 
are more formal. As an example, he recounted that he was once invited for an afternoon 
meal in Europe, and all he was served was a cup of coffee and cookies. “This is not 
because these people are rude,” he explained, “it’s just culture.” Also, Yoram proceeded, 
both Arab and Jewish women are under a great pressure to marry, but in Europe and 
America it is not considered as important, because work and travel are higher on the list 
  
253 
of priorities. Finally, he observed, just like for the Japanese, Arabs find it hard to say no. 
Wasim responded, “This is a really a big problem.” 
 The conversation then shifted to the official topic of the seminar, group therapy. 
Yoram started his mini-lecture in which he discussed various ways in which the group 
moderator can encourage consolidation [gibush] of the group. Ideally, participants in 
group therapy should feel like they all have something in common rather than 
preoccupied with their idiosyncratic issues. To achieve this goal, the moderator needs to 
subtly guide the group, mediating interactions between the participants. Yoram 
explained, 
A simple and effective technique is to ask the participants about what they think is 
going on between them. <Ask:> ‘What is this doing to us?’ For example, Wasim 
and Halim are fighting over a toy. <Ask:> ‘What do you think about it? How do 
you feel?’ You should show interest [hitanyenut], but don’t offer interpretations 
like: ‘You feel like you are entitled to everything here because that is the way you 
are treated at home.’ In order to relate and show interest [lehityaches 
ve’lehitanyen], you can refer to shared anxieties, shared expectations, and shared 
anger.  
 
Kamilla interjected, “Like our shared anger at Gloria [director of “Karim”]!”, and 
Yoram and others broke out in laughter.  
 What do we make of this seminar? I contend that it provides a superb, internally 
rich example of Arab and Jewish therapists negotiating their differences and their shared 
identity as colleagues. Yoram initiates a conversation about group therapy in the Arab 
context and immediately frames this context as problematic (although he does so 
humorously and hardly with any intent to offend) by referring to the limited capacity of 
many Arab patients to verbalize their concerns beyond the catch-all asabiyyeh. When 
Lina then brings up, in a seeming non-sequitur, the allegedly “Jewish” character of 
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psychology, this precipitates a moral breakdown that shakes everyone “out of the 
everydayness of being moral” (Zigon 2007, 133). The rupture emerges because Lina’s 
comments implicitly raise a possibility that psychology and allied disciplines are not 
universal – that they are a Western implant or, worse, a “Jewish science” (the implication 
hinted at by Yoram) that, perhaps, does not quite work in the Arab society.  
Lina’s subsequent reframing of the issue is a conciliatory gesture of sorts that 
shifts blame and responsibility: It is not that psychology has failed to be relevant to Arab 
patients (among other things, by not heeding the voices of Arab psychologists); it is just 
Arab patients are different and not well-suited for psychotherapy. Other participants then 
chime in with their examples, effectively asserting their “cultural intimacy” with Yoram: 
Despite themselves being Israeli Arabs, these clinicians are puzzled by the 
incommensurability of colloquial and imprecise Arabic words for emotions with the more 
psychologically salient terminology of Hebrew and frustrated by their patients’ 
unwillingness to discuss feelings. (Interestingly, when I asked Lina after the seminar 
what she thought about the exchange with Yoram, she repeated her original contention: 
Psychology in Israel ignores Arab voices and experiences.)  
 Reacting to these reparative attempts, Yoram also offers a conciliatory gesture by 
shifting the conversation away from Jewish-Arab differences to their similarities. 
Specifically, he invokes a rather clichéd, but comforting image of Middle Eastern 
warmth, hospitality, and family-centeredness that is humorously contrasted to European 
and American ways. The entire deliberation about group therapy that follows can be read 
at a meta-level, as an attempt to further work through and repair the ruptured group 
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dynamic of the staff, asserting their solidarity as a team. This interpretation may seem 
far-fetched at first glance, but, in fact, the seminar with Yoram was deliberately designed 
to provide experiential learning of group therapy. What I mean by this is that Yoram and 
other participants routinely invoked the interpersonal and group-level dynamics of the 
seminar itself when discussing the theory of group therapy. In the specific meeting I 
presented above, Yoram chooses to discuss group “consolidation” and proposes focusing 
on shared grievances as a strategy to unify the group. When Kamilla brings up the shared 
anger that many staff members, Jewish and Arab, felt at the clinic director (known for her 
authoritarian style), she puts this already rather obvious connection out in the open. 
 To summarize my analytical reading of this seminar, I contend that it shows that 
culture talk is one of the several rhetorical means by which clinicians at “Karim”, both 
Arab and Jewish, negotiate the meanings of their collective identity as members of a 
professional team. It also illustrates that culture talk is not a uniformly accepted 
discourse, but a contested one that takes up different forms and plays different roles 
depending on the situation. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the beginning of this chapter, I introduced a distinction between two clinical 
frameworks that Israeli Arab clinicians at “Karim” oscillate between: the structural 
approach that traces the “political etiologies” (Hamdy 2008) of mental health issues and 
the familial-psychologizing approach that operates on the individual and familial level, 
while also implicating the problematic features of Arab culture at large as sources of 
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psychological distress. I then argued that this negative culture-talk should not be 
understood as a simple “internalization” of stereotypes circulating in Israeli society. In 
fact, there is no single explanation for this phenomenon, because it is related to such 
diverse factors as the discursive struggles over modernity among Arabs in Israel, my 
interlocutors’ professional socialization into psy discourses, and their constant efforts to 
negotiate a professional identity as part of the Jewish-Arab team. Rather than asking 
where culture-talk comes from, we could reframe the question altogether and consider 
what it does at “Karim”. Seen from this angle, not all instances of culture-talk are created 
equal: In some cases, “Arab culture” may very well be used as an explanatory factor 
during clinical deliberation over a patient, but in others it is invoked in a more 
performative and strategic way, as part of the Arab clinicians’ ongoing efforts to assert 
their professional identity as marginal insiders, familiar enough with the “culture” to be 
knowledgeable about it, but removed enough from it to claim solidarity with their Jewish 
colleagues. 
One implication to draw from all this is that the dynamics at “Karim” illustrate the 
limits of patient-clinician “ethnic matching” – a practice that has been critiqued and 
deconstructed by anthropologists (Santiago-Irizarry 1996; Santiago-Irizarry 2001; Shaw 
2010; Shaw 2012; Willen 2011a). Although patients and most clinicians at “Karim” 
nominally come from the “same” ethnic background (Israeli Arabs, which is itself a 
constructed and politicized category in the Israeli context), the differences of class, 
regional background, and – less so – religion create powerful divisions. An Israeli Arab, 
secular or nominally Christian/Muslim middle-class professional living in a mixed or 
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predominantly Jewish city in the north may have more in common with his Jewish 
neighbor in terms of worldview than with a poor, intensely religious fellow Arab in Balad 
il-Ghabar. Clinicians are hardly immune to making disparaging or contemptuous class-
based remarks about patients from the “same” group. 
But this is, perhaps, already obvious. On a deeper and more pessimistic level, 
however, both the negative culture talk and the constant re-negotiation of group 
boundaries at “Karim” speaks to a central, recurring theme of this dissertation – namely, 
that clinical settings in Israel are an epistemologically privileged site where the most 
intractable contradictions and tensions at the heart of Israeli society are put on display 
and reinscribed. In Mattingly’s terms (2014), everyday encounters between Jewish and 
Arab staff members of “Karim” function as “moral laboratories” wherein the meanings of 
difference and belonging are constantly co-constructed and (re-)negotiated.  
While flexible and occasionally subversive, this (re-)negotiation has its limits, 
however, and they have to do with the salience of the Arab/Jewish dichotomy in Israeli 
society. To put things somewhat provocatively, it appears that both Arab and Jewish 
clinicians at “Karim” can neither do away with this dichotomy altogether nor fully accept 
it, because they cannot agree on what the nature of this divide is and how it should be 
evaluated. Is it all a matter of malleable cultural differences that will eventually vanish, 
through a further modernization of the “Arab sector”? Or are these differences a lot more 
fundamental – so much so that the “Jewish”/Western psychology is not applicable to the 
Arab patients? The second alternative (invoked by Lina in the seminar) is especially 
troubling. On one level, it is troubling because it brings to mind the old calumny of 
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psychology as a “Jewish science” (the association picked up on by Yoram). But, more 
profoundly, it raises the question: If (European) Jews and Arabs are so incommensurably 
different, is the State of Israel, with its European genealogy, ultimately an alien presence 
in Palestine?  
To return to the theme of recognition that has been running through this 
dissertation, the various forms of clinical (and ethical) deliberation that I analyze in this 
chapter raise more questions about the meaning of recognition: Here, it unfolds not inside 
the patient-clinician dyad, but also between the members of the clinical team itself. 
Furthermore, clinical discussions about individual cases do not remain confined to the 
individual level, but rather branch out, implicitly or explicitly, to the political arena, 
invoking not only the debates that are unfolding in the Israeli public sphere about the 
place of the Arab citizens in Israel’s social fabric, but also the contestations over the 
meaning of the Jewish state. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I mainly explored how psy practitioners in Israeli mental 
health care settings grapple with the effects of cultural differences and political divisions 
on clinical practice in the era when “culture” itself is increasingly invoked in 
governmental rhetoric and policies. I argued that, although the Ministry of Health policies 
that aim to reduce health disparities and improve the cultural sensitivity/“competence” of 
health care practitioners and institutions may be modest in scope and limited in their 
effect on actual clinical practices, they are nevertheless emblematic of the momentous 
shifts that have been reshaping Israeli society since the late 1970s. Following a retreat 
from the assimilationist policies of the early decades, the dilution of the secular, 
Ashkenazi, Labor-Zionist political hegemony, and the deepening neoliberal 
transformation of Israeli economy, many Israelis are increasingly preoccupied with what 
they perceive as a loss of the country’s original vision of equality and unity or, 
alternatively, are concerned that the disparities and inequalities that have characterized 
Israeli society from the very beginning are not only persisting, but growing. In this 
context, the Ministry of Health measures may be understood as a reaction of a particular 
segment of Israeli political elite to these new realities and as an attempt to address the 
mounting public anxieties, while also working within the existing neoliberal and largely 
non-pluralist political-economic framework. The specific discourses of the cultural 
competence policies construe culture as a property of individual patients that individual 
clinicians and institutions should learn to accommodate, without attending to structural or 
political considerations. 
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I further showed that the actual implementation of the governmental agenda in the 
sphere of cultural competence training is surprising, occasionally ingenious, and almost 
never a mere passive reflection of the official discourses. Although at times they echo 
some of the essentializing and implicitly hierarchical rhetoric of the official policies, the 
training discourses also smuggle in quietly subversive approaches to cultural difference 
and recognition. The impact of this training on actual clinical practice is, unsurprisingly, 
very limited, and clinicians themselves rarely find the discourses of “cultural 
competence” resonant or relevant. At the same time, they are constantly engaged in 
complex moral reasoning and ethical decision-making that concerns not only the nature 
and limits of empathy and recognition in the face of cultural alterity and political 
difference, but also the positioning of psy fields and practitioners themselves vis-a-vis 
(what are imagined to be) dominant societal values and practices. To put it differently, 
while these clinicians may not be over(t)ly concerned with “culture” as a category, from 
an anthropological standpoint they inevitably do end up grappling with culture, be it the 
beliefs, behaviors, and social contexts of their patients or the processes unfolding in the 
society at large. 
In addition to contributing to our understanding of contemporary Israel, this 
dissertation also proposes several larger theoretical interventions. First, I call on 
anthropology to redefine its stance toward psy disciplines, both as an object of study and 
as a source of theory. Let me tackle these two interrelated, but nevertheless distinct 
concerns in order.  As I suggested elsewhere in this dissertation, the anthropological 
study of psy disciplines (and medicine more generally) has been undergoing a significant 
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re-evaluative shift in the last several decades. Early accounts, rooted in the critiques of 
psychiatry as a repressive force, subjected psy institutions and practitioners to an 
intensive scrutiny and detailed how they “desocialize and dehumanize distress, naturalize 
social and economic inequities, silence the voices of suffering and resistance and 
eliminate the possibility of agency” (Young 2008, 299).  
More recently, however, anthropologists began to pay more attention to the 
potential of clinical discourses and practices to generate new forms of subjectivity and 
sociality, as well as to take a more nuanced and sympathetic approach toward clinicians 
themselves, and their positionality, ethical predicaments, and self-fashioning. To put 
things somewhat provocatively, one could argue that anthropology of psy disciplines has 
already begun an “ethical turn” of sorts, but this has not been accompanied by a sustained 
engagement with the ongoing “ethical turn” in anthropology at large. In my view, the 
ground is already prepared for an anthropological study of psy disciplines that draws on 
the theoretical innovations and debates brought about by the anthropology of ethics and 
morality. In more precise terms, this would require systematically and comparatively 
tackling such questions as how psy practitioners navigate and contest the ethically 
ambiguous terrain of everyday clinical practice and how the decisions they make and the 
narratives they tell foster – and are fostered by – their individual and collective projects 
of ethical self-cultivation.  
My contention is not merely that anthropologists of psy disciplines have not made 
sufficiently wide a use of the conceptual vocabulary developed as part of the “ethical 
turn” – although that, indeed, would be a good thing to do, and I attempted to show what 
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such engagement could look like in this dissertation, especially in chapters 3 to 6. There 
is something much more essential that we can and should borrow from the anthropology 
of ethics and morality. A good model here is the work of James Laidlaw (2014), who 
provocatively argued that a deterministic social science that relies on the early Foucault’s 
totalizing conceptions of power/knowledge should be replaced by an “anthropology of 
freedom” that would draw, among other things, on later – and more sophisticated – 
Foucauldian notions of subjectivation and ethical self-making.  
Using Laidlaw’s distinction, it appears to me that the anthropology of psy 
disciplines (and medicine) has been caught between the critical and deterministic notions 
of the “clinical gaze” that can be traced back to the critiques of the 1960s and the more 
recent concerns with the generative potential of clinical discourses. This latter partially 
resulted from a conceptual “hangover” following the 1990s explosion of power-and-
resistance-centered theorizing in anthropology, including medical anthropology, and 
therefore predated the “ethical turn”, strictly speaking. Either way, however, there is not 
enough acknowledgment of or theoretical engagement with this tension. To be clear, I do 
not advocate for a complete shift away from the critical concerns of the earlier decades – 
indeed, a critical stance has informed my own scholarship to a considerable degree, 
although I ended up modifying my initial excessively simplistic position. Instead, I 
contend that anthropologists who study psy disciplines and medicine should reflect in a 
more deliberate and systematic fashion on how we can do justice to the moral complexity 
of psy fields and practitioners, while also fully appreciating and accounting for the psy 
disciplines’ (and medicine’s) embeddedness within the larger systems of power.  
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While a closer and more self-aware engagement between the anthropological 
study of psy disciplines and the anthropology of ethics and morality could take many 
forms, I will suggest just one potential track here. As I argued in the introduction, all too 
often scholars seem to assume too neat a correspondence between a neoliberal ideology 
(which in itself is an ambiguous and problematic category) and the forms of selfhood 
promoted by psy disciplines, sometimes going so far as collapse the two together. By 
contrast, an approach that is informed by the anthropology of ethics and morality would 
result in a more nuanced analysis of the linkages between psy disciplines and the 
sociopolitical processes unfolding in the larger society. Some questions to consider here 
are: How are psychological concepts and theories invoked and mobilized in the ethical 
claims made by various political movements and forces? Conversely, how do psy 
practitioners from different fields and schools locate themselves, as moral actors, in 
relation to various political projects?  
It is by tackling the sorts of questions that I raise in the previous paragraph that 
medical and psychological anthropology can also make a contribution to the 
interdisciplinary literature focused on recognition, pluralism, and tolerance. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the concept of “recognition” usually appears in two different kinds of 
scholarly conversations. Psy disciplines, and especially psychoanalysis, treat recognition 
as a fundamental human need, a desire for empathy, affirmation, respect, and reciprocity 
that resurfaces in all interpersonal encounters, from the earliest bonds with parents or 
caretakers to later relationships with friends, lovers, or therapists (Benjamin 1998; 
Orange 2010; Winnicott 1969). Conversely, political philosophers and social scientists 
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usually talk about recognition in the context of societal debates around pluralism and 
difference (Fraser 1997; Honneth 1996; Modood 1998; Taylor 1992). Both of these 
literatures share common philosophical roots, namely the ideas of Hegel and existentialist 
thinkers such as Martin Buber and Emanuel Levinas, and there have been some 
productive engagements across the two fields. Indeed, Charles Taylor (1992) explicitly 
acknowledged psychoanalytic feminist theories in his foundational essay, whereas Alex 
Honneth (1996) incorporates intersubjective psychoanalytic theories in his models. 
At the same time, these two strands of scholarship on recognition are by no means 
inherently compatible or seamlessly integratable. In fact, the psychological dimensions of 
Taylor’s and Honneth’s accounts have been scrutinized and criticized (Benhabib 2002; 
Fraser 1997). It is this slippery, ambiguous nature of “recognition” as a category 
(sometimes explored as an intersubjective process, at others as a political demand) raises 
a host of questions: Is the “recognition” that political and social theorists are talking 
about the same as, analogous to, or rooted in the human need for, the “recognition” and 
affirmative intersubjective experience discussed by psychoanalysts? What are the 
political implications of psychoanalytic theorizing, and what models of psychology and 
subjectivity – whether explicit or implicit – do the political theories presuppose and 
promote? After all, if “all anthropology is psychological” (Bock 1988, 1), this applies to 
political theory, as well, whether the role of psychological factors is explicitly 
acknowledged or diminished. A denial of “psychologism” is a psychological model in 
itself. 
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The connections and tensions between the two “modes” of studying recognition – 
psychological and political – have received some attention in scholarship (Benhabib 
2002; Jurist 2009; McNay 2008; Thompson 2006), but these analyses are surprisingly 
few in number, tend to take a philosophical form, and concentrate on the thought of 
specific authors (often Honneth in opposition to Fraser). In contrast, medical and 
psychological anthropology are almost uniquely well-positioned to bring these two 
strands of the conversation together in a way that is both theoretically rigorous and 
grounded in lived, historically and culturally situated experience. This dissertation, with 
its focus on the connections between the workings of recognition in the political arena 
and recognition as an intersubjective process in clinical encounters, is meant to illustrate 
one possible way of integrating the political and psychological meanings of recognition. 
My final, and perhaps more controversial, suggestion is for anthropology as a 
whole to reconsider its stance vis-à-vis psy disciplines as an interlocutor, rather than an 
object of study. It goes without saying that collaboration and exchange of ideas between 
anthropologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists has a long history – indeed, the entire 
enterprise of “culture and personality” could be described as an attempt to at a dialogue, 
and in some cases integration, between psychoanalytic and anthropological perspectives. 
It is not my intention to deny this legacy that continues to this day, as manifested in, most 
recently, a wave of renewed interest in psychoanalysis that seems to be sweeping over 
psychological anthropology (Borneman 2011; Gammeltoft and Buch Segal 2016; Hollan 
2000; Hollan 2016, Molino 2004; Throop 2012).  
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My purpose is to acknowledge and build on these precedents, as well as propose a 
different direction. Over the last three or four decades, whereas some psy practitioners 
are embracing increasingly biomedical perspectives, others, under the influence of social 
constructivism, feminism, post-modernism, and the “narrative turn”, have come to adopt 
the models of the self that are profoundly relational and modes of clinical practice that 
are deeply self-reflective and social-constructivist. Indeed, I would argue that some of the 
lines between clinical and anthropological perspectives are becoming blurred.  
Furthermore (as my fieldwork at “Karim” drove home for me), the implicit 
understandings that clinicians employ in their everyday practice are not necessarily fully 
captured by the explicit, verbalized theoretical models that are studied in clinical training 
– instead, they are a lot more contextual, inventive, and creative. In light of this, I am left 
wondering: can anthropology engage more widely and self-consciously with some of this 
emerging socially attuned thinking in psy disciplines, and especially with the contextually 
specific understandings of the self and intimate relationships that are embedded in the 
everyday clinical practices, although not always articulated as abstract theoretical 
models? This engagement could enrich not only psychological anthropology, but the 
discipline as a whole which, as the interest in the “ethical turn” is demonstrating, is 
increasingly drawn toward elucidating and debating approaches to human subjectivity.
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